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This doctoral thesis emphasizes the significance of informational condi-
tions in studying economic decisions. The first chapter concerns access to
accurate probabilistic information in the domain of medical interventions.
We estimate that, in many developed countries, there appears to be demand
for governments to grant citizens free access to impartial reviews of medical
evidence, as provided in Cochrane Reviews. For these countries, we estimate
that this demand can be met at low costs. The second chapter concerns
the communication of such information and examines the facilitating effect
of natural frequencies on the derivation of posterior probabilities, as de-
lineated by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). In a meta-analysis, we clarify
concepts and disentangle the effects of 15 study characteristics. We find that
in the simplest study design, 4 percent correct solutions when presented
with conditional probabilities and 24 percent when presented with natural
frequencies. The final two chapters examine the satisficing class of strategies
for uncertain decision environments in which agents lack a full probabilistic
description of the decision problem. According to Simon (1955), satisficing
strategies use aspiration levels to terminate search for suitable alternatives.
The third chapter describes how in economics, satisficing is modeled as
a preference structure or as a decision rule that yields choices inferior to
utility maximization, whereas in cognitive science, satisficing strategies use
aspiration levels to solve inference problems. We explain the divergence,
noting that they refer to risky and uncertain environments, respectively.
The final chapter examines satisficing in an applied setting, studying taxi
drivers’ shift termination behavior. We find that drivers’ hourly earnings are
very uncertain and drivers’ behavior is best predicted by simple satisficing





Diese Dissertation unterstreicht die Rolle von Informationen bei der
Erforschung ökonomischer Entscheidungen. Das erste Kapitel beschäftigt
sich mit dem Zugang zu akkuraten Informationen über die Wirksamkeit
medizinischer Interventionen. Unserem Model zufolge besteht in vielen en-
twickelten Ländern Nachfrage für Zugang zu unabhängigen medizinischen
Informationen wie Cochrane Reviews. Wir schätzen, dass für viele Länder
diese Nachfrage zu moderaten oder geringen Kosten erfüllt werden kann.
Das zweite Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit der Kommunikation solcher Informa-
tionen und untersucht den unterstützenden Effekt natürlicher Häufigkeiten
bei der Berechnung von A-posteriori Wahrscheinlichkeiten (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995). Durch eine Meta-Analyse erklären wir Konzepte und ent-
flechten die Effekte von 15 Studienmerkmalen. Im einfachsten Studiendesign
führen natürliche Häufigkeiten zu 24 Prozent korrekten Antworten ver-
glichen mit 4 Prozent bei konditionellen Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Die finalen
beiden Kapitel analysieren Satisficing-Strategien für unsichere Entschei-
dungsumgebungen in denen Agenten eine vollumfassende, probabilistische
Beschreibung des Entscheidungsproblems fehlt. Simon (1955) zufolge nutzen
Satisficing-Strategien ein Anspruchsniveau um die Suche nach weiteren
Entscheidungsalternativen zu beenden. Das dritte Kapitel beschreibt wie
solche Strategien in der ökonomischen Literatur als Präferenz modelliert wer-
den um Entscheidungen zu erklären die der Nutzenmaximierung unterlegen
sind während die Kognitionswissenschaften diese Strategien als Lösungen
für Inferenzprobleme betrachten. Wir erklären die Divergenz mit unter-
schiedlichen Annahmen über die vorliegenden Informationen der Agenten.
Das letzte Kapitel untersucht Satisficing-Strategien unter Taxifahrern. Wir
stellen fest, dass die Stundenlöhne von Taxifahrern kaum vorhersagbar sind
und ihre Entscheidungen Schichten zu beenden am besten durch einfache




This text is an appreciation of information. As a doctoral thesis, it
concludes more than twenty years of formal education. The privilege
of having such access to information cannot be overstated. The
title of this thesis is an acknowledgement of this privilege while
also synthesizing the four independent chapters of this text. Jointly,
these chapters emphasize the significance of information in studying
economic decisions.
Information has been studied broadly in economics and touches
on many of the discipline’s fundamental topics. For example, de-
cisions under risk are fundamentally characterized by the absence
of information. Instead of knowing future states of the world with
certainty, agents know their probabilities under each available path
of action. For this reason, theories of risky choice, including expected
utility theory (Bernoulli, 1738/1954), can plausibly be called theories
of imperfect information. Later, Frank Knight (1921) introduced un-
certainty as a distinct, more severe category of information shortage.
In contrast to risk, uncertainty refers to agents lacking a complete
description of the probabilistic structure of the environment. For
example, Herbert Simon (1955, 1956) modeled agents searching for
suitable paths of action with limited knowledge of possible alterna-
tives, let alone their consequences. In the second half the twentieth
century, the effects of imperfect information were studied in more
diverse settings. In individual choice, George Stigler (1961) picked up
Simon’s focus on search and modeled a situation in which a consumer
is aware of the distribution of prices for cars but needs to find the
seller offering the best car price. In macroeconomics, George Akerlof
(1970) famously pointed out that used cars are usually “lemons”, as
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information of the quality of the car is private to sellers. Consequently,
consumers are ultimately unwilling to pay more than the price of
a low-quality car, driving high-quality cars out of the market. In
labor economics, Michael Spence (1973) described how employers
lack information on prospective employees’ skills. Employees can
therefore use education as a costly signal of their skills. Finally, in a
similar case of asymmetric information, Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew
Weiss (1987) describe a “screening” process to overcome the problem
of sellers who are unaware of customers’ willingness to pay. By this
process, firms set prices and conditions in such a way so as to induce
customers to reveal their true willingness to pay. This brief summary
of the work by some of the twentieth century Nobel laureates does
not do justice to the range of informational conditions addressed by
contemporary economic theory. Nonetheless, its diversity serves to
demonstrate that the topic of information has moved out of the “slum
dwelling in the town of economics” Stigler had seen it occupying in
1961.
At the same time, building on this analogy, information does not
yet reside on the hillside where every suburb of the discipline can see
it. In an attempt to broaden the consideration of information within
economics, the focus of this text is on the quality of information, in
contrast to most existing work that has focused more dichotomously
on the presence of specific pieces of information. To be effective,
information must not only be available but also useful. This aspect
is often overlooked in existing research, particularly in much of
behavioral economics. I argue that the quality of information affects
behavior in different ways, which I address within the four chapters of
this text. These chapters are organized around Knight’s two categories
of information shortage, with the first two chapters concerning
decisions under risk and the final two concerning decisions under
uncertainty.
Risky environments lack information about future states of the
world but offer agents a full probabilistic description of the decision
problem. The textbook example is a game of chance, such as a coin
that is tossed or a dice that is thrown. In such simple cases, agents are
informed that the probability of a specific event is one in two or one
in six and agents can integrate this information with their valuation
of possible outcomes to reach a decision. More applied problems
include the probability of rain or the probability of a specific side
effect of some medication. In these problems, all relevant probabilities
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are reported1. However, many applied problems are more complex.
Consider, for example, a screening test to detect a disease. Often,
screening tests use a marker to detect a disease before a patient
becomes symptomatic. Screening tests are not without error and both
a negative and a positive test result can be incorrect, referred to as
a miss and a false-alarm, respectively. Consider an agent who has
taken such a screening test. To interpret the result, the agent needs to
derive the relevant posterior probability of having the disease from
the test’s specifications. Accordingly, the agent consults information
on the test’s miss and false-alarm rates. To be useful, this information
needs to fulfill at least two conditions, addressed in chapters one and
two.
First, information about the test’s miss and false-alarm rates needs
to be accurate and accessible. Particularly in the medical domain,
probabilities of side effects or test outcomes are estimated from
randomized controlled trials and often change as new data become
available. In addition, the structures of many markets for health
services and products do not incentivize providers to inform patients
neutrally and based on evidence. Therefore, consumers often find
themselves faced with selective and distorted information. To address
both of these problems, the Cochrane Collaboration publishes and
updates meta-analyses and lay summaries of the effects of several
thousand health interventions. These are written by some 30,000
medical scholars and epidemiologists to inform doctors and patients
alike. Downloads of Cochrane Reviews are costly at about $38 per
review, unless they are accessed from a country with a national
subscription to the Cochrane Library. To date, few countries have
subscribed to the Cochrane Library, possibly owing to uncertainty
about whether it would be used.
The first chapter estimates demand for Cochrane Reviews as if
they were free in countries that have not already subscribed nationally.
To this end, we aggregate web-traffic data from Cochrane websites to
obtain the number of downloads per country. We use conventional
OLS regression to disentangle the effect of a national subscription
from that of alternative factors, including those related to language
and development. Using these estimates, we calculate for all mem-
bers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
1Note, however, the long and ongoing debate about the application of relative
frequencies to single events (compare e.g., Savage, 1954; von Mises, 1957)
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(OECD) the expected number of review downloads if they were to
offer a national subscription. We find that, for the vast majority of
member states, the number of review downloads would increase
under a national subscription, and for some they would more than
double. Next, we calculate estimates of the effective price per addi-
tional download. Using these estimates, we identify three groups
of countries: (1) About half a dozen countries for which a national
subscription is unlikely to be worthwhile, (2) the majority of countries
for whom additional downloads would cost less than $2 each, and (3)
three countries that would save money under a national subscription.
Thus, for many countries a national subscription appears to offer
a promising means to disseminate medical evidence and empower
agents to base their decisions on the best information available.
Second, information about the test’s specifications needs to be
intuitively understandable. Interpreting a test result from the test’s
miss and false-alarm rates can be difficult, even for those familiar
with Bayes’ theorem, including economists (Berg, Biele, & Gigeren-
zer, 2016). Apart from the miss rate, 𝑝(negative result|disease) and
false-alarm rate 𝑝(positive result|no disease), the disease’s base rate
𝑝(disease) is required to obtain the predictive value of the positive or
negative result 𝑝(disease|result) using Bayes’ equation. Gerd Gigeren-
zer and Ulrich Hoffrage (1995) reported that only 16 percent of their
participants were able to solve a problem when given information
in conditional probabilities. The authors hypothesized that if test
specifications were reported as natural frequencies, more agents would
be able to correctly derive the relevant posterior probability. Natural
frequencies report frequencies analogously to their natural occur-
rence. In the case of a screening test, the miss rate could be reported
as “𝑥 in 𝑦 people with the disease receive a negative test result”. If
𝑥 and 𝑦 are chosen such that 𝑦 is the number of people out of 100
who have the disease, this format maintains the base rate and aides
the decision. Indeed, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) reported that
under this format, 46 percent of their participants were able to solve
the problem correctly, a finding referred to as the natural frequency
facilitation effect.
The second chapter comprises a meta-analysis of the natural
frequency facilitation effect. To account for the effect, various ex-
planations and experimental designs were put forth, resulting in a
fragmented body of evidence. For example, some studies used stricter
criteria than others in scoring correct solutions, and some studied lay
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persons whereas others studied participants with above-average sta-
tistical literacy. In addition, some authors mistook natural frequencies
to mean any frequency representation. This chapter reviews this liter-
ature, clarifies concepts, and analyzes 226 estimates of performance
under conditional probability and the natural frequency formats. In
addition, we characterized each study along 15 dimensions pertain-
ing to methodology, participants, and experimental setup. We then
use a meta-analytic model to disentangle the effects of the various
moderators on performance. We find that, in its simplest form we
would, on average, expect 24 percent of those presented with natural
frequencies and 4 percent of those presented with conditional proba-
bilities to solve such problems correctly. This implies an odds ratio of
7.10, which is a sizable effect. Further, methodological choices such
as showing participants multiple problems of the same format or of
different formats are estimated to affect the performance under both
formats. The strongest moderator, overall and conceptually, was the
presentation of a visual aid, which increased performance under both
formats by 22 and 23 percentage points, on average. Both the confir-
mation of the natural-frequency facilitation effect and the additional
effect of the visual aid illustrate how probabilistic choice requires
comprehensible information and how adequate communication can
assist such decisions.
To summarize, the first two chapters maintain that good choices
are not only a function of the decision strategy but also of the
decision environment. By this account, risky choice often requires
probabilistic information to be accurate and available in a form
that allows agents to intuitively extract the relevant pieces. These
conclusions, although fairly straightforward, are difficult to draw
from conventional economic theory. Expected utility theory explains
differences in choices by differences in preferences, assuming that
agents are capable of obtaining the necessary information without loss
of accuracy. Much of the work in behavioral economics has challenged
this assumption, demonstrating that human judgements are not
necessarily flawless (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). However, this
literature concludes that flaws are rooted in the human mind. The
view advocated in these two chapters is that such conclusions may or
may not be warranted, but studies of this issue need to go beyond
probability trick questions and consider the environmental factors
that shape the performance of the mind.
Next, we turn our attention to uncertain decision environments.
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In contrast to risky environments, uncertain decision environments
do not supply agents with the information necessary for an exhaustive
probabilistic description of the decision problem. Under such circum-
stances, agents need to use the available information as best as they
can to reach a decision. Unfortunately, similar to the arguments made
in the previous two chapters, the best use of the available information
depends on its quality. Consider, for example, a situation where the
agent is aware of all possible alternatives and their consequences but
unaware of the probabilities of these consequences. With sufficient
information available, the agent can estimate the probabilities and
treat the uncertainty as risk. In contrast, suppose there exists a
subset of consequences that the agent is unaware of. In this situation,
viewing the decision problem as a risky choice task and applying
some form of optimization on the known portion of the environment
is not guaranteed to be the most profitable decision strategy. Instead,
it is possible that alternative decision strategies that ignore part of
the information, heuristics, yield better decisions. In his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech, Herbert Simon (1979, p.489) succinctly pointed out
that uncertain agents can decide “either by finding optimal solutions
for a simplified world, or by finding satisfactory solutions for a more
realistic world. Neither approach, in general, dominates the other
[...].”
The third chapter elaborates on one particular class of strategies for
“finding satisfactory solutions for a more realistic world”. Simon (1955)
described a satisficing strategy that uses aspiration levels to find a
suitable alternative. In this model, agents search for alternatives until
one meets all aspiration levels formulated by the agent. Aspiration
levels are defined directly on the relevant decision attributes rather
than a composite, such as a utility function. Consider, for example, an
agent looking for a new car. One possible satisficing strategy would
be to formulate aspiration levels on trunk size, fuel consumption, and
annual costs, and then examine cars one by one until one meets all
three aspiration levels. Despite its simplicity, two different literatures
have evolved around the concept of satisficing.
On the one hand, the cognitive science literature studies strategies
for inference problems. In this type of problem, the agent tries
to predict an objective criterion from available information. For
example, an agent may guess which of two cars has higher fuel
consumption based on information about horse power and weight.
In this literature, satisficing strategies use an aspiration level to make
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inferences. One possible strategy uses an aspiration level to determine
which information about the two cars to consider: If the difference in
weight exceeds some aspiration level, the heavier car is predicted to
have higher fuel consumption, but if the weight is sufficiently similar,
the more powerful car is predicted to consume more fuel (Luan,
Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2014). Analysts can compare the decision
of this strategy to the true level of fuel consumption. Therefore,
empirical studies of satisficing strategies in this literature examine
two questions — the descriptive question of how agents behave and
the prescriptive question of which strategy yields the best decision
for a particular problem.
On the other hand, the economics literature studies strategies
for preference problems. In these problems, agents are confronted
with choices between certain or risky alternatives. For example, an
agent may decide between two cars, one small but fast and the other
large but comparatively slow. In these settings, decisions cannot
be right or wrong, as the correct choice depends on the agent’s
preferences. Therefore, empirical studies of such problems examine
only the descriptive question of how agents behave. Variation in
behavior between agents is modeled as differences in the preferences
of these agents. This literature interprets satisficing as a particular
preference structure that is often contrasted with expected utility
theory. For example, an agent may be modeled by a utility function
defined over the speed and size of a car. A satisficing model can
then be distinguished from the neoclassical model by a kink of the
utility function, such that marginal utilities (and marginal rates of
substitution) change discontinuously at specific points along the
utility function. Rational choice in these problems is defined by
consistency criteria and attributed to expected utility theory. In
contrast, deviations from this ideal, including satisficing, are viewed
as inferior.
Depending on the stream of literature, the concept of satisficing
refers to different classes of models, methodologies and conclusions
about the rationality of satisficing. We review both these literatures
and explain how their seemingly opposing approaches and conclu-
sions follow from their assumed degrees of information shortage:
Whereas the economics literature focuses on risky conditions, the
cognitive science literature is concerned with uncertain environments.
We clarify this distinction and describe the informational conditions
under which satisficing can be rational.
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The final chapter of this thesis combines elements from both
streams of the literature and studies preferences under uncertainty.
It adds to the existing literature on the wage elasticity of taxi drivers,
which was initially found to be negative and taken as evidence of the
income-target hypothesis (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, & Thaler,
1997). According to this model, drivers set daily income targets
and terminate their shifts as soon as they reach their target. The
resulting negative correlation between a shift’s length and average
hourly wage contradicts the intuition that higher wages should be
associated with longer labor supply. Following the approach for
risky choice, the existing literature has interpreted this finding in
terms of differences in agents’ preferences, focusing on comparisons
of theories of expected and reference-dependent utility. However,
this approach confuses choices under risk and uncertainty.
The chapter presents two analyses. The first examines taxi drivers’
decision environment using the Hamburg taxi data, which we ac-
quired for this study. To understand the degree of uncertainty drivers
face, we used a range of statistical models to predict drivers’ hourly
earnings from observables and assessed the quality of these pre-
dictions. We find that taxi drivers face severe uncertainty, with
root-mean squared errors of the best predicting model only slightly
lower than the standard deviation of hourly earnings. Under these
circumstances, using a strategy that requires accurate expected values
cannot be expected to yield good decisions. In the second analysis,
we predict drivers’ shift ends using behavioral models. In contrast
to earlier studies, we compare both utility models and satisficing
heuristics. These heuristics set an aspiration level on shift income,
shift duration, clock hour, or the hiatus between trips and terminates
the shift as soon as that aspiration level is satisfied. We interpret the
choice of the aspiration variable as an expression of which goal the
driver ranks highest. In contrast, we understand the aspiration level
as the threshold that offers the driver an acceptable balance of time
and income. We find that the majority of drivers are best predicted
by one of these heuristic models, whereas both utility models predict
only a fraction of drivers best.
Parenthetically, the four chapters of this thesis stand in the tradi-
tion of Herbert Simon’s aspirations for behavioral economics. These
aspirations are often described as an empirical test of the assumptions
underlying various forms of utility theory. Alternatively, I have
tried to make the point that Simon’s research agenda can be viewed
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as an invitation to analysts to step into the agent’s shoes and take
seriously their informational conditions. Such a step would offer
economics several opportunities, two of which are emphasized in
this text. First, there exist many situations beyond lotteries and other
games that closely resemble risky choice and present agents with
a probabilistic description of their decision environment. Focusing
empirical scrutiny on this environment can offer insights that are
relevant for improving decisions. After all, any decision can only
be as good as the environment affords. Second, there remain many
uncertain situations where agents have only partial knowledge of
the decision problem. Engaging with these situations, rather than
failing to distinguish them from risky ones, offers the opportunity to
expand the rich theory of preferences to uncertainty. However, doing
so requires additions to the methodological toolbox. Chapters three
and four describe how some tools can be borrowed from cognitive
science, however, to address preferences under uncertainty more
generally, more innovation may be needed. In a letter to John Conlisk
in response to his 1996 article on bounded rationality, Simon (1996)
remarked that methods are slow to change and also require changes
in graduate teaching, but can improve in the long run. He concluded
noting that “Keynes had something to say about the long run, and
I would very much like still to be alive when this all happens on a
major scale. I’m counting on you of the next generation to bring it




What Would be Demand for Cochrane
Reviews if Access Was Free?
This chapter is forthcoming as: Jacobs, P. & Gigerenzer, G. (2020), Using
Variation Between Countries to Estimate Demand for Cochrane Reviews
When Access Is Free: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. British Medical Journal
open, doi: 10.1136/ bmjopen-2019-033310.
Medical research accounts for a substantial proportion of research and
development (R&D) expenditures. In the United States (U.S.), total
spending on medical and health R&D increased between 2013 and
2016 to $172 billion, led by industry with 67 percent and the federal
government with 22 percent (Research America, 2017). Worldwide,
biomedical publications are increasing year by year: for instance,
about one million articles are added to this literature annually (Khare,
Leaman, & Lu, 2014). Faced with this large volume of articles, no
healthcare worker is able to stay fully informed about recent research.
The problem of quantity is amplified by one of quality; many of the
clinical trials published are unreliable or of uncertain reliability, and
most healthcare professionals, including physicians and nurses, do
not have the time and/or training to evaluate the quality of a research
article (Ioannidis, Stuart, Brownlee, & Strite, 2017). Additionally,
direct-to-consumer ads, websites, and television shows compete for
the attention of healthcare professionals and patients, disseminating
a mix of evidence and unwarranted claims based on commercial
interests or personal opinion (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). In
the U.S., an estimated 20 to 50 percent of health care service use
is inappropriate, wasteful, or harmful for patients (Ioannidis et al.,
2017).
To address these issues, over 10,000 medical researchers have built
an international network, named Cochrane after the British epidemiol-
ogist Archie Cochrane, to assist healthcare professionals and patients
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in making well-informed decisions about healthcare interventions.
This network produces systematic reviews of the available evidence
on the benefits and harms of medical interventions and tests, such as
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccination, check-ups, prostate cancer
screening, and statins. Since 1992, these Cochrane Reviews have
been written by some 30,000 medical researchers and are generally
recognized as the gold standard of medical evidence (Schünemann
et al., 2008; Useem et al., 2015). The reviews are intended to be regu-
larly updated as new findings become available. Cochrane Reviews
provide three important services for healthcare professionals (Jeffer-
son, Demicheli, Rivetti, & Deeks, 1999). First, they offer an overall
assessment of the available evidence by evaluating individual studies
according to the quality of their evidence and statistically integrating
their results, which often vary due to their small sample sizes. Second,
in contrast to a self-survey of the literature, systematic reviews allow
professionals to absorb the relevant information about the benefits
and harms of specific treatments under the typical conditions of time
pressure. Finally, Cochrane Reviews offer plain-language summaries
and summary-of-findings tables that highlight key findings and can
be easily understood by persons without statistical training, which
makes them suitable for both professionals and lay people alike. For
these reasons, many professionals consult the Cochrane Reviews
regarding interventions. Yet here is where the problem arises.
Whereas plain-language summaries are openly available online,
access to the full-text reviews is often restricted, despite their contain-
ing large amounts of relevant information for patients and healthcare
professionals. Institutions in many low and middle income countries
are granted free or inexpensive access through the World Health
Organization’s Hinari Access to Research for Health Programme (see
also www.who.org/hinari), but healthcare professionals or patients
outside of an institutional context are excluded. Most countries in
North America and Europe (including the U.S. and Germany), by
contrast, are not eligible and fall into one of two groups: those with
and those without a national subscription. The latter group far ex-
ceeds the former, with only eight countries subscribing nationally in
2014, six of which are members of the OECD1. Specifically, Australia,
1The 34 OECD member states are Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium
(BEL), Canada (CAN), The Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST),
Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland
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Denmark, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, and Great Britain offered
free access nationwide, as did Egypt and India, which are not OECD
member states. In addition, one U.S. state, Wyoming, and three Cana-
dian provinces, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan,
had statewide subscriptions in 2014. Given their small shares of the
country’s total population, we treated the U.S. and Canada as having
no subscription. Whereas a national subscription grants all domestic
internet users free access to Cochrane Reviews, users in countries
without a national subscription need to pay for access2.
This article examines the expected demand for full-text reviews
and plain-language summaries under free access for countries that
have no national subscription. Absent institutional access, many
healthcare professionals and patients may be unwilling or unable
to purchase alternative access but would use reviews if access was
free. Governments in countries without a national subscription,
however, may be reluctant to subscribe nationally without knowing
the expected benefit of such a policy.
In this article, we define the benefit of a national subscription as
the increase in the downloads of Cochrane Reviews. This benefit
depends on the elasticity of demand, that is, users’ responsiveness to
changes in the price of review downloads. National subscriptions
reduce the marginal cost a user incurs for download of a review
to zero. Using the standard model of supply and demand, we
would expect review downloads to increase as more users can afford
to download. When access is restricted, these potential users are
either unable or unwilling to pay for review downloads and resort
to summaries, which provide less detailed information, or other —
potentially misleading — sources of information. Free access would
attract downloads from both these users and those who learned about
the service through its growing popularity.
(ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Republic of Korea (KOR),
Luxembourg (LUX), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NDL), New Zealand (NZL), Norway
(NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (POR), Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain
(ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR), and
United States (USA).
2Individual users can read reviews at $6 each, download reviews at $38 each, or
obtain a personal subscription at $365 annually. In addition, academic and corporate
institutions with fewer than 1,001 employees can obtain licenses at annual prices of
$2,582 and $3,812, respectively. All prices are given in U.S. dollars and retrieved from
www.cochranelibrary.com/help/how-to-order and links therein on April 5, 2020.
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An increase in review downloads can be expected to have a con-
verse effect on its (imperfect) substitutes. On the one hand, this would
be desirable if increased reviews manifested in reduced use of mis-
leading sources of information. For example, misleading information,
such as exaggerating benefits and downplaying harms of drugs or
cancer screening, is the norm on (commercial) websites and in patient
brochures (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007; Yeung & Mortensen, 2012).
On the other hand, an increase in review downloads may also sub-
tract from plain-language summary views; ignoring this substitution
effect would overestimate the effect of a national subscription. We
expect this effect to be limited because some users may prefer or need
the detail of the reviews whereas others may prefer the conciseness
and availability of plain-language summaries, particularly when
summaries are translated into their native language. Translations
from English into other national languages primarily address a lay
audience (or healthcare professionals who do not understand statis-
tics) with little or no command of English. We therefore expect that
translating additional plain-language summaries can counteract the
drop in summary views under free access, as they attract additional
users who were previously unable to use the service.
To test these hypotheses, the goal of this article is to estimate the
impact of national subscriptions on the number of downloads and
views of (translated or untranslated) online summaries for individual
OECD countries.
1.1 Method
The data used for the analysis were drawn from both Cochrane and
publicly available databases. We obtained from Cochrane data of
web traffic data on their websites in 2014, including the Cochrane
Library hosted by Wiley and third-party sites such as EBSCO and
OVID. From these data, we derived our two variables of interest
for this study: the number of review downloads and the number
of summary views, stratified by country. Each of these variables
captures one way in which Cochrane reviews can be used. Full-text
reviews are likely, but not exclusively, downloaded by healthcare
professionals who understand technical details. Naturally, these
professionals often function as multipliers who pass on information





variable measure type source
free open access in 2014 binary Cochrane
HINARI access possibility through HINARI binary Cochrane
OECD OECD member state binary OECD
english majority or official language is En-
glish
binary CIA
subscriptions number of subscriptions (absent
national subscription)
intervals Cochrane
translations number of summaries in majority
language (in 100)
continuous Cochrane
GDP gross domestic product per capita
in 2016 US Dollars
continuous World Bank
population total population size continuous World Bank
life average life expectancy continuous World Bank
research number of scientific articles pub-
lished in all fields
continuous World Bank
internet percentage of population with in-
ternet access
continuous World Bank
physicians number of physicians per 1000 per-
sons
continuous World Bank
downloads number of full-text downloads in
2014
continuous Cochrane
views number of summary views in 2014 continuous Cochrane
likely to consult plain-language or other summaries available on
different Cochrane websites. These summaries are intended for a lay
audience and are sometimes translated for this purpose. Jointly, the
number of downloads and summary views give a comprehensive
picture of how Cochrane Reviews are accessed.
Our analysis exploited the variation in the use of Cochrane Re-
views across a range of countries to estimate the effect of different
subscription schemes. Specifically, we compared the groups of coun-
tries with and without free access on their number of downloads
and used the difference to calculate the expected effect of a national
subscription on countries without one. Taking into consideration that
each country’s use of Cochrane Reviews is not exclusively affected
by their subscription scheme, we collected data on additional deter-
minants of review downloads and summary views. For example,
we expected that more populous countries download, all else being
equal, more reviews than less populous countries. Our analysis
hence needed to isolate the effect of subscription type from that of
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population size and other country characteristics.
Table 1.1 lists all variables considered in the analysis. The number
of review downloads, number of summary views, and subscription
status refer to 2014, whereas supplementary data (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2020; World Bank, 2020) are as recent as 2016 but may go
back as far as 2008, especially in less-developed countries. One
variable, subscriptions, was available only as intervals of the form
0–50, 50–100, etc. For the analysis, we used the center of each
interval as an estimate of each country’s number of subscriptions. For
some countries, the available data were incomplete. Excluding these
countries, we obtained a total set of 158 countries for the analysis.
Binary variables are coded as zero and one for no and yes, respectively.
We used two linear models to isolate the effects of a national
subscription on review downloads and summary views, respectively.
The first model, DOWN, decomposes the number of downloads into
the effects of the different country characteristics listed in Table 1.1.
Formally, the number of review downloads of country 𝑖 is given by
𝑙𝑛[downloads𝑖] = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛[GDP𝑖] + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛[population𝑖]
+ 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛[research𝑖] + 𝛼4 𝑙𝑛[internet𝑖]
+ 𝛼5 𝑙𝑛[life𝑖] + 𝛼6 𝑙𝑛[physicians𝑖]
+ 𝛼7 𝑙𝑛[subscriptions𝑖] + 𝛼9 HINARI𝑖
+ 𝛼10 OECD𝑖 + 𝛼11 english𝑖
+ 𝛼12 free𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 ,
where 𝛼0 denotes the intercept, 𝛼 𝑗 denotes the partial effect of variable
𝑗, and 𝜖𝑖 denotes an error term that is assumed to be independently,
identically, and normally distributed. The purpose of the analysis
was to estimate the parameters 𝛼0 to 𝛼12 chief among them was 𝛼12,
the effect of a national subscription.
In addition to estimating the model shown here, we also estimated
an augmented model that includes interaction effects of free with
english and population. Likewise, we estimated three different
nonlinear models that predict downloads by combining a set of re-
gression trees such as random forests (Breiman, 2001a). Because many
variables were not normally distributed but included considerable
outliers, all five models were tested with and without logarithmic
transformation of all continuous variables, yielding a total set of 10
models that were tested. These models were compared on the qual-
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ity of their out-of-sample predictions using 17-fold cross-validation,
where the test set was restricted to the 34 OECD member states. The
model presented above, with logarithmic transformation, produced
a root-mean squared error (RMSE) of 182,662 downloads, whereas
the closest competitor exhibited an RSME of 187,298 downloads. A
sensitivity check using the model with the next lowest out-of-sample
error yielded comparable results. Further, a visual check of the model
assumptions revealed no irregularities.
The second model, VIEW, decomposed summary views into the
effects of the different country characteristics listed in Table 1.1. Unlike
reviews, summaries are sometimes translated into other national
languages, but the number of translated summaries varies across
countries. To separate the effect of language from that of national
subscriptions, we used the same linear model as before to estimate
the number of summary views based on country characteristics but
replaced the binary variableenglishwithtranslations, which gives
the number of plain-language summaries available in the national
language. Formally, summary views are then described as follows:
𝑙𝑛[views𝑖] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛[GDP𝑖] + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛[population𝑖]
+ 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛[research𝑖] + 𝛽4 𝑙𝑛[internet𝑖]
+ 𝛽5 𝑙𝑛[life𝑖] + 𝛽6 𝑙𝑛[physicians𝑖]
+ 𝛽7 𝑙𝑛[subscriptions𝑖] + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑛[translations𝑖]
+ 𝛽9 HINARI𝑖 + 𝛽10 OECD𝑖
+ 𝛽12 free𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 ,
where 𝛽0 denotes the intercept, 𝛽 𝑗 denotes the partial effect of variable
𝑗, and 𝜖𝑖 denotes an error term that is assumed to be independently,
identically, and normally distributed. Again, the purpose of the
analysis was to estimate the parameters 𝛽1 to 𝛽12, with particular
interest in variables 𝛽8 and 𝛽12.
As before, we chose this model from a set of 10, including six
random-forest and four linear models. Two of the linear models
slightly outperformed the selected model in 17-fold cross-validation,
with test sets restricted to OECD countries. These models used
non-logarithmic versions of the variables included and yielded root
mean squared errors around 301,000 views whereas the chosen
model yielded an error around 317,000 views. Nonetheless, we
chose the selected model because the logarithmic versions seemed
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more adequate, particularly because the model led to slightly better
estimates for the majority of countries, although predictions for a
few countries were less precise. A sensitivity check showed that this
choice was conservative in the sense that the combined effects of
free and translations, which are most relevant to our argument,
are somewhat smaller in the model chosen than in the model with
the lowest out-of-sample error.
1.2 Results
In this section, we compare countries with and without a national
subscription on their review downloads and summary views. We
present the results of our two statistical models and use these models
to calculate the expected number of reviews for all OECD countries.
Finally, we provide rough estimates of the monetary costs of a national
subscription.
1.2.1 Review Downloads
The black and gray circles in Figure 1.1 show the total number of
review downloads in 2014 for all OECD member states. The position
of each circle on the x-axis indicates the number of downloads per
1,000 persons and the size of the circle indicates the total number
of downloads. Among countries without free access, shown by the
black circles, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland had the
highest and Mexico, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic the lowest
number of downloads per capita. Although there was a tendency
for more prosperous countries to have more downloads per capita,
exceptions can be found. Most notably, there were seven downloads
per 1,000 persons in Chile, but only 0.25 per 1,000 in Japan. On
average, countries without a national subscription downloaded 2.33
reviews per 1,000 persons.
The Netherlands had 10 downloads per 1,000 persons, making
it the country with by far the highest download rate among those
without free access. For countries with a national subscription, the
gray circles show downloads per capita. Each of these countries had
more downloads per capita than the Netherlands, on average 19.20
reviews per 1,000 persons. Download rates were particularly high
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Figure 1.1: Observed and expected annual review downloads per 1,000 persons
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To illustrate the effect of a national subscription, it can be in-
structive to compare countries that differ in their subscription status
but are similar in many other respects. For example, Denmark and
Norway, with free access, had roughly twice as many downloads as
Finland, which was without free access. Likewise, United Kingdom,
with free access, had roughly the same total as the U.S., without free
access, despite its population being only a fifth of the latter’s.
Although these comparisons provide a first indication that more
reviews were downloaded when access was free, the DOWN model
offers a more rigorous estimation of the effect of a national subscrip-
tion when it is isolated from other factors. Comparing the standard
deviation of ln(downloads) with the prediction error for OECD coun-
tries indicates that the model yielded fairly accurate predictions.
However, a visual inspection of the predictions per country (not
shown) revealed that the models underestimated downloads for
Chile and the Netherlands, whose downloads appeared to be driven
by idiosyncratic factors omitted here. At the same time, the countries
that were best predicted appear to be those with free access.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.2 present the estimates of 𝛼1 to
𝛼12, which indicate the approximate percentage increase in review
downloads associated with a one-percent increase in the variable of
interest3.. For example, a gross domestic product (GDP) increase of
one percent is associated with a rise in review downloads of half
a percent on average. As expected, most variables are positively
associated with review downloads. The only exceptions are OECD
membership, which appears to have no discernible effect beyond the
effect of GDP, and the number of physicians. Increasing the number
of physicians by 10 percent is estimated to reduce downloads by
about three percent on average. This negative effect may appear sur-
prising. One possible explanation is that an increase in the number of
physicians per capita implies fiercer competition among them, given
that the number of patients is fixed. Such increased competition may
incentivize physicians to favor profitable over effective treatments,
lowering demand for medical evidence (Mulley & Wennberg, 2011).
A second possible explanation is that countries with more physicians
3Coefficients of this type are often referred to as elasticities. In 𝑙𝑛[𝑦] = 𝛼 × 𝑙𝑛[𝑥],
elasticity 𝛼 gives the approximate percentage change in 𝑦 associated with a one percent
change in 𝑥. To see this, recall that 1+Δ ≈ 𝑒Δ for small values of Δ, so raising 𝑥 by one
percent increases 𝑙𝑛[𝑥] to 𝑙𝑛[𝑥 × 1.01] ≈ 𝑙𝑛[𝑥 × 𝑒0.01] = 𝑙𝑛[𝑥] + 𝑙𝑛[𝑒0.01] = 𝑙𝑛[𝑥] + 0.01.




Estimated Coefficients and Diagnostics of OLS-Regression Models
review summary
OECD downloads views
No variable min max ?̂? 𝑆𝐸𝛼 ?̂? 𝑆𝐸𝛽
0 intercept — — −28.33 5.48 −33.86 8.35
1 𝑙𝑛[GDP] 9.24 11.67 0.48 0.17 0.46 0.26
2 𝑙𝑛[population] 12.70 19.58 0.64 0.10 0.90 0.16
3 𝑙𝑛[research] 5.32 12.25 0.34 0.09 0.25 0.14
4 𝑙𝑛[internet] 3.79 4.59 0.41 0.21 0.73 0.32
5 𝑙𝑛[life] 4.32 4.42 3.94 1.20 4.36 1.82
6 𝑙𝑛[physicians] 0.03 1.82 −0.28 0.13 −0.38 0.19
7 𝑙𝑛[subscriptions] 0 7.13 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.14
8 𝑙𝑛[translations] −2.30 8.69 0.12 0.03
9 HINARI 0 1 1.64 0.34 0.27 0.52
10 OECD 0 1 −0.09 0.35 −0.38 0.53
11 english 0 1 0.76 0.26
12 free 0 1 2.46 0.53 0.30 0.80
estimated variable 𝑙𝑛[downloads] 𝑙𝑛[views]
standard deviation (all 158 countries) 2.68 3.14
standard deviation (all 34 OECD countries) 2.14 1.70
fitting: share of variance explained 0.85 0.74
cross-validation RMSE (158 countries) 1.12 1.76
cross-validation RMSE (34 OECD countries) 0.88 1.06
cross-validation RMSE (8 free-access countries) 0.21 0.94
are more likely to have alternative resources available such as na-
tional guidelines for professional practice including those by the US
Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). A comparison of guidelines
in the UK and the US points in this direction (Weisz et al., 2007).
For the present purpose, interest lies in the estimated effect of a na-
tional subscription. All else equal, the model estimated that the num-
ber of review downloads increased, on average, to 𝑒2.46 × 100 ≈ 1,166
percent when access was free. However, concluding that a national
subscription increases downloads tenfold would be premature. Un-
der a national subscription, institutional and individual subscriptions
are no longer needed and should no longer be considered in the
model. We therefore need to subtract the estimated effect of those
subscriptions from that of a national subscription to obtain the in-
cremental effect. The model then estimates that for countries with
25 or 150 subscriptions, the number of downloads would increase to
𝑒2.46−0.24×𝑙𝑛[25] × 100 ≈ 540 percent and to 𝑒2.46−0.24×𝑙𝑛[150] × 100 ≈ 352
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percent, respectively. As usual, these estimates indicate the average
increase in the number of downloads, and observed increases may
vary for countries that are dissimilar to those that had a national
subscription in our data.
The estimated coefficient for a national subscription exhibits a
large standard error of 0.53 (see Table 1.2). Although we can reject
the null that 𝛼12 = 0, we suspect that the lack of precision is due to
the fact that only eight countries are currently subscribed whereas
150 countries are not. Given this imbalance, a large standard error
is not surprising. For an alternative assessment of the accuracy of
the estimated coefficient 𝛼12ˆ = 2.46, we calculated the root-mean
squared error in cross-validation specifically for those countries with
free access. To this end, we predicted downloads for each country
separately, based on parameters estimated from the data of all other
countries. Across the resulting 158 models, the estimated effect of
free access varied only slightly between 2.33 and 2.56. Using these
estimates, the bottom of Table 1.2 shows that the model’s predictions
were considerably more precise among countries with free access
than among those without. These findings indicate that the estimated
effect of free access is closer to its true value than its standard error
may suggest.
Using the estimated coefficients and the data on existing sub-
scriptions, we can calculate for each OECD country the number of
expected downloads under a national subscription. These projections
are shown by the white circles in Figure 1.1. The logarithmic nature
of the model implies that the number of additional downloads gener-
ated by a national subscription is driven by the existing download
volume: countries with larger download volumes (e.g., anglophone,
populous, and prosperous) are expected to profit more from their
introduction.
Consider two cases that illustrate the expected effects of a national
subscription. First, recall the case of the U.S. with as many downloads
as the United Kingdom (around 1.4 million), despite having a popu-
lation that is five times larger. The results of our analysis showed that
a national subscription would be expected to generate an additional
1.56 million downloads per year, doubling the national total. Second,
among non-anglophone countries, Germany had a download level of
only 116,000 reviews, less than twice as many as Denmark despite
its population being around 13 times larger. A national subscription
would be estimated to increase national totals in Germany to 408,000,
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approaching Denmark’s rate of downloads per person.
1.2.2 Summary Views
Our second analysis concerned the effect of a national subscription
on plain-language summary views. The black and gray circles in
Figure 1.2 show the number of plain-language summary views in
2014 per 1,000 persons for all OECD member states. Among countries
without a national subscription, France, Canada, and Spain had the
highest number of views per capita, and Turkey, South Korea, and
Japan had the lowest. The average number of summary views for
countries without a national subscription was 2.18 summaries per
1,000 persons.
In contrast, there were on average 5.39 summaries per 1,000
persons in countries with a national subscription, indicating an
effect of such a subscription. Although the levels for countries with
and without national subscription overlap, the highest level (9.11
views per 1,000 persons) was reached by Australia, which held a
national subscription. Within this group of subscribing countries,
Denmark had the fewest views per capita, in keeping with the level of
structurally similar countries such as Finland and Sweden. Among
national subscribers, anglophone countries appear to have consumed
more: not only were more reviews downloaded, as noted before, but
also more summaries were viewed.
The VIEW model offers a more detailed examination of the effects
of a national subscription and of language. Although the model
diagnostics indicated that the model yielded acceptable predictions,
predicting the number of summary views was apparently more
difficult than predicting downloads. Most notably, the model overes-
timated the number of views from Japan, Germany, and South Korea,
where there appeared to have been constraining factors omitted from
the model. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 1.2 report the estimated model
parameters. Whereas most variables had their expected positive effect
on the number of summary views, a higher density of physicians
and OECD membership decreased the number, although this latter
effect is imprecisely estimated. We were particularly interested in the
estimated effects of free access and translations.
Given the substituting nature of full-text downloads and sum-
maries, we had expected a negative effect of a national subscription
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Figure 1.2: Current and expected annual summary views per 1,000 persons; note that scales
differ from Figure 1.1.
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indicating at first sight that the additional popularity of the service
compensates for summary views supplanted by review downloads.
However, there are two caveats to this conclusion. First, the effect
was imprecisely estimated so that the degree of compensation cannot
be firmly established to be positive or negative. More importantly,
subtracting the effects of existing subscriptions can lead to a nega-
tive net effect for countries with more than 𝑒0.30/0.06 ≈ 136 existing
subscriptions. Generally, we conclude that the negative effect of a
national subscription on summary views appears to be small, if at all
present.
In contrast, the effect of translations was precisely estimated and
positive. The point estimate indicates that increasing the number
of summary translations by 100 percent increases views by approx-
imately 𝑒0.12 × 100 − 100 ≈ 13 percent. Although the magnitude of
this effect appears small, it is worth pointing out that some countries
had only few translations. For example, only 128 of 5,952 summaries
have been translated into German. A translation of all summaries is
then estimated to increase summary views to 158 percent.
To illustrate the interaction of the effects of free access to full-text
reviews and summary translations, we used the model estimates to
calculate for all OECD countries the number of expected summary
views under a national subscription and full translation. These
projections are shown by the white circles in Figure 1.2 and vary
considerably for two reasons. First, as before, the logarithmic nature
of the model implies that those with many views benefit more strongly
than those with few views. Second, countries vary in their progress
on summary translations, and those with few translations have more
room for improvement than those with many translations.
1.2.3 Implied Costs
Like all policy instruments, national subscriptions to Cochrane Re-
views ought to be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. We have seen
above that the benefits in terms of additional full-text downloads
and summary views vary across countries but can be substantial in
some cases. Here, we set these benefits in relation to the monetary
costs of a national subscription. These costs depend on the price of a
national subscription and the amount spent on existing subscriptions
that would be obsolete under a national subscription. We will discuss
each of these factors in turn.
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Although Cochrane does not publish rates for national subscrip-
tions, the annual rate is believed to be around $0.01 per capita (Antes,
n.d.). On the basis of this estimate, the first column of Table 1.3
lists the total costs of a national subscription for each country ac-
cording to its population size. For example, a national subscription
for small countries such as Finland or Austria would cost less than
$100,000 annually while larger countries such as Germany or Japan
would require around one million dollars per year.
At the same time, a national subscription implies that existing
subscription holders no longer need their subscriptions. This may
further lower the cost of a national subscription. Unfortunately, we
do not know each country’s total spending on individual downloads,
personal licenses, or institutional subscriptions. However, our data
include an interval of the total number of subscriptions, which can
be used to estimate existing total spending. For this purpose, we
assumed that observed downloads increase linearly within each
subscription interval and estimated for each country 𝑖 the number of
subscriptions, ?̂? 𝑖 , from the number of review downloads, 𝑑𝑖 , using




where 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 denote the lowest and highest possible number of
subscriptions in the interval of country 𝑖, and 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖 denote the
minimum and maximum number of downloads for countries with
the same interval. The approximated number of subscriptions is
then multiplied by $2,582 , which is the price of the least expensive
institutional subscription. For the country with the fewest downloads
in the interval, ?̂? 𝑖 is set at the lower bound of the interval plus ten
percent of its range, to avoid inconsistencies at the interval bounds.
Conversely, for the country with the most downloads, ?̂? 𝑖 is set at the
upper interval bound minus ten percent of its range. For example, if
three countries in the 50−100 subscriptions interval had 100, 1,100,
and 350 downloads, they would be assumed to have 55, 95, and
55 + (95 − 55) × 250/1000 = 65 subscriptions, respectively. With only
one country per interval, ?̂? 𝑖 is set at the center of the interval.
The second column of Table 1.3 lists the approximate existing total
spending for each country. It shows that some countries without a
national subscription, such as Germany and Japan, have spent large
amounts of money on Cochrane licenses for research institutions






with without estimated costs per
open access open access additional download
Australia $234, 907 — —
Austria $85, 345 $24, 590 $1.33
Belgium $112, 252 $59, 016 $0.29
Canada $355, 404 $233, 605 $0.23
Chile $177, 626 $110, 655 $0.18
Czech Republic $105, 106 $12, 295 $22.17
Denmark $56, 396 — —
Estonia $13, 136 $12, 295 $0.43
Finland $54, 636 $36, 885 $0.18
France $662, 069 $135, 245 $1.97
Germany $808, 895 $368, 850 $1.51
Greece $109, 577 $14, 754 $6.34
Hungary $98, 617 $14, 754 $6.99
Iceland $3, 276 $12, 295 −$3.06
Ireland $46, 127 — —
Israel $82, 153 $31, 967 $0.67
Italy $613, 364 $164, 753 $1.31
Japan $1, 271, 318 $614, 750 $4.14
Luxembourg $5, 561 $0 $1.11
Mexico $1, 253, 858 $27, 049 $21.25
Netherlands $168, 542 $231, 146 −$0.12
New Zealand $45, 097 — —
Norway $51, 365 — —
Poland $379, 955 $29, 508 $4.87
Portugal $103, 974 $27, 049 $1.24
Slovakia $54, 185 $12, 295 $17.70
Slovenia $20, 622 $17, 213 $0.19
South Korea $504, 240 $88, 524 $1.42
Spain $464, 046 $68, 852 $1.84
Sweden $96, 896 $98, 360 −$0.00
Switzerland $81, 902 $71, 311 $0.05
Turkey $759, 323 $56, 557 $4.06
United Kingdom $645, 104 — —
United States $3, 188, 571 $3, 073, 750 $0.07
individual licenses would become obsolete. However, to determine
the actual financial burden of a national subscription, it may be
important to consider the mix of private and public institutions
among existing subscribers. Unlike potential savings by public
institutions, which may be subtracted from the total costs, savings by
private institutions would in fact raise costs to governments through
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foregone sales taxes. However, we suspect that the large majority of
existing subscribers are publicly funded, implying that omitting the
need for existing spending on Cochrane licenses would reduce the
effective cost of a national subscription.
The third column of Table 1.3 subtracts the estimated existing
costs from the estimated total and divides it by the estimated increase
in review downloads shown in Figure 1.1. Integrating costs and
benefits, this column can be used to separate the countries into three
groups. First, three countries, Czech Republic, Mexico, and Slovakia,
would pay around $20 per additional download, a sum that falls short
of the price of an individual download but exceeds the cost of merely
viewing a review. Similarly, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey
would pay $4 to $7 , considerably more per additional download than
most other countries. Second, three countries, Iceland, Sweden and
the Netherlands, are predicted to save money through a national
subscription. The majority of countries, including Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, and the U.S., fall in between these extreme groups,
with costs per additional download ranging between $0.05 and $2
1.3 Discussion
Cochrane Reviews are currently of limited use, as many healthcare
professionals and most patients do not have free access to them..
In spite of efforts to promote informed healthcare professionals
and patients, governments have been reluctant to purchase national
subscriptions. We calculated estimates of the increase in full-text
downloads and summary views of Cochrane Reviews in OECD
countries if they were to purchase a national subscription. We then
integrated these estimated benefits with the estimated costs of a
national subscription and provided a measure of the effective costs.
Our findings are encouraging. Although the estimated increases
in downloads vary between countries, Figure 1.1 shows that consid-
erable improvements are possible. Indeed, the majority of countries
is projected to multiply their downloads by a factor above two, in-
cluding countries with few downloads in the absence of a national
subscriptions.
In addition, our analysis of summary views showed that a na-
tional subscription is not associated with a reduction in summary
views. Instead, the effect of a national subscription could be both
18
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positive and negative, depending on the country. However, Figure 1.2
illustrates that translations of summaries into the national language
can attenuate possible negative effects and offer a second avenue
for disseminating Cochrane evidence. As we used each country’s
national language to determine the number of available translations,
the model did not control for national differences in English profi-
ciency. Therefore, the model may have overestimated the effect of
additional translations for countries in which English is widely and
well understood, such as Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands.
Nonetheless, the results indicate that translations have the potential
to increase summary views in many countries, including some with-
out exceptional English proficiency. For example, Slovenia, Greece,
Italy, and Germany hold the potential for considerable improve-
ments through comprehensive translation of existing summaries. We
therefore conclude that translations of Cochrane summaries offer an
additional tool for disseminating Cochrane evidence that can be used
independently of a national subscription.
Integrating these estimated benefits with the costs of a national
subscriptions, we find that for most OECD members, the net costs
would be small. Whereas seven countries can expect to face insuf-
ficient demand to justify the purchase of a national subscription,
according to our estimates in Table 1.3, many countries would pay
less than $1 for each additional download and three countries would
save money under a national subscription. Thus, for most countries,
national subscriptions to Cochrane Reviews present an inexpensive
way of disseminating medical evidence. The question of to what
degree this evidence will be used cannot be answered by the present
study, although Cochrane Reviews have in the past had direct impact
on policy making (Bunn et al., 2014) and, when translated into fact
boxes and other understandable forms, can foster physicians’ and
patients’ understanding and decision making (McDowell, Gigeren-
zer, Wegwarth, & Rebitschek, 2019; Wegwarth & Gigerenzer, 2018;
Wegwarth, Wagner, & Gigerenzer, 2017).
The estimates of our analysis are based on an OLS regression
model of observational data and are not without caveats. Most
importantly, observational data are ill-suited to establish causal
relationships. That is, our analysis cannot formally answer the ques-
tion whether national subscriptions lead to increases in downloads,
whether the reverse is true, or whether both variables have a com-
mon cause. Instead, we have found that it is more plausible that a
19
Chapter 1 Free Access to Cochrane Reviews
national subscription leads to a given number of downloads than
vice versa because subscriptions have a causal effect on the costliness
of a download. However, it is important to note that there remains
the possibility that both subscription and downloads are caused
by a third variable that we have not accounted for in our models.
Despite all efforts to control for potential confounds such as economic
strength or research activity, comparisons across countries retain
the possibility that relevant differences between countries remain
unnoticed or unobserved. To corroborate our findings, we therefore
encourage studies that examine the effects of national subscriptions
by comparing downloads before and after its introduction within the
same country.
A second limitation of this study concerns the uncertainty of our
cost estimates. When calculating the expected costs per additional
download, both the numerator and the denominator were based on
estimates. The costs in the numerator were based on estimates of the
costs of existing subscriptions and the denominator was based on our
model estimates. Although we could compute confidence intervals for
the denominator, we cannot quantify the uncertainty of the numerator,
which is based on the number subscriptions and an estimate of their
costs. These estimates are conservative but their uncertainty remains
unclear until more detailed data on subscriptions becomes available.
Our cost-benefit analysis provides estimates of the effective costs
per download gained through a national subscription. The analysis
remains agnostic as to how highly additional downloads are valued
and leaves such judgements to policy makers. However, we emphasize
the importance of evidence for directing healthcare resources to where
they are most effective. This is especially true in healthcare systems
where various actors are incentivized to overstate the effectiveness of
different health interventions. In these environments it is key that
professionals and patients are empowered to base their decisions on
evidence instead of advertisements. To be effective, good evidence
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The ability to make sound probabilistic inferences has long been
considered essential to human rationality. Assessing whether human
inferences adhere to the rules of probability theory has therefore
a long tradition, not only in the study of judgement and decision
making, but also in economics and philosophy (Gigerenzer et al.,
1989; Hacking, 2006; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern,
1944). The conclusions from early work in psychology suggested that
“man is an intuitive statistician", albeit a slightly conservative one
(Peterson & Beach, 1967; Phillips & Edwards, 1966, p. 39). That is,
studies suggested that human inference followed or approximated
the rules of probability theory.
Subsequent work led to the contradictory view that the human
mind was not built to work according to the rules of probability
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973). For example, based largely on
laboratory studies using textbook problems, the heuristics-and-biases
program documented a long list of cognitive errors or fallacies where
human judgements about probabilities deviated from the normative
standards of probability theory (for an overview see Gilovich, Griffin,
& Kahneman, 2002). For example, one prominent finding was that
participants tended to overweight or ignore base rates (e.g., the
prevalence of breast cancer in a population) in probabilistic inference,
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phenomena referred to as the base-rate fallacy or base-rate neglect. In
contrast, earlier work suggested that participants almost always take
the base rate into consideration (see Koehler, 1996, for a discussion
of theoretical and methodological criticisms of prior empirical work
on the base-rate fallacy). Nevertheless, the apparent robustness of
the base-rate fallacy was considered a demonstration of cognitive
error (Bar-Hillel, 1980, 1984). This finding, among others, led to the
conclusion that “[i]n his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently
not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all" (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1972, p. 450). These findings underlie the view of some
behavioral economists that we can nudge people into making better
decisions by exploiting their cognitive biases — a view often referred
to as libertarian paternalism, as people retain choice but are steered
towards decisions that governments and institutions deem welfare
enhancing (Gigerenzer, 2015; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2016; Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008).
A number of explanations have been offered to reconcile these
conflicting views. Some authors have argued that many findings
from the heuristics-and-biases program use an inadequate normative
standard, or that in many everyday situations it can be ecologically
rational (e.g., adaptive in a natural ecology) to ignore information or
contradict the axioms of rational choice theory (see, e.g., Gigerenzer,
1996a; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Stanovich & West, 2000). Critiques
have also compared the research methodologies used within different
programs (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Schulze & Hertwig, 2016) or have
observed that prior studies have lacked ecological validity (Fiedler &
von Sydow, 2015; Koehler, 1996). For instance, the apparent base-rate
neglect phenomenon from research on textbook problems contra-
dicts findings from related work on probabilistic reasoning using
experience-based paradigms where participants learn the associa-
tions or co-occurrences between events. Animals, children, and adults
in prenumerate indigenous populations are found to be capable of
making probabilistic inferences in line with the statistical proper-
ties of environments (Biernaskie, Walker, & Gegear, 2009; Fontanari,
Gonzalez, Vallortigara, & Girotto, 2014; Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, &
Glymour, 2001; Rakoczy et al., 2014; Real, 1991; Real & Caraco, 1986;
Sobel & Munro, 2009; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004).
The present meta-analysis focuses on one of these criticisms that
relates to the tendency for textbook tasks on Bayesian inference to
ignore the connection between external information representations
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(e.g., numerical representations) and cognitive processing. In these
textbook tasks, probabilities are summarised and one must make
an inference based on a description of the relevant statistics. In
their seminal paper, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) argued that
there are different ways to summarise statistical information that
are mathematically equivalent but not necessarily computationally
equivalent, so that the choice of representation format affects the
performance of a given cognitive process. For instance, although
different numerical representations (e.g., Arabic or Roman numerals,
or binary systems) can be mapped onto one another, the (cognitive)
algorithms that operate on these representations may require different
computations. A common analogy is that of the pocket calculator,
designed to operate on Arabic numerals: can one infer that it has
an algorithm for multiplication when it is fed information in binary
numbers? In relation to an elementary Bayesian inference textbook
task, often used in demonstrations of the base-rate fallacy, Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage demonstrated that presenting statistical information in
the form of joint frequencies resulting from natural samples, known
as natural frequencies (defined in detail, below), yielded substantial
improvements in Bayesian reasoning. The present meta-analysis
focuses on research that has sought to account for or explain this
facilitation effect.
Over the past 20 years, there has been some debate as to why natu-
ral frequencies can facilitate Bayesian inference in textbook problems.
Although there is now a general consensus that natural frequencies
can facilitate Bayesian inference (Brase & Hill, 2015; Johnson & Tubau,
2015), studies in this area report substantial variations in performance
rates, ranging from 0 to 90 percent correct solutions recorded across
studies. As such, it is unclear exactly how much natural frequencies
facilitate performance and it is difficult to quantify the conditions
under which facilitation effects are most likely to occur. For example,
we know that natural frequencies can boost probabilistic inferences
but to what extent and how high can performance be bolstered, given
which features of the problem and in what contexts? More recent
work has turned its attention to identifying the features of the person,
problem, or methodological context that account for differences in
performance rates across studies or that can shed light on underlying
mechanisms. However, the field lacks a systematic examination of
these factors. Rather, much of the prior work has focused on debating
which theoretical perspective, the ecological rationality framework or
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nested sets theory, offers the most coherent account for why facilitation
effects occur (Brase & Hill, 2015). Early work was plagued by mis-
interpretations of the natural frequency format, yet the theoretical
accounts that were proposed on the basis of these misinterpretations
actually converge on many common concepts (e.g., the importance
of the subset problem structure). We move beyond these theoretical
debates to examine why, when, and for whom natural frequencies
facilitate Bayesian inference in an attempt to offer some closure or
focus to the debate, and to provide guidance for future studies.
Accordingly, the current review and meta-analysis has three broad
aims. First, we clarify what are natural frequencies (and what they are
not) and highlight where theoretical accounts converge and diverge.
Second, we identify and examine potential moderators for when, why,
and for whom natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian inference. We
report results from a meta-analysis of 35 studies representing 9,611
participants on the relative effect of natural frequencies in comparison
to conditional probabilities (normalised formats, defined below), and
report how individual, methodological, and problem representation
factors moderate this effect. Third, we emphasise current research
gaps and suggest how to stimulate and progress research in this area.
2.1 Bayesian Inference and Natural Frequencies
Bayesian inference refers to the process of updating a prior proba-
bility of some hypothesis in response to new data. The normative
benchmark for this process is provided by Bayes’ theorem, described
in detail below. A broad range of phenomena across many different
research areas has been modeled using Bayes’ theorem, from the
study of perception to human cognition (Chater, Oaksford, Hahn, &
Heit, 2010; Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006). In relation to human
cognition, the question is how well Bayes’ theorem describes human
inferences, for example, how the probability of some (unobserved)
event changes in the presence of another (observed) event.
One approach to study Bayesian inference is the textbook paradigm
where probabilities are summarised and one must make an inference
based on a description of the relevant statistics. Consider, for example,
an elementary textbook version of a Bayesian inference task presented
using conditional probabilities (Eddy, 1982; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995, p.685):
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The probability of breast cancer is 1% for a woman at age
forty who participates in routine screening. If a woman
has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will get a
positive mammography. If a woman does not have breast
cancer, the probability is 9.6% that she will also get a
positive mammography. A woman in this age group had
a positive mammography in a routine screening. What
is the probability that she actually has breast cancer?
%.
In order to solve this task, let 𝐻 denote the hypothesis (here, the
presence of breast cancer), 𝐷 a specific data outcome (here, a positive
mammogram), and ¬𝐻 and ¬𝐷 their negations (here, the absence
of breast cancer and a negative mammogram, respectively). The





𝑝(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻) + 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ ¬𝐻) , (2.1)
that is, by dividing the probability of having both breast cancer
and a positive mammogram by the overall probability of having a
positive mammogram (both with and without breast cancer). As the
problem does not state the joint probabilities 𝑝(𝐷 ∩𝐻) and 𝑝(𝐷 ∩¬𝐻),
they need to be calculated. First, 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻) can be obtained from
multiplying 𝑝(𝐻), the base rate of breast cancer (that is, the prevalence
of breast cancer in the reference class), with 𝑝(𝐷 |𝐻), the hit rate of
the mammography test (the probability of a positive mammogram
given that one has breast cancer). Similarly, 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ ¬𝐻) is given by
𝑝(¬𝐻)×𝑝(𝐷 |¬𝐻). Filling these probabilities into equation (2.1) yields
Bayes’ theorem:
𝑝(𝐻 |𝐷) = 𝑝(𝐻) × 𝑝(𝐷 |𝐻)
𝑝(𝐻) × 𝑝(𝐷 |𝐻) + 𝑝(¬𝐻) × 𝑝(𝐷 |¬𝐻) . (2.2)
Generally speaking, Bayes’ theorem describes how the prior probability
𝑝(𝐻), that is the probability of the hypothesis without additional
information, is combined with a likelihood 𝑝(𝐷 |𝐻), that is the proba-
bility of outcome 𝐷 if hypothesis 𝐻 was true, to obtain the posterior
probability 𝑝(𝐻 |𝐷), that is the probability of the hypothesis after
obtaining additional information. Using the numbers given in the
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problem and equation (2.2), one can compute the solution:
𝑝(𝐻 |𝐷) = .01 × .80
.01 × .80 + .99 × .096
≈ .078.
There is overwhelming evidence demonstrating that participants
have difficulty solving such problems when presented in conditional
probability formats, as shown above. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)
reported that only 16 percent of participants in their study could
provide the correct Bayesian solution to such problems, a finding
consistent with many subsequent studies in the field (e.g., Chapman
& Liu, 2009; Ferguson & Starmer, 2013; Mellers & McGraw, 1999).
One interpretation of the poor performance on the above textbook
problem is the base-rate neglect phenomena mentioned previously:
participants neglect the base rate in their calculations and erroneously
focus on specific case data (Barbey & Sloman, 2007).
An alternative view was offered by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
(1995). Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, they proposed that,
as probabilities are a relatively recent information representation,
probabilistic information would likely have been acquired and up-
dated sequentially in reference to the event’s frequency in natural
environments — that is, a process of natural sampling (Kleiter, 1994).
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage argued that cognitive algorithms for sta-
tistical inference would likely have evolved to operate on this type
of representation. Consider, by analogy, a physician who acquires
information sequentially about patients who have a symptom and a
disease, and those who have the symptom but do not have the disease.
The physician can then use these joint frequencies to calculate specific
probabilities for a newly presented patient.
As we will see, the Bayesian algorithm is computationally simpler
if probabilities are represented as using joint frequencies, which
should allow more participants to find the correct solution. To test this
assumption, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) presented participants
with the same elementary Bayesian inference task described earlier
but presented information in natural frequencies (p.688):
10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate
in routine screening have breast cancer. 8 of every 10
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women with breast cancer will get a positive mammog-
raphy. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer
will also get a positive mammography. Here is a new
representative sample of women at age forty who got a
positive mammography in routine screening. How many
of these women do you expect to actually have breast
cancer? out of .
Here, the joint frequencies are given in the problem and can be com-
bined to obtain the posterior probability directly, analogously to
equation (2.1),
𝑝(𝐻 |𝐷) = 𝑛(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻)





where 𝑛(·) denotes the frequencies. When these frequencies result
from a natural sampling process, these are referred to as natural
frequencies. Related work on experience-based probabilistic inference
allows participants to experience this type of natural sampling process,
whereas this version in the textbook paradigm presents participants
only with the outcome of this process (Hoffrage, Krauss, Martignon,
& Gigerenzer, 2015; Schulze & Hertwig, 2016).
As natural sampling preserves information about the base rate,
which is contained in the joint frequencies, the base rate can be
ignored, simplifying the calculation of the correct solution: stating
the hit rate as 8 in every 10 women preserves the information that
only 10 in every 1,000 women have breast cancer; the information
is not normalised1 (e.g., compare Figures 2.1A and 2.1B to 2.1C and
2.1D, where the information is normalised in the former but not in the
latter). When presented with information in the natural frequency
format, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) found that 46 percent of
1For consistency and clarity, in the present paper we use the term conditional
probabilities to refer to any format that has a normalised structure, although we
acknowledge that chances, percentages, and frequency formats with a normalised
structure are not strictly conditional probabilities.
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of representation formats (adapted from Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007).
participants were able to provide the correct Bayesian solution for
these types of problems. Compared to the 16 percent who were
able to solve the conditional probability problems in their study, this
represents a considerable improvement, an effect we refer to as the
natural frequency facilitation effect.
2.1.1 Clarifying the Natural Frequency Facilitation Effect
Following Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) study, a number of au-
thors critiqued the notion that natural frequency formats facilitated
Bayesian inference based on a misinterpretation of the format. Ini-
tial misconceptions related to the information structure, that is the
distinction between naturally sampled frequencies, drawn from the
concept of natural sampling by Kleiter (1994), and frequencies that are
28
2.1 Bayesian Inference and Natural Frequencies
normalised or standardised. Natural sampling refers to the process by
which one would naturally acquire information about events and their
classes from experience, a sequential process where information is
collated without fixing the marginal frequencies a priori (Gigerenzer
& Hoffrage, 1995). In contrast, information formats that standardise
or normalise information (see Figure 2.1A and 2.1B), do not preserve
information about the base rates, which therefore require additional
computation to incorporate them back into the calculation, as seen in
Equation (2.2).
The natural sampling component was overlooked, rediscovered,
and relabelled a number of times, often in order to incorporate the
information structure within existing theoretical perspectives or to
propose new theories (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007). For example,
the natural sampling structure was introduced as the subset principle
in the context of mental models theory (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi,
Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni, 1999); the conjunctive information
structure was rediscovered as a partitioned information structure2 by
Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) and Macchi (2000); and the observation
that the numerator is a subset of the denominator was described
as facilitating the construction of a set-inclusion mental model by
Evans, Handley, Perham, Over, and Thompson (2000). This latter
point was followed up by Sloman, Over, Slovak, and Stibel (2003) in
support of a more general nested-sets hypothesis, or the argument
that any representation that makes the nested (subset) relations
transparent will facilitate performance. The nested-set observation
is evident in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) Equations 2 and 3, or
the observation that the numerator is a subset of the denominator
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 2007).
It is now generally understood that information structure is central
to the facilitation effect (that is, the natural sampling structures in
Figure 2.1C and 2.1D compared to the normalised structures of
2.1A and 2.1B). Nevertheless, nested-sets theory and the ecological
rationality framework have been pitted against one another to debate
which theoretical account provides the most homogenous explanation
2According to Girotto and Gonzalez (2001, p.250), a partitioned structure is one
where “the problem statement partitions a set of units into exhaustive subsets (e.g., a
set of 100 people is partitioned into two subsets: 4 infected people versus 96 uninfected
people; these in turn are divided into two subsets: 3 persons with a positive versus 1
person with a negative test result, and 12 persons with a positive versus 84 persons
with a negative test result).”
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of findings to date. In the following section, we provide a brief
overview of the ecological rationality framework and nested-sets
theory to highlight points of distinction and to set the context for the
different moderators of the natural frequency facilitation effect that
have been proposed and that we review in our meta-analysis.
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Natural Frequencies
One aim of our meta-analysis was to review and quantify the predic-
tions made by the ecological rationality framework and nested-sets
theory in relation to the natural frequency facilitation effect. However,
the many similarities in the predictions made by proponents of the
two frameworks make it difficult to tease apart those that clearly
differentiate the perspectives (see also, e.g., Brase and Hill, 2015,
Johnson and Tubau, 2015, and McNair, 2015 for related observations).
Admittedly, this problem was exacerbated by the fact that there is
heterogeneity within the theoretical perspectives themselves and
proponents differ as to the emphasis they place on certain concepts.
In some cases, properties attributed to the theories have been imposed
by others, often to the disagreement of the theory’s proponents (see,
e.g., comments on Barbey & Sloman, 2007). We review these theories
with the general aim to highlight their contributions to the literature,
summarise points of theoretical divergence, and to provide context
for arguments made as to the relevance of different moderators. The
meta-analysis ultimately moves beyond these theoretical debates and
reviews the rich literature on the natural frequency facilitation effect
to provide quantitative estimates and identify problem features or
influential studies that can account for some of the variability in
performance rates reported across studies.
2.2.1 Ecological Rationality Framework
The ecological rationality framework is a broad theoretical approach
to the study of human cognition and decision-making (Gigerenzer,
Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) and has been applied to
study of a range of topics including inference, choice, and group
decision-making (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group,
2012; Hertwig, Hoffrage, & the ABC Research Group, 2013; Todd &
Brighton, 2015; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Central to the framework is
the concept of ecological rationality that emphasises the importance
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of considering the match between the human mind and the structure
of the environment as a fundamental unit of analysis (Gigerenzer,
1998; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). On the one hand, this involves the
study of cognitive mechanisms (e.g., the adaptive toolbox of decision
strategies) and on the other hand it involves the study of the environ-
mental structures that determine which of these mechanisms will be
successful (ecological rationality; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). For exam-
ple, the framework has been applied to study the role of recognition
knowledge in inference, showing that simple recognition knowledge
can promote accurate inferences specifically in environments where
recognition is a valid cue (e.g., the recognition heuristic; Gigerenzer
& Goldstein, 2011; Marewski & Schooler, 2011). With respect to
Bayesian inference with textbook problems, the ecological rationality
framework analysed different types of information representations
(i.e., conditional probabilities and natural frequencies) from a com-
putational perspective: The proponents showed that, although these
informations formats are informationally equivalent, they do not
entail computationally equivalent cognitive algorithms (i.e., Bayesian
computations).
In the context of Bayesian inference, the ecological rationality
framework has been attributed to Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)
and the study by Cosmides and Tooby (1996). Proponents converge
on the idea that an evolutionary perspective is useful for identifying
the match between cognitive strategies and environmental structures,
offering a framework for investigating the adaptiveness of strategies
to environments (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
2007). The proponents agree that external representations (e.g.,
probability information formats) influence internal representations
(e.g., cognitive algorithms). However, proponents differ as to their
views on the modularity of cognitive mechanisms. According to
Cosmides and Tooby (1996; 2008), an independent, domain-specific
cognitive mechanism evolved to operate on frequency representa-
tions and, when given the appropriate content (e.g., frequencies), this
frequency module would “allow certain computations to proceed
automatically or ‘intuitively’ and with enhanced efficiency over what
a more general reasoning process could achieve given the same input”
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2008, p.66). As such, their perspective suggests
an advantage for frequency representations more generally (e.g., also
for normalised frequencies). In fact, in their widely cited paper
on Bayesian facilitation often associated with the natural frequency
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facilitation effect, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) did not test natural
frequency formats but rather variations on normalised frequency
formats (e.g., formats similar in structure to 2.1B). Specifically, the
authors investigated the strength of different numerical format ma-
nipulations (e.g., presenting a problem using normalised frequencies
but asking for a response as a conditional probability and vice versa)
on Bayesian performance. Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) argued that
the high performance achieved across studies in their paper is a con-
sequence of the correct Bayesian response (2 percent) also potentially
capturing participants who falsely divided the base rate by the total
number of false positives, 1/50 or 1/51.
In contrast, claims about the modularity of cognitive mechanisms
are generally not held in broader applications of the ecological
rationality framework (Todd, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2005). Rather,
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) analysis of cognitive algorithms
and information structures was computational and generated a priori
theory-driven hypotheses about how cognitive processes map onto
informational structures (the ecological aspect of the framework). In
our view, the alignment between the theoretical perspective espoused
by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007) with the
modularity view of Cosmides and Tooby (1996, 2008) has contributed
to some of the critique of the ecological rationality framework from
proponents of nested-sets theory.
Nested-Sets Theory
The most dominant alternative framework to account for the facilita-
tive effect of natural frequencies on Bayesian inference is nested-sets
theory. A general premise of the theory is that any representation that
makes the nested-set structure of problems transparent will facilitate
computations (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Mandel, 2007). For example,
one could use verbal description or visual representation to make
the partitions and relations between relevant subsets clearer (e.g., a
Venn diagram showing the relation between or nesting of subsets;
Mandel, 2007). Nested-sets theory is founded in work on set relations
in probability judgement and extensional reasoning. As such, its
origins have been attributed to a variety of authors and theories (e.g.,
Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-Laird
et al., 1999; Sloman et al., 2003; A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) and
it claims to have broad applications to a variety of reasoning tasks
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(Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Mandel, 2007). Sloman and colleagues (2003)
were the first to use the term nested-sets hypothesis and outline the
theory in relation to probability problems. According to them, the
most elementary relations are those related to set inclusion and set
membership, and should these be made transparent in a represen-
tation, the arithmetic operations that follow are easier to perform.
In this regard, proponents of the theory have made a number of
predictions about alternative nested-set manipulations that can fa-
cilitate performance on Bayesian inference tasks, such as enhancing
the transparency of nested sets through visualisations (Yamagishi,
2003), and modifications to problem wording, such as improving
the wording of text to show causal relations (Krynski & Tenenbaum,
2007; Sloman et al., 2003).
As nested-sets theory emerged, in part, in response to initial
misconceptions about the natural sampling component of natural
frequencies (outlined in the previous section), many of the current
claims of the theory converge with the computational arguments
initially put forward by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). In fact, at
the time of Barbey and Sloman’s (2007) review of research on base-
rate neglect that incorporated work on natural frequencies, Mandel
(2007) regarded nested-sets theory as “an assemblage of hypotheses,
empirical findings, and rebuttals to theorists proposing some form of
the ‘frequentist mind’ perspective” (p.275). Proponents also disagree
as to whether the theory should be situated within a dual-process
framework (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Evans & Elqayam, 2007; Lagnado
& Shanks, 2007; Mandel, 2007; Samuels, 2007).
Nevertheless, despite recent calls for theory integration (Brase &
Hill, 2015; Johnson & Tubau, 2015; McNair, 2015), nested-sets theory
continues to be pitted against the ecological rationality framework
on the basis of a few general claims. Specifically, in an effort to
differentiate domain general reasoning processes from the strong
modular domain-specific processes attributed to Cosmides and Tooby
(1996, 2008) and the modularity principle, the theory has explored the
effects of individual difference measures such as general intelligence
(e.g., education, cognitive abilities) and motivation (e.g., incentivised
performance; Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Lesage, Navarrete, & De Neys,
2013; Lesage et al., 2013; Sirota & Juanchich, 2011; Sirota, Juanchich,
& Hagmayer, 2014). However, the finding that general intelligence or
motivation is relevant to problem solving is not surprising to some
authors who argue against the use of such data to infer cognitive
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structures or abilities (Brase, 2007; Brase & Hill, 2015; Trafimow, 2007).
If evolutionary and dual-process claims were put aside, nested-sets
theory and the ecological rationality framework appear to converge
on the argument as to why natural frequencies support Bayesian
inference: natural frequencies are a representation that provides a
transparent information structure to simplify computations.
In summary, researchers from both nested-sets theory and the
ecological rationality framework are interested in understanding the
interaction or relation between external and internal representations
of information (e.g., information formats and cognitive processes;
Brase & Hill, 2015; Johnson & Tubau, 2015). Where divergence re-
mains it relates to arguments as to how these external representations
influence internal ones (e.g., domain-general or specific cognitive
mechanisms). A positive side of this debate has been the proposi-
tion of a variety of potential moderators to the natural frequency
facilitation effect, which we discuss in detail below. The present
meta-analysis quantifies the effect of these moderators with the aim
to identify those features of the problem representation, methodology,
and the individual that are most influential and can account for the
substantial variability in performance across studies.
2.3 When, Why and for Whom is the Natural Frequency
Facilitation Effect Most Likely to Occur?
Potential moderators of the effect are those that manipulate the prob-
lem representation (e.g., inclusion of visual aids), alter the method-
ological procedure (e.g., use of incentives), or account for aspects of
the individual (e.g., expert or non-expert participants). Moderators
related to problem representation can provide an understanding of
the features of the format most influential to the effect. Method-
ological moderators are generally overlooked in debates about the
facilitation effect, but nonetheless can contribute to the variation in
the size of the effects reported across studies. Individual difference
moderators can improve our understanding of the basic competencies
of individuals that underlie effects and can help to tailor problem
representations to different audiences. Previous reviews of this work
have been qualitative, and although these have sought to provide a
comprehensive overview of the literature to date, the conclusions of
some of these reviews tend to support opposite theoretical viewpoints
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(Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Brase & Hill, 2015; Johnson & Tubau, 2015).
A quantitative estimate of the magnitude of effects from different
manipulations is currently lacking.
The current meta-analysis fills this gap, not only by isolating the
effects of different moderators but also by providing quantitative
estimates of the magnitude of effects. As such, the present meta-
analysis focuses on those studies that have simultaneously compared
performance for natural frequency and conditional probability for-
mats. In the following sections, we review a broad range of potential
moderators that have been put forth over the past two decades. In
some cases, studies have examined the effect of moderators on the
performance rates for one format only. We did not include these
studies as they were more likely to differ in other ways that could
not be controlled for in the analyses. While these studies cannot
be included in the meta-analysis, we do mention these below as
the moderators could still be coded for. We emphasise that not all
moderators mentioned below were able to be included or coded for
in our meta-analysis and we specify why this is the case in the re-
spective sections. Nevertheless, we think it is important to review all
potentially relevant moderators to provide context for those that were
included. Each potential moderator is indicated with italics within
the following sections. Moderators that were able to be included in
the meta-analysis are listed in Table 2.1.
2.3.1 Problem Representation
The most widely debated aspects of the natural frequency facilitation
effect relate to the representation of problems, and the different ways
of presenting information in natural frequency, conditional proba-
bility, or both formats. Over the years, researchers have modified
formats by adding or substituting information, or by altering the
computational complexity of the problems to tease apart potential
explanations for the effect. While there are many aspects of the prob-
lem representation that have been explored, we attempt to address
those features that have received most empirical attention.
Computational or problem complexity. The argument that nat-
ural frequency formats are less computationally demanding than
conditional probability problems is generally not debated and in
fact, this was the only argument made in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s
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Table 2.1
Summary of Study Characteristics
counts
Name Description no yes
short menu short menu used in both formats 199 27
three hypotheses problem complicated by third hypothesis 208 18
two or more cues problem complicated by additional cues or
cue values
212 14
probability question probability question asked in natural fre-
quency format
206 20
frequency question frequency question asked in conditional
probability format
216 10
enumerated population enumerated population given for condi-
tional probability
198 28
multiple events conditional probability phrased in terms of
multiple events
162 64
visual aid visual aid used in both formats 200 26
base rate∗ base rate in problem solved by participants numerical
hit rate∗ hit rate in problem solved by participants numerical
false-alarm rate∗ false-alarm rate in problem solved by par-
ticipants
numerical
show-up fee∗ participants are paid a show-up fee 50 115
performance pay∗ participants are paid a by performance 153 12
strict scoring correct answer based on accuracy and/or
protocol
193 33
within-subject∗ within-subjects study design 212 14
both formats both formats solved by each participant 174 52
additional problems number of additional problems solved by
each participant
numerical
high numeracy∗ participants have a high numeracy scores 26 26
experts educated participants (students & profes-
sionals)
38 188
Notes: Study characteristics marked with ∗ were coded but not able to be included
in the full-sample meta-analysis because of the lack of a sufficient number of logits;
where needed, we conducted separate subset-analyses that did not control for the
larger set of study characteristics.
(1995) computational analysis. Specifically, to demonstrate that the
computational advantage of natural frequencies lay in their more
parsimonious segmentation of information, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
introduced the short menu of conditional probability and natural fre-
quency formats. The short menu versions displayed only two pieces
of information: 𝑝(𝐷) and 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻) for the probability format and
𝑛(𝐷) and 𝑛(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻) for the natural frequency format. For example,
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the probability problem stated: “The probability that a woman at age
forty will get a positive mammography in routine screening is 10.3%.
The probability of breast cancer and a positive mammography is 0.8%
for a woman at age forty who participates in routine screening”. For
the conditional probability version, the joint probabilities simplified
the computational algorithm, 𝑝(𝐻 |𝐷) = 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻)/𝑝(𝐷), similar to
Equation (2.1), while for the natural frequency version the computa-
tional algorithm was the same as Equation (2.3) above, albeit with
the sum in the denominator already calculated3. As reported in the
results of their Study 1, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage found that when
compared to the standard versions, the short menu versions resulted
in improved performance for conditional probability formats, but not
for natural frequency formats. Thus, the study showed that lowering
computational complexity may explain the advantage of natural
frequency formats over more computationally complex conditional
probability formats. However, we note that in their study, short menu
versions of natural frequency formats continued to outperform short
menu versions of conditional probability formats despite similar
computational algorithms: the natural frequency format improved
from 46 percent for the standard format to 50 percent in the short
format, and the conditional probability format improved from 16
percent to 28 percent correct solutions across problems.
While there is general agreement that short menu versions facili-
tate performance because there are fewer and easier calculation steps
(Ferguson & Starmer, 2013; Mellers & McGraw, 1999), in particular
for conditional probability formats, some authors have proposed
alternative reasons for their advantage. For example, Mellers and
McGraw (1999) suggest that presenting joint events makes the nested
sets easier to visualise, thus facilitating computation. Fiedler et al.
(2000) suggested that joint frequency and probability versions im-
proved performance because these formats used a common reference
scale (e.g., 8 out of 1000 women; 95 out of 1000 women), although
we are unsure how the argument about the advantage of a common
3Mellers and McGraw (1999), Lesage et al. (2013), Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, and
Wild (2000) utilised a slightly different version of the short menu than Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage (1995) which is known as the joint menu, where instead of providing
𝑝(𝐷), participants were provided with 𝑝(𝐻 ∩𝐷) and 𝑝(¬𝐻 ∩𝐷) and they had to make
the additional calculation: 𝑝(𝐷) = 𝑝(𝐻 ∩ 𝐷) + 𝑝(¬𝐻 ∩ 𝐷) themselves. The natural
frequency version is essentially the same, with information presented only in terms of
joint frequencies with the complements provided.
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reference scale provides any additional explanation for this effect. Un-
fortunately, Fiedler et al. (2000) misinterpreted the natural frequency
format used in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), suggesting that they
had compared the short menu version to the standard conditional
probability version and thus, this was responsible for the facilitation
effect. Not surprisingly, Fiedler and colleagues found that short
menu versions resulted in better performance than standard versions.
Admittedly, it is difficult to tease apart theoretical arguments for the
enhanced performance on short menu versions: making the nested
set relations transparent is argued to require simpler computational
algorithms, a prediction that was originally made by Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage (1995). We distinguish between short and standard menu
versions in the coding of studies for the meta-analysis, to determine
how much the facilitation effect is reduced as a result of the simpler
computational structure.
To further address arguments regarding computational complex-
ity, a number of studies have explored how manipulating the number
and type of calculation steps affects performance. For example,
Krauss, Martignon, and Hoffrage (1999) and Hoffrage, Krauss, et al.
(2015) have argued that the information structure should still provide
an advantage to natural frequencies even as Bayesian computations
become more complex with an increasing numbers of cues and hy-
potheses. That is, although overall performance would be expected
to decrease with additional computational complexity, the natural
frequency facilitation effect should still hold given multiple cue values
(e.g., a medical test can return a positive, negative, or unclear result;
in this case three cue values), multiple hypotheses (e.g., three diagnoses
are considered; in this case three hypotheses), more than one cue (e.g.,
multiple tests, such as a mammography and ultrasound; in this case,
two or more cues). Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) reported that creating
an additional mathematical calculation step by providing 𝑛(¬𝐻 ∩¬𝐷)
rather than 𝑛(¬𝐻 ∩ 𝐷) for the natural frequency format, reduced
performance rates (in their study, from 53 percent to 35 percent).
In this connection, Ayal and Beyth-Marom (2014) manipulated
the number of calculation steps required to solve natural frequency
problems by providing participants with different pieces of relevant
or irrelevant numerical information and found that performance
decreased as the number of steps increased (e.g., from 55 percent
with one step to 10 percent with four steps). Unfortunately, similar
manipulations for conditional probability formats are often not tested,
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and the relative detriment to performance cannot be compared. We
intended to code for calculation steps in our meta-analysis, however,
we found that it was not clear what would constitute a single mental
step or if different mental steps should have equal weight (e.g., simple
arithmetic versus recalculation or transformation). We do note that
in one study minor manipulations to the numerical complexity of
natural frequency versions by using large numbers or numbers not
of multiples of 10 did not appear to reduce the facilitation effect
(Misuraca, Carmeci, Pravettoni, & Cardaci, 2009). For our analysis,
we code the number of cues and hypotheses within problems as an
indicator of computational complexity.
A related manipulation has been to separate the problem format
and question format such that the respondent is required to translate
the information in the problem (e.g., natural frequencies) into a
response for the alternative format (e.g., provide the answer as a
probability). A number of studies have directly or unwittingly tested
whether the facilitation effect is reduced if there is incongruence
between problem and answer format (Ayal & Beyth-Marom, 2014;
Evans et al., 2000; Fiedler et al., 2000; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001).
When the question asks for a numerical probability response, (i.e.,
probability question: What is the probability that a woman actually
has breast cancer? %) this tends to reduce performance on
natural frequency problems (Ayal & Beyth-Marom, 2014), yet when
the question asks for a numerical response using frequencies or pairs
of integers (i.e., frequency question: How many of these women do you
expect to actually have breast cancer? out of ), the effect
on performance for probability problems is mixed (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Evans et al., 2000). Few studies directly test incongruent problem
and question formats for both types of problems, instead they focus
on frequency or probability problems only (Ayal & Beyth-Marom,
2014), or compare the effect of congruence between problem and
question formats on probability and normalised frequency versions
(e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Evans et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the
results of these studies suggest that a numerical response that does
not match the information format of the problem reduces the natural
frequency facilitation effect (Johnson & Tubau, 2015). Accordingly, it is
expected that incongruence would disadvantage whichever format is
made incongruent and thus, this may explain some of the variability in
performance rates across studies. Where a direct comparison between
natural frequency and conditional probability formats includes a
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manipulation of congruence for one or both formats, we include this
moderator in the meta-analysis.
A number of other manipulations have been explored across
studies, however in many cases the manipulations have been tested
on a single format only or slight modifications to the formats have
not been investigated systematically. Lesage et al. (2013) found that
providing a total sample size or enumerated population on which to
make calculations (e.g., “the study contains data from 8,500 chil-
dren”) did not enhance performance for probability versions, despite
some indication that a reference class facilitates judgements on other
Bayesian inference tasks (Neace, Michaud, Bolling, Deer, & Zecevic,
2008). Other studies state an enumerated population in probability
versions but do not systematically test this format modification on
performance rates (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2000; Konheim-Kalkstein, 2008;
Macchi, 2000). However, meta-analyses can address this question by
pooling estimates from different studies. It is unclear whether or not
an enumerated population should enhance or decrease performance
in the conditional probability format.
One final manipulation to problem complexity we think is worth
mentioning involves textual modifications intended to increase or
decrease problem comprehension. Increasing verbal complexity was
shown to reduce performance (Johnson & Tubau, 2013), suggesting a
role for basic text comprehension abilities in performance on word
problems. Results of manipulations aimed at providing a causal
explanation of a false alarm (e.g., that a benign but harmless cyst could
cause a false-positive mammography result) to clarify the nested
set structure or to facilitate the construction of a causal model (and
therefore the determination of relevant model parameters) to use
in solving conditional probability problems are mixed (Krynski &
Tenenbaum, 2007; McNair & Feeney, 2014, 2015; Sloman et al., 2003).
Further, when Moro, Bodanza, and Freidin (2011) tested one of these
causal explanation versions against a natural frequency format, they
found no effect of wording on performance rates for this manipulation.
Unfortunately, as few studies manipulated and tested performance
across formats, the relative advantages of such manipulations from
one format to another were not able to be examined systematically.
Multiple events. In earlier work on the natural frequency effect,
the distinction between a conditional probability and single-event
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probability was often confused such that natural frequencies were
thought to be an alternative to single-event probabilities (Barbey
& Sloman, 2007; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). However, conditional
probability problems could be represented in terms of single events
(e.g., probability between 0 and 1; chances of one event) or as multiple
events (e.g., relative frequencies, see Figure 2.1A but with the phrasing
“1% of women”), provided the information structure is normalised.
To emphasise the different dimensions of statistical representations,
Barton, Mousavi, and Stevens (2007) outlined a statistical taxonomy
whereby representations can vary according to three orthogonal
dimensions: number of events (single event or sets of events), numer-
ical format (percentages, probabilities, fractions, or pairs of integers),
and information structure (normalised or conjunctive). Thus, the
statistical information in Bayesian inference tasks can be represented
in multiple ways by crossing these dimensions.
To illustrate that the computational advantage of natural frequen-
cies was related to the information structure rather than the number
of events per se, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) demonstrated that
the natural frequency facilitation effect did not extend to relative fre-
quency versions of the conditional probability problems in their Study
2 (the relative frequency format tested by Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995, was similar to Figure 2.1A but was presented in percentages and
referred to women rather than a single woman). In further support of
the relevance of information structure to the facilitation effect, Girotto
and Gonzalez (2001) tested a representation that expressed chances
of a single event, as pairs of integers (10 in 100 chances), in a format
that mimicked the natural sampling structure of natural frequencies
(compare C and D in Figure 2.1) and found that performance rates
were similar for chance and frequency versions. However, simply
using the term chance to represent problems does not seem to be
sufficient to improve performance. Brase (2008) tested natural fre-
quencies against chance representations with a natural sampling or
normalised structure to distinguish the effect of multiple events and
information structure. Brase found that chances with natural sam-
pling improved performance compared to normalised chances but
that natural frequency formats were still the superior representation.
People do appear to understand the distinction between probability
and frequency (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2002), however, participants who
interpret chances as frequency representations tend to perform better
on these problems (Brase, 2008).
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From a computational perspective, proponents of the ecological
rationality framework argue that chances with natural sampling
mimic the computations for natural frequencies in Equation (2.3)
and thus, performance should be improved relative to normalised
versions (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007; Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss,
& Martignon, 2002). However, other authors disagree as to whether
the adoption of the chance formulation as an extension of the natural
frequency format fits within the ecological rationality framework
and its evolutionary claims about the acquisition of information in
the form of frequencies experienced as a series of events (Barbey
& Sloman, 2007; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2002). Rather, proponents of
nested-sets theory argue that, like natural frequency formats, chance
formulations are effective because they make the set structure more
transparent (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001). Given the different ways
in which information structure, numerical format, and number of
events can differ in the problem representations used across studies,
the current meta-analysis will code each of these three dimensions
to discern those features of the representation most influential for
facilitation effects. As the chances with natural sampling format is
not normalised, it is fundamentally different from regular probability
formats and accordingly, we do not examine these studies together
with standard probability formats but conduct a separate analysis
comparing them to natural frequency formats. Owing to the similarity
in the natural frequencies and chances with natural sampling formats
in terms of information structure and numerical format, it is expected
that the performance is similar when comparing these formats, but we
anticipate that there may still be an added advantage of frequencies,
consistent with the work reviewed (see also Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
2007; Hoffrage et al., 2002).
Calculations. As noted in the preceding sections, the formulation
of the Bayesian inference problems can differ in a variety of ways
and some authors have suggested that the specific numerical values
for the base rate, hit rate, and false-alarm rate have the potential to
influence performance rates (see, e.g., Mellers and McGraw’s, 1999,
and Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s, 1999, discussion and reanalysis
of the cab problem from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995). In a
recent assessment of the influence of numeric task characteristics on
solution rates, Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage (2015) examined how the
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base rates, hit rates, and false-alarm rates of 19 different Bayesian
inference problems influenced performance rates using data from
the 15 problems in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and 4 problems
from Hoffrage, Hafenbrädl, and Bouquet (2015). In general, they
found that while higher base rates and hit rates were associated
with a higher number of Bayesian solutions, higher false-alarm rates
were associated with a lower number of correct responses. Further,
probability formats were more affected by these factors.
In this connection, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) explored how
different cognitive shortcuts could approximate Bayesian solutions
under certain task conditions and proposed reasons for why higher
base rates and hit rates are associated with better performance. For
example, when the base rate, 𝑝(𝐻), is small (and 𝑝(¬𝐻) is close to
one), then the rare-event shortcut can be applied to simplify compu-
tation by approximating 𝑝(𝐷 |¬𝐻) × 𝑝(¬𝐻) by 𝑝(𝐷 |¬𝐻). Few studies
have explored alternative solution strategies or the environments in
which they work well (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007). A few studies
have attempted to classify the most common errors on Bayesian
inference problems from supportive protocols (that is, written or
verbal protocols accompanying solutions to word problems; Hoffrage
& Gigerenzer, 1998; Siegrist & Keller, 2011; Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006),
however, few explore the connection between solution strategies and
the specific features of the problems. As many studies report out-
comes aggregated across problems, we cannot examine the specific
effects of the base rate, hit rate, and false-alarm rate on performance,
systematically. However, we believe the recent analysis by Hafenbrädl
and Hoffrage (2015) sufficiently addresses these points.
Visual aids. Of the manipulations intended to bolster performance
on Bayesian inference problems, the addition of a visual aid has been
the most broadly tested (see Figure 2.2 for examples of the different
types of aids tested across studies). Visual aids have been utilised to
examine whether performance can be improved further by helping
participants to visualise relations between the different pieces of
information4. Specifically, some authors have argued that if one
makes the nested-set structure transparent through visual aids (e.g.,
one can see how different events are related to one another), then
4Note that we use the term visual aid to denote that the visual is presented
alongside or in addition to the text, not as a replacement.
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this modification can reduce the natural frequency facilitation effect
by enhancing performance for conditional probability formats (e.g.,
Sloman et al., 2003; Yamagishi, 2003). Others have argued that visual
aids, shown to be effective in communicating probability information
in other domains (e.g., health risks), can further enhance the effect
of natural frequencies (Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 2013). The rele-
vance of visual aids for helping reasoners solve Bayesian inference
problems was not only evident in the use of pictoral analogs by
participants in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), but also in early work
by Cole (1988) who explored different possibilities for visualising
laboratory results to aid Bayesian reasoning. Generally, visual aids
improve performance across formats (Brase, 2009a; Garcia-Retamero
& Hoffrage, 2013; Sloman et al., 2003; Yamagishi, 2003). However,
the theoretical arguments for when and why visual aids should or
should not facilitate are mixed. Arguments attributed to the ecolog-
ical rationality framework, typically the account by Cosmides and
Tooby (1996), include that visual aids should facilitate performance
when they incorporate discrete, individualised events that can be
counted or when iconicity is high (i.e., greater similarity between the
icon and the object or event it represents) because these help to tap
into the frequency-encoding mechanism (Brase, 2009b, 2014; Sirota,
Kostovičová, & Juanchich, 2014). Nested-sets theory proponents ar-
gue that it is the nested-set component of visualisations that facilitate
performance, or that pictures can boost performance by drawing on
people’s visual computation abilities (Yamagishi, 2003).
To address some of these predictions, a number of studies have
sought to illustrate that not all visual representations are equally
effective (Brase, 2009b, 2014; Moro et al., 2011; Sirota, Kostovičová,
& Juanchich, 2014). Different visualisation techniques have been
employed, some of which may indicate a relative effect size indicated
by the size of elements in the display (see, e.g., Figure 2.2B icon
arrays or frequency grids and Figure 2.2D roulette wheel) and others
that simply reveal set structure (see, e.g., Figure 2.2A frequency or
probability trees). Moro et al. (2011) criticised the use of visual aids
that confound clarification of set structure with the relative size of an
effect. Testing two visual aid designs that did not reveal the relative
size of an effect, (e.g., a Venn diagram that represented sets without
reference to the relative size of the elements), Moro et al. (2011) found
that these visual aids did not significantly improve performance
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Figure 2.2: Examples of visual aids for conditional probability and natural frequency problems.
A) Natural frequency or conditional probability tree (see, e.g., Binder, Krauss, & Bruckmaier,
2015; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001). Numbers in tree represent natural frequencies and
numbers beside branches represent probability versions. B) Icon array/frequency grid (e.g.,
Brase, 2009a, 2014). C) Interactive cards (e.g., Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau,
2015). D) Roulette wheel (e.g., Brase, 2014; Yamagishi, 2003). E) Euler diagram and F) Area
proportional Euler diagram (e.g., Micallef, Dragicevic, & Fekete, 2012; Sloman et al., 2003).
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performance on natural frequency formats was consistently better
than for conditional probability formats regardless of the use of visual
aids. Further, as most participants in both natural frequency and
conditional probability conditions were able to accurately identify
the set structure of problems illustrated with the visual aids, this
suggests that the visual aids used in the study did not make the set
structure of problems unclear. The present meta-analysis compares
studies that use visual aids for both formats to those that do not
use visual aids in order to establish whether visual aids reduce or
enhance the natural frequency facilitation effect. We also code the
specific type of visual aid employed.
2.3.2 Methodological Factors
Methodological or procedural factors may account for some of the
variation across studies and a few studies have attempted to explore
their effect on performance rates. For example, incentives to remu-
nerate or motivate participants to complete a study (e.g., financial
incentives, course credit) can enhance performance, particularly in
cases where incentives are tied to performance (i.e., performance-
based incentives; Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014). Brase (2009a) found
performance-based incentives (performance pay) to be more effective
than a show-up fee or course credit incentive structures at enhancing
performance on Bayesian inference problems; there was no difference
in performance for the latter two incentive structures. However, there
are contradictory findings regarding the effect of incentives on perfor-
mance according to presentation format. Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer
(2001) found participants given rule-based training (Bayes rule) for
solving conditional probability problems maintained high, stable
performance at follow-up only when incentivised whereas partici-
pants receiving natural frequency training maintained performance
regardless of incentives. Brase (2009a) found the effect of incentives
was more evident for Bayesian inference problems of intermediate
difficulty, notably variations of natural frequency formats, and not
for the more difficult conditional probability formats. In contrast,
Ferguson and Starmer (2013) found a main effect of incentives on
performance but no interaction with presentation format. Given
these mixed results and that theoretically it is not clear how incen-
tives should influence performance across formats, we examine the
incentive structure reported across all studies in the meta-analysis.
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Multiple authors have suggested that the way in which Bayesian
solutions are coded as correct may account for some of the varia-
tion across studies (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; McNair, 2015; McNair
& Feeney, 2014). Studies vary as to whether a strict (point esti-
mate) or more lenient estimate (point estimate plus or minus 𝑥
percentage points) is used to classify correct Bayesian responses,
and whether a supportive verbal or written protocol is required to
determine Bayesian reasoning. Supportive protocols are used to
classify marginally incorrect estimates that suffer from minor calcu-
lation errors as correct, or to reclassify as incorrect those responses
that indicate a correct guess but that have not followed a Bayesian
reasoning approach. In Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) initial study,
supportive protocols were used as an additional requirement for
determining the use of Bayesian reasoning and to provide insight
into the types of errors that participants made, thus distinguishing
between outcome and process. We are aware of only one study that
compared performance rates given different scoring criteria. McNair
and Feeney (2014) found that a strict scoring (an exact estimate) re-
sulted in near-negligible rates of correct responses when compared
with scoring that allowed for calculation errors (within 5 percentage
points of the correct estimate). The present meta-analysis attempts to
address whether scoring criteria can account for some of the variation
found across studies.
Given the wide variety of study designs and procedures used
across studies on natural frequencies, we also consider other method-
ological factors that could account for variation in effects. For example,
we consider the potential for learning or practice effects to influence
performance rates and account for whether a within-subjects design
was employed, whether participants solved a single or both formats
(e.g., natural frequency and conditional probability formats), and
record the total number of problems (additional problems) participants
were required to solve.
2.3.3 Individual Differences
Characteristics of the sample or the individual have been investigated
in an attempt to determine for whom the natural frequency format
is most effective. Some of these individual-level moderators have
been investigated with the view that they reveal insights into the
nature of the cognitive mechanisms involved (e.g., general purpose
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or domain-specific; see Lesage et al., 2013; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hag-
mayer, 2014). Others have been explored in an attempt to elucidate
boundary conditions or to identify characteristics of individuals that
contribute to variations in performance (e.g., numeracy, education;
see Brase, Fiddick, & Harries, 2006; Johnson & Tubau, 2013). For
instance, exploring the natural frequency facilitation effect in dif-
ferent lay and expert populations can provide insights into how
expertise, education, cognitive ability and development contribute to
performance differences across formats and studies.
Individual differences have generally been explored in relation to
differences in cognitive capacity or ability, for instance, in terms of
educational achievement or cognitive development across the lifespan,
to the importance of basic numerical skills or the role of expertise.
There is little surprise that higher general intelligence or cognitive
ability (i.e., cognitive reflection, thinking disposition) has been linked
with improved performance across formats for Bayesian inference
tasks (Lesage et al., 2013; McNair, 2015; Sirota & Juanchich, 2011;
Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014). Nevertheless, even amongst
individuals with higher ability there are substantial variations in
performance across studies and considerable room for improvement.
In this connection, numerous studies have explored whether a basic
level of numeracy is needed for the facilitation effect to emerge (e.g.,
the threshold hypothesis; see Hill & Brase, 2012) or whether natural
frequencies can facilitate performance even for individuals with low
numerical ability (Galesic, Gigerenzer, & Straubinger, 2009). While
high numerates tend to perform better across formats, results are
mixed as to whether the effect of numeracy is independent to that
of information format (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Hill & Brase, 2012;
Johnson & Tubau, 2013).
Similar results are found in relation to the effect of educational
experience on performance (Brase et al., 2006; Siegrist & Keller, 2011).
For instance, even medical professionals and students, who are ex-
posed to conditional probabilities in medical textbooks and curricula
(e.g., test statistics, such as positive predictive value), have been shown
to benefit from natural frequency formats (Friederichs, Ligges, & Weis-
senstein, 2014; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998), with some suggestion
that professionals may benefit more than lay audiences (Bramwell,
West, & Salmon, 2006). A number of studies have also shown that nat-
ural frequency formats facilitate performance on Bayesian inference
tasks for both children (Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006) and adolescents
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(Lesage et al., 2013), suggesting that the computational advantage
is evident even at early stages of cognitive development. Galesic,
Gigerenzer, and Straubinger (2009) also showed that natural frequen-
cies facilitate performance in the elderly, who can face age-related
cognitive declines in numerical reasoning abilities. Studies inves-
tigating training effects suggest performance on natural frequency
formats is more robust over time (Kurzenhäuser & Hoffrage, 2002;
Ruscio, 2003; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001; Sirota, Kostovičová, &
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015a), indicating the potential to further build
on cognitive ability with training.
In summary, general cognitive ability is associated with improve-
ments in performance on Bayesian inference problems across a range
of individual difference factors. However, it is unclear whether cog-
nitive abilities increase the facilitation effect of natural frequencies
or simply improve performance across tasks irrespective of format.
Accordingly, we seek to quantify to what degree these individual
characteristics contribute to performance differences across studies.
Specifically, we code for a variety of individual differences across
studies, including sample characteristics (e.g., educational experience,
or expertise) and whether the study made comparisons based on cog-
nitive ability measures (e.g., numeracy). We anticipate that cognitive
ability and educational expertise will increase performance rates for
both formats and therefore it is unclear how these will influence the
overall facilitation effect.
2.3.4 Overview of Meta-Analysis
As evident in our review, a variety of potential moderators have
been proposed to account for the variation in the natural frequency
facilitation effect found across studies. Some of these moderators
have been introduced to explore or test specific theoretical accounts
(e.g., cognitive ability, short menu format), while others have been
proposed as factors to account for the variation in the size of effects
across studies (e.g., scoring criteria). Predictions as to how each mod-
erator should affect the size of the natural frequency facilitation effect
are not always possible, because of mixed results and/or theoretical
arguments in the literature (e.g., numeracy) or because studies have
manipulated some moderators without testing them explicitly. Even
in cases where moderators were not tested within any given study,
meta-analyses are able to use the between-study variation to estimate
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the effect of such moderators, provided sufficient variation. Accord-
ingly, the meta-analysis examines whether each moderator further
enhances performance for natural frequencies, whether performance
is enhanced across formats, or whether performance improves on
conditional probability formats such that the relative difference in
performance between formats is reduced. Table 2.1 summarises the
moderators that were coded for in the present meta-analysis.
2.4 Method
2.4.1 Literature Search and Inclusion Criteria
Multiple methods were utilised to identify relevant papers for the
review. A literature search of relevant databases (PsycINFO; PubMed;
and Web of Science) was conducted on the following search terms
(with thesaurus to explode terms, if available): bayes* AND con-
ditional probab*, natural frequenc*, nested set, OR (reason* OR
inference). Cited reference searches were conducted on key theoreti-
cal or review papers in the field (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Cosmides &
Tooby, 1996) as well as on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) initial
paper. Finally, a message was posted to the Society for Judgment and
Decision Making (JDM) list requesting any additional publications,
published or unpublished. No language restrictions were applied
explicitly. The search covered papers published until December 2015,
inclusive.
Studies were considered eligible for inclusion if they directly
compared natural frequency and conditional probability formats.
Studies that examined performance rates for different moderators on
one format only were excluded. For studies that included multiple
variations of different formats, the formats that were most equivalent
to one another were selected for comparison (e.g., when both formats
included a visual aid). If the moderator applied to one format
only (e.g., the inclusion of an enumerated population for probability
conditions), the effect was included and coded accordingly (see Table
2.1). Where more than one comparison was possible, for example
when a natural frequency format was compared with two different
conditional probability versions (typically normalised frequencies),
the effect for the two most equivalent formats were compared, or
two separate effects were included and then multiple comparison
effects were controlled for in the analysis. We included studies that
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compared natural frequencies and chances with natural sampling,
however these were analysed separately for the reasons specified
in the review and again below (see section on Coding of Moderators;
Brase, 2008; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2015a). For the meta-analysis the sample sizes and
performance rates for each format were required. When these were
not reported in the publication, we attempted to obtain the relevant
data from the corresponding author.
2.4.2 Screening for Eligible Studies
The database search yielded 213 relevant abstracts of which 35 re-
ported on studies that met the inclusion criteria. The primary reasons
for excluding studies were that they did not report an experiment (65
papers; 37% of excluded papers), studied a different type of probabil-
ity problem (e.g., not conditional probabilities; 49 papers, 28%) or did
not include one of the relevant formats for comparison (e.g., tested
only natural frequency or probability problems; 44 papers, 25%).
One additional paper was identified from the cited reference search,
two additional papers were retrieved from the JDM mailing list (one
currently unpublished), and one additional paper was sourced from
the bibliography of another relevant paper during coding (the paper
was published in a law journal and was not indexed for retrieval from
the database search). For two of the relevant papers, an effect size
could not be derived from the results or retrieved from the authors
(Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 2013; Kochetova-Kozloski, Messier, &
Eilifsen, 2011) and these could not be included in the meta-analysis.
Three papers compared natural frequencies and chances with natu-
ral sampling formats (Brase, 2008; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sirota,
Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015b). As two of these papers
did not also include a conditional probability format as a comparison
(Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau,
2015b), these papers were coded separately and all chances with
natural sampling conditions were analysed in a separate analysis (see
subsection “Subset analysis: Chances with natural sampling”). Thus, a
total of 35 papers that compared natural frequency and conditional
probability formats were finally included in the meta-analysis.
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2.4.3 Coding of Moderators
Each study was coded according to a coding manual that was devel-
oped on the basis of the literature reviewed. Binary variables were
coded for the presence (1) versus absence (0) of the moderator. Basic
study characteristics included year of publication (and publication
status), sample size per group, sample characteristics (e.g., age and
gender; these were not always available), and study design (within-
or between-subject). Coding of papers was completed by research
assistants and authors, with any disagreements resolved through
discussion. One sixth of papers were double-coded and for each
variable the agreement assessed using Cohen’s , with a median
value of 1 and an average of .89.
Problem representation. Problem representation moderators were
recorded for each format separately (e.g., question format used in
natural frequency format and in probability format), unless the
moderator applied to only a single format (e.g., as in the case of an
enumerated population). In studies where multiple problems were
tested but the details for all problems were not provided, we made
the assumption that all problems contained the same information,
structure, and other representation factors (e.g., numerical format).
Information structure or short menu was coded as either (0) for
standard or (1) for short menu. A problem was coded as short
menu if it presented only joint events, either with the denominator
already calculated, as in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s 1995 original
study: 𝑝(𝐻 ∩𝐷)/𝑝(𝐷); or requiring a simple calculation as in Mellers
and McGraw (1999): 𝑝(𝐻∩𝐷)/[𝑝(𝐻∩𝐷)+ 𝑝(¬𝐻∩𝐷)]. For the latter
studies, the natural frequency version presented all joint frequencies
(e.g., hit rate, false-alarm rate, and their complements) relative to
a total sample rather than to subsets and the computation was the
same as in standard versions. We coded studies that compared
both formats in short menu, or both formats in standard menu.
Task complexity was coded for the number of hypotheses, cues,
and cue values presented in the problem. We set out to code the
following variations: (a) two hypotheses, single dichotomous cue;
(b) two hypotheses, two dichotomous cues; (c) three hypotheses,
single dichotomous cue; (d) two hypotheses, single cue with 3 cue
values; and (e) two hypotheses, three dichotomous cues. As only one
study (Hoffrage, Krauss, et al., 2015) examined a single problem for
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categories (d) and (e) (representing two effects each), and only two
additional studies (Hill & Brase, 2015; Krauss et al., 1999) examined
category (b) problems (representing 10 effects), these were combined
under the more general two or more cues coding category, coded as
present (1) or absent (0). This category represents more complex
problem representations where two or more cues or cue values were
examined (for example, multiple medical tests or a single test with
multiple test results). Three hypotheses refers to case (c) where the
problem included three hypotheses (e.g., one of three diagnoses) with
a single dichotomous cue (e.g., a single medical test), and was also
coded as present (1) or absent (0).
To account for any variation in effects attributable to the number
of events referred to in probability formats, we coded moderator
multiple events as (0) if the problem referred to the probability of a
single event (e.g., the probability that a woman has breast cancer;
chances that a student passes a test) and (1) if numbers referred to
sets of events (e.g., the relative/absolute frequency of women having
breast cancer). As all natural frequency problems relate to multiple
events, this category only applied to the coding of the probability
formats. We coded the numerical format used within each problem.
However, there was minimal variation in the numerical formats
used for the problems and questions. For conditional probability
formats, only normalised frequency formats used pairs of integers
(representing only 4 comparisons) whereas the remaining probability
formats used percentages in the majority of cases, and in some cases
fractions, or mixed numerical formats. Given the minimal variation
in these numerical formats, we did not consider this moderator any
further, except for cases in which an incongruent question format
was used. In cases where a probability question was asked for the
natural frequency format, we coded probability question as (1), and (0)
otherwise. Similarly, when probability formats required a frequency
response in pairs of integers, we coded frequency question as (1) and
(0) otherwise.
An enumerated population (or reference class) was coded as present
(1) if the probability problem included an enumerated population as
part of the problem description, that is, a sample size was provided
for the participant to use in their calculations (e.g., “the data refers
to 1,000 women”), otherwise it was coded as (0). For each estimate,
the base rate, hit rate, and false-alarm rate used within the problem was
recorded, where possible. If an estimate represented the average
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performance across multiple problems, or in cases where problems
included multiple hypotheses or cues, no values were recorded.
Studies that included a visual aid were coded for the type of visual
aid used: (a) 2 × 2 contingency table, (b) frequency/probability tree,
(c) Venn diagram, (d) picture, or (e) experienced-based interactive
cards. Given that there were few instances of each type of visual, we
compared effects that used any visual aid (a)–(e) coded as (1) versus
no visual aid (0) in the analysis.
Three of the included studies (representing seven independent
comparisons) made a direct comparison between natural frequency
and chances with natural sampling problem formats. The only
difference between the two conditions was related to the number
of events (chances referred to the probability of a single event, and
natural frequencies to multiple events). In all other respects, these
chances formats differ almost entirely from other probability formats,
specifically in terms of information structure (or lack of normalisation).
We decided to include these effects when coding for studies because
of recent interest in their similarities and the implications they are
argued to have on theoretical perspectives (see, e.g., Brase, 2008; Sirota,
Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015a). However, we analyse these
effects separately from the primary analysis.
Methodological factors. For each effect, we coded sample size
and whether the study employed a within-subjects design, coded
as (1), or not, coded as (0), for use in analyses as well as various
study procedural factors. We coded whether participants received
at least one problem of both formats as (1), and (0) otherwise, and
the number of additional problems completed per format. We also
recorded whether problems were presented in a fixed sequence or
random order, however most studies used counterbalanced designs
and it was not possible to test any order effects. Further, we recorded
whether an incentive was offered and if so, the type of incentive:
A show-up fee was coded as (1) when a it was given in the form
of money or course credit, and (0) if participation was voluntary.
Similarly, performance-pay was coded as (1) when payment depended
on performance, and (0) when participation was voluntary. Where
no information about incentives was stated explicitly, no category
was recorded.
In relation to strict scoring criteria, we categorised studies as apply-
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ing either a strict or more lenient criteria for scoring a respondent’s
solution as correct5, and coded whether or not a supportive protocol
was required. Specifically, we coded studies as requiring an: (a)
exact estimate (include rounding), (b) exact estimate plus or minus
a percentage margin, (c) exact estimate (including rounding) with
supportive protocol, and (d) exact estimate (including rounding) or
a supportive protocol6. Given that categories (a), (b), and (d) were
determined to be more lenient criteria, and category (d) was not
common, these were grouped together and strict scoring was coded
(0) in these cases and (1) in case (c).
Individual differences. The primary sample of participants com-
prising each effect was coded to account for the education and exper-
tise of the participants: (a) university undergraduate/postgraduate
students, (b) medical students, (c) physicians, (d) general popula-
tion, (e) older adults, (f) children, (g) secondary school students, (h)
management executives. Owing to small samples across some of the
categories, we considered categories (a), (b), (c), and (h) as instances
of samples of (experts) in probabilistic reasoning or similar problems
as described in the literature and coded these samples as (1) and
(0) if they belonged to groups (d), (e), (f), or (g). Where numeracy
was examined and reported as a moderator, samples were coded as
having high numeracy (1) or low numeracy (0), typically determined
by a median split of the sample in the study7. In all cases, the 11-item
Lipkus numeracy scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) was used
to measure numeracy, although one study (Galesic, Gigerenzer, &
Straubinger, 2009) added an additional item about a coin toss from
Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, and Welch (1997). There were almost no
studies that employed other measures of cognitive ability (see Lesage
et al., 2013; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014, for exceptions).
5Only one study used average errors as a dependent variable (Fiedler et al., 2000),
for which we obtained data classifying responses as correct or incorrect.
6A supportive protocol could be used to confirm a correct estimate, or to recode
an incorrect estimate if the correct process was followed but a calculation error was
made. In all but two studies (Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015;
Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006), the protocol was used to confirm a correct estimate.
7In one case, we obtained raw data from the authors in order to calculate separate
effects for high and low numeracy (Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau,
2016).
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2.4.4 Calculation of Outcome Measures
The focus of the meta-analysis is on the proportion of correct responses
obtained for each of the two formats, that is, the natural frequency and
the conditional probability formats. As mentioned above, we only
considered studies that compared performance across formats eligible
for inclusion. For this reason, each condition of each experiment
yielded two proportions when two formats were compared, or three
proportions when three formats were compared. We will refer to
them as a tuple and assume, for the sake of exposition, that each tuple
consists of two proportions, one for each format. Each study can
yield either one tuple or several when it includes multiple conditions.
Likewise, each of the 35 articles could include one study or several.









where subscripts 𝐹 and 𝑃 denote the natural frequency format and
the conditional probability format, respectively, 𝑐 denotes the number
of correct responses, and 𝑖 denotes the number of incorrect responses.
Each observed proportion provides one estimate of the true propor-
tion underlying the observed value. We therefore refer to observed
proportions as estimates.
The meta-analytic model that aggregates the different estimates
requires that they follow normal distributions. However, because 𝑝𝐹
and 𝑝𝑃 can only take values in the limited range of [0, 1], they cannot
be normally distributed and require transformation before being























For each format, the logit is the natural logarithm of the odds of a
correct response, which is in turn defined as the ratio of correct to
incorrect responses. When correct and incorrect responses are equally
frequent, the odds are one and the logit takes a value of zero. When
a correct response is more frequent than an incorrect response, the
odds exceed one and the logit is positive. Conversely, more incorrect
than correct responses imply a negative logit. From now on, we will
refer to the logit when we would usually refer to a proportion.
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Because each logit is estimated from a finite sample of participants,
we record the corresponding sampling variance as a measure of its













Most estimates were calculated from independent samples so
that we assumed the covariances between them to be zero. However,
some estimates were based on the same set of participants, which
happened in either of three cases. First, in five studies, results were
reported separately for each problem although all problems were
solved by the same set of participants. In this case, we averaged
proportions correct across problems, yielding only one estimate for
each format. Second, in five experiments (yielding 18 logits), the
same set of participants was used for both formats, yielding a within-
subject estimate of the facilitation effect. Finally, five experiments
(yielding 40 logits) shared participants across conditions. In both
these cases, we estimated the covariance between the two logits based
on the same set of participants using a method suggested by Stedman,
Curtin, Elbourne, Kesselheim, and Brookhart (2011),
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑙𝑎 , 𝑙𝑏) = 𝑛 ×
𝑛 × 𝑠 − 𝑐𝑎 × 𝑐𝑏
𝑐𝑎 × 𝑐𝑏 × 𝑖𝑎 × 𝑖𝑏
, (2.7)
where 𝑎 and 𝑏 denote two arbitrary formats, 𝑛 denotes the sample size,
and 𝑠 denotes the number of participants giving a correct response
under both formats8.
We are not only interested in aggregating the proportion of correct
responses for each format but also in the relative advantage of one





which gives the ratio of the odds for the natural frequency format to
the odds for the conditional probability format. The logarithm of the
8There were eight logits for which the quantity 𝑠 was not available. In three of
these cases, either 𝑐𝐹 = 0 or 𝑐𝑃 = 0, so that 𝑠 = 0. In the remaining five cases, we
used the middlemost possible value and examined the effect of this choice on model
outcomes (see section Model Diagnostics).
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odds ratio is easily computed from the logits of both formats,
𝑙𝑛[OR] = 𝑙𝑛[𝑐𝐹/𝑖𝐹] − 𝑙𝑛[𝑐𝑃/𝑖𝑃] = 𝑙𝐹 − 𝑙𝑃 . (2.9)
Intuitively, 𝑙𝑛[OR] is positive when the logit (and therefore the
proportion correct) under the natural frequency format exceeds the
logit under the conditional probability format, and is negative in the
reverse case.
After averaging proportions and calculating covariances, we
obtained a final set of 𝑘 = 226 logit estimates from 115 conditions in
35 papers, as well as a 𝑘 × 𝑘 covariance matrix of these logits, V. The
estimates could then be aggregated to obtain summary estimates and
examine the effects of different study characteristics. The following
section will present the statistical strategy for conducting this meta-
analysis.
2.4.5 Aggregation of Outcome Measures
To aggregate the 𝑘 = 226 logits shown in Table 2.A in Appendix A, we
use a bivariate mixed effects model (van Houwelingen, Zwinderman,
& Stĳnen, 1993). Because bivariate models are relatively new to the
meta-analytical toolbox, this section gives a detailed exposition of the
model.
According to the bivariate model, each experiment is characterized
by two logits that represent the proportions correct for each format.
Rather than combining these logits in an effect-size estimate, the
model treats them separately and estimates how a given moderator
affects responses under each format. Formally, each experiment

















which consists of two observed logits, 𝑙𝐹 and 𝑙𝑃 that serve as estimates
of the true logits, 𝐹 and 𝑃 . Because estimates are based on random
samples of participants, the true logits differ from their observed
values by residuals 𝑒𝐹 and 𝑒𝑃 . The residuals are assumed to reflect
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𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑙𝑘 , 𝑙1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑙𝑘 , 𝑙2) · · · 𝑣𝑙𝑘
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(2.11)
where the (estimated) sampling variances of each logit are given
along the main diagonal and the (estimated) covariances between
the logits are either assumed to be zero or estimated using Equation
(2.7), as discussed above.
The true logits of each estimate 𝑗 are further assumed to consist
of two components, reflecting the effects of moderators and residual
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which describes each format’s true logit as the sum of a base logit,
the effects of moderators, and the effect of residual heterogeneity.
Consider first the base logits, 𝛽𝐹,0 and 𝛽𝑃,0. For each format, they give
the average true logits underlying estimates from a standard study
that has none of the 12 characteristics examined in the full-sample
meta-analysis.
Consider next the effects of moderators. For each of the twelve
study characteristics, 𝑥𝑚,𝑗 is a binary variable that takes value 1 when
estimate 𝑗 is based on a study with characteristic 𝑚, and 0 otherwise.
A value of 1 on 𝑥 𝑗 ,𝑚 adds the products 𝛽𝐹,𝑚 × 1 and 𝛽𝑃,𝑚 × 1 to the
base logits, implying that 𝛽𝐹,𝑚 and 𝛽𝑃,𝑚 capture the effects of study
characteristic 𝑚 on the true logits. In contrast, a value of 0 on 𝑥 𝑗 ,𝑚
leaves the true logit unaffected by study characteristic 𝑚.
Finally, consider the effects of residual heterogeneity, 𝑢𝐹,𝑗 and
𝑢𝑃,𝑗 . They capture, for example, differences in study design that are
left unexplained by the set of moderators. Because studies differ
in the exact problems they use and because these problems vary in
difficulty, such residual heterogeneity is realistic. The mixed-effects
model assumes that the effect of residual heterogeneity follows a
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where 𝜏2
𝐹
denotes the variance of 𝑢𝐹,𝑗 , 𝜏2𝑃 denotes the variance of 𝑢𝑃,𝑗 ,
and 𝜏𝐹𝑃 denotes their covariance. In addition, the model assumes
that the sample of studies is a random sample from the population of
possible studies. Provided that these assumptions are met, the mixed-
effects model can be used to make inferences about the population
of hypothetical studies. An alternative approach does not include
random effects from residual heterogeneity. Such a fixed-effects
approach does not allow inferences beyond the sample of studies
included (Hedges & Vevea, 1998) and is therefore not considered for
the present analysis.
The goal of the present meta-analysis is to estimate all 𝛽 and 𝜏
coefficients. That is, we want to estimate both base logits, the average
effects of all twelve study characteristics, and the (co-)variances of
the random effects of residual heterogeneity. To assess the precision
of these estimates, we compute cluster-robust standard errors that
account for potential associations between results reported in the
same paper (Hedges, Tipton, & Johnson, 2010). To estimate the
parameters, individual logits are weighted by their precision using
the covariance matrices V and T. This implies that logits based on
large, independent samples receive, ceteris paribus, higher weight
than those based on small, correlated samples.
2.5 Results
In this section, we examine the pool of collected studies and report
results of our meta-analytical model that aggregates the individual
study results and delineates the effects of different study charac-
teristics. This model was estimated using the statistical package R,
version 3.3.3 (R Core Team, 2014), and the development version of
the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010).
2.5.1 Distribution of Observed Values
Of the 𝑘 = 226 logits collected for analysis, 𝑘𝐹 = 111 concern the
natural frequency format and 𝑘𝑃 = 115 concern the conditional
probability format. The disparity of 𝑘𝐹 and 𝑘𝑃 is due to the fact that in
four cases an alternative probability format (normalised frequencies)
was included along with the usual conditional probability format.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show forest plots of the proportions correct for
the natural frequency and conditional probability formats, respec-
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Figure 2.3: Funnel plot of model residuals: For each observed log odds ratio, the x-axis gives
the residuals from a univariate mixed-effects model that includes the same study characteristics
as the bivariate model. The y-axis gives the standard errors of the observed log odds ratios, and
the triangle defines the 95 percent confidence interval. In the absence of publication bias, the
funnel plot is symmetric; asymmetry indicates publication bias. We can observe that the plot
appears largely symmetric with slightly more studies having positive residuals than negative
ones.
tively. Here, each estimate is represented by a square, enclosed by its
95% confidence intervals. The distributions of observed proportions
differ markedly between formats, with the majority falling above
.2 in Figure 2.4 and below .2 in Figure 2.5. Proportions from the
conditional probability format therefore appear to be smaller, on
average, than those from the natural frequency format.
To examine evidence of selective reporting of studies, Figure 2.3
shows a funnel plot of the observed effects. Selective reporting refers
to a biased publication system that favors results of a particular
direction of the effect and/or size of the p-value. Because the effect
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size is given by the odds ratio, we estimated a univariate mixed-effects
model (Hedges & Vevea, 1998) of the estimated 𝑙𝑛[OR]. This model
contained the same set of moderators as our original model but
takes 𝑙𝑛[OR] as the outcome variable. Figure 2.3 plots the residuals
from this model against each estimate’s standard error. One would
expect estimates with small standard errors to have residuals closer to
zero and those with large standard errors to fluctuate more strongly
around the estimated value. The white area reflects this intuition and
gives the 95%-confidence intervals.
Funnel plots are commonly used to detect asymmetries that
indicate a relative lack of studies with residuals in a particular
direction. Although the plot appears largely symmetrical, we can
observe that the presence of two very imprecise studies with negative
residuals in the lower left portion of the plot creates a relative lack
of studies with similar imprecision and positive residuals. Indeed,
a formal test of funnel plot asymmetry in meta-analyses of odds
ratios (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2006) rejects the null
hypothesis of funnel plot symmetry at the one percent significance
level (𝑡 = 2.7, 𝑝 = .0077). Although such funnel-plot asymmetry
cannot unambiguously establish selective reporting (see, e.g., Lau,
Ioannidis, Terrin, Schmid, & Olkin, 2006), we conclude that there
is some evidence of publication bias. Because over-reporting of
studies with negative residuals has a negative effect on most of the
estimated coefficients, we note that the estimates reported here may
underestimate the underlying true effects. However, because the
degree of asymmetry is small, we suspect that the under-estimation
is limited9.
2.5.2 Model Diagnostics
The meta-analytical model introduced in the previous section uses the
observed proportions to estimate the underlying true proportions for
studies with different combinations of study characteristics. Before
we discuss the summary estimates, let us consider a few model
diagnostics.
9Ideally we would re-estimate the model after correcting for publication bias (e.g.,
Duval & Tweedie, 2000) or employ methods that are unaffected by publication bias
(e.g., van Assen, van Aert, & Wicherts, 2015). However, these methods are either not
suitable or not available for the bivariate mixed-effects model employed here.
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For each observed logit, the polygons in Figures 2.4 and 2.5
give the estimated average proportion for studies with the same
characteristics, along with their 95% confidence intervals. However,
the estimates do not include the effects of residual heterogeneity,
that is heterogeneity in the true effect that is unaccounted for by the
study characteristics included in the model. The model estimates
?̂?2𝐹 = .54, ?̂?
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. The effect of residual heterogeneity is estimated
to be, on average, larger in the natural frequency format than in
the conditional probability format. At the same time, the high
correlation between the random effects implies that studies with
large residual heterogeneity in one format have, on average, large
residual heterogeneity on both formats. A formal test of residual
homogeneity (𝑄188 = 773.19, 𝑝 < .0001) suggests that the presence of
residual heterogeneity is not merely a sampling artifact. To put the
estimated amount of residual heterogeneity into perspective, consider
the ratio of residual heterogeneity to the total variation in observed
logits (Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Jackson, White, & Riley, 2012).
This ratio is estimated at 𝐼2
𝐹
= 76% for the natural frequency and
𝐼2
𝑃
= 75% for the conditional probability format. Thus, in both formats,
more than 70 percent of the variance in effects is due to residual
heterogeneity, which would be considered a considerable amount
of heterogeneity in medical research (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks,
& Altman, 2003). Although psychological studies tend to be less
stringently controlled, the amount of heterogeneity can nevertheless
be considered large.
Like all model parameters, the amount of residual heterogeneity
is estimated with some level of imprecision. We use the upper and
lower bounds of the confidence intervals of all three heterogeneity
parameters to examine the effect of this imprecision. In total, these
parameter estimates can be combined in 2×2×2 = 8 different ways. For







fixed a priori. Because the amount of heterogeneity affects
the weights assigned to each observed logit, each re-estimation of the
model yields a different set of estimated summary effects. However,
none of the estimated changes in proportions varies by more than
two percentage points, leading us to conclude that the imprecision in
the estimated amount of heterogeneity has no considerable effect on
the conclusions of our analysis.
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Author(s) and Year Proportion Correct [95% CI]
Figure 2.4: Forest plot of proportions correct in natural frequency format: The black squares
represent the observed values and the whiskers their corresponding confidence intervals. The
polygons represent the estimated average proportions (and their confidence intervals) for studies
with the same characteristics. Estimates A, B, C,... denote different comparisons from the same
paper, referenced in Table 3.
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Author(s) and Year Proportion Correct [95% CI]
Figure 2.5: Forest plot of proportions correct in conditional probability format: The black
squares represent the observed values and the whiskers their corresponding confidence intervals.
The polygons represent the estimated average proportions (and their confidence intervals) for
studies with the same characteristics. Estimates A, B, C,... denote different comparisons from
the same paper, referenced in Table 3.
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Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that accuracy appears to be lowest at
the very top and bottom of each forest plot, where extreme observed
logits are found. To identify such outliers, we computed the stan-
dardized residuals, dividing each residual by its standard deviation
(Viechtbauer & Cheung, 2010). This metric follows a standard nor-
mal distribution where all logits with residuals |𝑧 | > 1.96 may be
defined as outliers, 18 in the present case. Outliers can have an
undue influence on the model parameters when their leverage is
high, that is when their study characteristics differ strongly from
the average. Leverage is expressed by an estimate’s hat value and
there are 4 logits with hat values indicating high leverage, however
none of them is an outlier. Therefore, we would expect that none of
the outliers has undue influence on model parameters. Indeed, we
computed the Mahalanobis distances of the observed logits, which
indicate their individual effects on the estimated summary values.
Again, no single observed logit was found to have an undue effect
on the model estimates, which may not be surprising given the total
number of logits. Therefore, no observed logit was excluded from
the meta-analysis.
Another sensitivity check concerns the estimation of the sample
covariances in the section Calculation of Outcome Measures. As men-
tioned before, the estimation required knowledge of quantity 𝑠, the
number of participants with a correct response in both formats. This
number was not available for all studies but the range of possible
numbers was restricted by zero on the lower end, and 𝑐𝐹 and 𝑐𝑃
(whichever is lower) on the upper end. From this range, we used the
middlemost value for estimating the covariance. To examine the effect
of this choice on the outcomes of the meta-analysis, we re-estimated
the model for all possible combinations of 𝑠 values. Given the ranges
of the five estimates, there are 2 × 4 × 10 × 2 × 6 = 960 different possi-
bilities and model re-estimations. The model parameters changed
very little with no estimate of 𝛽𝐹 or 𝛽𝑃 varying by more than 0.1 and




ranging by more than 0.02. We therefore suspect
that this factor is unlikely to affect our conclusions.
Last, the model assumes normality in the errors and Figure 2.6
shows a quantile plot of the residuals, where the straight line indicates
full normality. Indeed, the observed residuals follow the line closely









































































































































Figure 2.6: Quantile plot of residuals: When the residuals follow a normal distribution, they
should line up along the diagonal line where the theoretical quantiles of a normal distribution
equal the observed quantiles. Indeed, the observed quantiles follow approximately a normal
distribution and deviations are small and non-systematic.
2.5.3 Summary Estimates and Study Characteristics
The upper panel of Table 2.2 shows the estimated summary effects.
The first row gives the base proportions of both formats. Recall that
the base proportions give the proportions correct for a standard study
with none of the characteristics examined below. To obtain these









which is the inverse of Equation (2.5). For the natural frequency
format, the model estimates that on average 24 percent of participants
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Table 2.2
Estimated Average Proportions and Implied Odds Ratios
natural conditional implied
frequency probability effect size
No variable Δ𝑚 CI.95 Δ𝑚 CI.95 OR CI.95
0 baseline .24 [.13, .40] .04 [.01, .14] 7.11 [4.37, 11.56]
1 short menu +.12 [−.13,+.47] +.11 [−.00,+.38] 3.08 [1.75, 5.42]
2 three hypotheses +.19 [−.05,+.45] +.09 [+.01,+.25] 4.66 [2.32, 9.37]
3 two or more cues −.04 [−.20,+.37] −.02 [−.04,+.07] 11.37 [4.59, 28.20]
4 probability question −.02 [−.17,+.27] +.02 [−.02,+.13] 4.42 [2.08, 9.37]
5 frequency question −.01 [−.18,+.38] −.02 [−.04,+.06] 12.40 [3.90, 39.44]
6 enumerated population −.00 [−.15,+.24] −.00 [−.02,+.06] 7.06 [3.40, 14.69]
7 multiple events +.02 [−.17,+.37] +.02 [−.02,+.12] 5.53 [3.31, 9.24]
8 visual aid +.23 [+.02,+.45] +.22 [+.04,+.53] 2.52 [1.36, 4.67]
9 strict scoring −.02 [−.16,+.23] +.01 [−.03,+.15] 4.72 [2.67, 8.33]
10 both formats +.13 [−.15,+.53] −.01 [−.03,+.09] 16.19 [8.75, 29.96]
11 additional problems +.01 [−.03,+.05] +.00 [−.01,+.02] 6.72 [4.14, 10.91]
12 experts +.07 [−.11,+.34] +.03 [−.03,+.24] 5.96 [4.39, 8.09]
0 chances .40 [.16, .71] .19 [.03, .67] 2.77 [1.49, 5.16]
0 no incentive .41 [.27, .57] .10 [.05, .21] 6.10 [3.46, 10.77]
1 show-up fee −.03 [−.22,+.20] +.01 [−.07,+.21] 4.90 [3.60, 6.68]
2 performance pay +.23 [+.07,+.36] +.11 [−.00,+.28] 6.62 [2.57, 17.07]
0 low numeracy .26 [.00, .97] .04 [.00, .56] 9.37 [4.10, 21.41]
1 high numeracy +.25 [+.04,+.46] +.11 [−.01,+.50] 5.92 [3.32, 10.57]
Notes: Top panel gives results of full-sample meta-analysis and bottom panels give results of
subset analyses; numbers without sign give baseline proportions and numbers with sign give
changes in proportions; confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors (Hedges et
al., 2010); numbers are rounded.
give a correct response. In contrast, on average only 4 percent
of participants are estimated to give a correct response with the
conditional probability format. These proportions imply an odds
ratio of 7.1, which can be considered a strong effect. Even at the lower
bound of the 95% confidence interval, this corresponds to an effect
that is exceptionally large. On average, the share of participants who
correctly solved Bayesian inference problems is 20 percentage points
higher when they are presented in natural frequencies rather than
conditional probabilities.
The remaining rows of the top panel in Table 2.2 give the changes
in proportions that can be attributed to different moderators. For
each format, we obtained Δ𝑚 associated with study characteristic 𝑚
by adding 𝛽0 and 𝛽𝑚 , converting the resulting logit into a proportion,
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Using the estimates of Δ𝐹,𝑚 , Δ𝑃,𝑚 we are now able to examine the
effects of each of the twelve study characteristics on the proportions
correct and the resulting odds ratios. Note that a study characteristic
that affects performance of both formats equally can have strong
effects on the odds ratio, because it alters the relative advantage of
one format over the other. For example, increasing performance
from 50% to 60% in one format and from 10% to 20% in the other
reduces the odds ratio from .5.5/ .1.9 = 9 to .6.4/ .2.8 = 6. Note also that we
discuss the different study characteristics individually, although most
studies include one or more of them simultaneously. For example, the
original study by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) used strict scoring,
tested experts, and had participants complete 14 additional problems in
both formats. To obtain the proportions correct estimated by our model
for this scenario, one needs to add the effects of all these moderators
to the base proportions.
As shown in Table 2.2, visual aids, three hypotheses, and short menu
were the strongest problem representation characteristics across for-
mats. Methodological factors were also influential, in particular both
formats. In many cases, moderators that improved performance for
probability formats also improved performance for natural frequency
formats. However, performance rates varied markedly across studies,
and it is sobering to acknowledge that even with the inclusion of
influential moderators, many participants were still unable to solve
Bayesian inference problems in natural frequency formats. Below,
we discuss the results and their practical and theoretical implications
following our moderator analysis.
Problem representation moderators. Problem representation mod-
erators affected natural frequency and conditional probability formats
in a similar direction although to varying degrees and often with
greater percentage increases for natural frequency formats. However,
owing to the relative improvement or decline found for both formats,
in some cases the size of the facilitation effect was reduced. A subset
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analysis on studies that compared natural frequencies to chances
with natural sampling suggests that, despite a similar information
structure, natural frequencies retained a facilitative effect.
Short menu As predicted by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995),
short menu formats have a positive effect on probability formats but
perhaps unexpected was the improvement in performance for the
short menu versions of natural frequencies. A short menu is estimated
to increase the share of correct responses by 12 percentage points in
the natural frequency condition and by 11 percentage points in the
conditional probability format. Although both proportions increase
by similar amounts, the parallel increase would lower the average
odds ratio to 3.1 because the absolute difference in proportions now
constitutes a smaller relative advantage. Thus, presenting short
menu formats improves performance as predicted, but there is some
added facilitative effect for short menu formats presented in joint
frequencies.
As mentioned in the introduction, there were differences in the
conjunctive structure of information presented in the short versions
used across studies: three studies provided 𝑝(𝐷) and 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻)
(Ferguson & Starmer, 2013; Gigerenzer, 1996b; O’Brien, Roazzi, &
da Graca B. B. Dias, 2004) and three studies provided 𝑝(𝐷 ∩ 𝐻) and
𝑝(𝐷 ∩¬𝐻) (Fiedler et al., 2000; Lesage et al., 2013; Mellers & McGraw,
1999). Consistent with Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) argument,
in both cases the equation for short and standard natural frequency
versions remains the same (albeit in some cases with the denominator
already calculated) whereas for conditional probability versions the
equation is substantially simplified owing to the fact that the base
rate is no longer needed in the calculation. Rather, participants must
determine which of the joint events are relevant to the solution; this is
most obvious in the case where only 𝑝(𝐷) and 𝑝(𝐷 ∩𝐻) are provided
but may also be facilitated when all joint events are provided (Ottley
et al., 2016; Wu, Meder, Filimon, & Nelson, 2017).
From a nested-sets theory perspective, Lesage et al. (2013) and
Mellers and McGraw (1999) argue that formats presenting joint events
facilitate performance because they help participants to visualise the
nested or subset structure, although Mellers and McGraw (1999)
argued that this would be the case for common but not rare events. It
is not entirely clear how the results of the meta-analysis support or
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refute these claims, as the mechanism by which the subset structure
is revealed has not been specified. Nor is it clear how the joint event
formats help participants to visualise the nested structure. Similarly,
the theory does not extend this explanation to further describe the
improved performance of short natural frequency formats. Although
the ecological rationality framework makes specific predictions for
the facilitation of performance for short probability formats based on
a computational analysis, the additional facilitation effect for natural
frequency formats is also not immediately clear from a computational
perspective. One potential explanation is that the base rate is not
explicitly mentioned in the joint event or short menu versions which
may reduce errors associated with selecting an incorrect denominator.
To test this explanation would require primary data from these
studies.
Three hypotheses The improvement in performance across both
conditional probability and natural frequency formats on problems
involving three hypotheses was unexpected. While the natural
frequency facilitation effect was anticipated to remain, the added
complexity of the additional hypothesis was expected to decrease
performance across formats. Introducing a third hypothesis increases
performance in both formats, albeit to different extents. Performance
for the natural frequency format is increased by 19 percentage points,
and more than the 9 percentage point increase for the conditional prob-
ability format. Again, increased performance in both formats lowers
the estimated odds ratio to 4.7, implying a reduced advantage of the
natural frequency format over the probability format, but the effect
remains considerable nonetheless. Looking at the three-hypotheses
problems included in the meta-analysis gives some indication as
to why this effect may have been found. Three papers examined
three-hypotheses problems: Yamagishi (2003, contributing 12 logits)
tested numerical variations of the gemstone problem, Johnson and
Tubau (2013, contributing four logits) included a gemstone problem
and an apple distribution problem based on the probabilities used in
the gemstone problems in Yamagishi (2003), and Hoffrage, Krauss,
et al. (2015, contributing two logits) used a medical test that could
identity the presence of one of two diseases (or neither disease). In all
cases except for the Hoffrage, Krauss, et al. (2015) medical diagnosis
problem, the problems segment information in a way that requires
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that only two hypotheses need to be considered for the solution. To
illustrate, the gemstone problem segments information into three
hypotheses (blurred, cracked, and clear gemstones) and the goal is
to infer how many of the stones that pass inspection are clear. The
hit rates and true negative rates are 100% for two of the hypotheses
(a machine retains all clear stones and rejects all cracked stones),
reducing it to a two hypotheses format with a perfect hit rate. For this
reason Johnson and Tubau (2013) described the problems as simple
because the format presents a simpler structure. This may explain
the absence of a negative effect based on computational complexity
predictions.
We can also further speculate as to why a positive effect was
found for three-hypotheses problems. The numerical formats used in
these problems, particularly for the conditional probability formats,
differed from many of the other formats. In six of the three-hypotheses
problems (representing 12 logits), common fractions were used to
represent proportions (these were the only problems that ever used
proper fraction representations), namely 1/2, 1/3, or 1/4. Calculations
involving fractions are typically difficult mathematical operations
to learn (Siegler, Thompson, & Schneider, 2011), however, dividing
quantities into common proportions or parts of a whole (e.g., half,
third, quarter) is taught relatively early in formal schooling and
fractions are frequently used to divide resources (e.g., sharing food).
It is possible that the use of the part-to-whole representations afforded
by the fractions and wording used within these problems facilitated
the segmentation of information into proportions, similar to the
effect of presenting joint frequencies (e.g., imagine cutting a cake
in thirds, keeping a third, and cutting one of the thirds in half and
comparing the two proportions). This interpretation is supported
when considering the high performance on the conditional probability
formats (70 − 81 percent correct responses) when the gemstone
problems were also accompanied by the roulette wheel visual aid in
the studies by Yamagishi (2003). The roulette wheel segments the
information in such a way that its segments line up to create a clear
visual segmentation, which may have facilitated performance in these
conditions (Brase, 2014). In this connection, Yamagishi (2003) argued




Two or more cues Adding additional dichotomous cues or cue
values (two or more cues) to the standard Bayesian inference task
reduces performance for both conditional probability and natural
frequency formats (by 4 and 2 percentage points, respectively), al-
though the general facilitation effect of natural frequencies remains.
Using two or more cues instead of one was estimated to have a small,
negative effect on responses in the natural frequency format and a
negligible effect on responses in the conditional probability format.
Jointly, these two effects increased the implied odds ratio to 11.4.
However, both effects are imprecisely estimated from the small set of
studies that are currently available, and the results may change, in
both sign and magnitude, with more diverse examinations.
Multiple events In the present meta-analysis, studies that em-
ployed conditional probability formats with multiple-event phrasing
had a small improvement on performance rates by 2 percentage points
compared to problems with single-event phrasing10. Curiously, the
framing of the conditional probability format appears to have affected
performance in the natural frequency format, although these effects
are imprecisely indicated and may reflect sampling variation. Taken
together, the two effects decrease the estimated average odds ratio to
5.5. One explanation for these effects is that the types of problems that
were used in these studies were generally easier problems. However,
as we cannot examine the problems in greater detail, this is only
speculative.
Incongruent question formats and enumerated population In-
congruent question formats (probability question, frequency question)
appear to offer only small disadvantages to the respective formats
(each decreases 2 percentage points). As these estimates are based
on a small number of studies that manipulated these characteristics,
the effects are estimated imprecisely and may require further exam-
ination. However, based on the evidence currently available, the
effects appear to be small and negligible. Similarly, augmenting the
probability formats with an enumerated population does not appear to
facilitate performance (no percentage change). This effect is imprecise
10To ensure the effect was not driven by the few studies that examined normalised
frequency formats presented using numerical frequencies (e.g., 10 in 1000) we repeated
the analysis with these studies excluded. The effect did not change.
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for natural frequency formats but is estimated with greater precision
for the probability formats. Thus, small changes to the complexity of
the problem or introducing a requirement to convert problem and
question formats appear to have a negligible effect on performance,
particularly in contrast to the strong effects of information structure.
Visual aids The strongest moderator of performance for both
natural frequency and probability formats involved the inclusion of a
visual aid. Supplementing both formats with a visual aid increased
performance by 23 and 22 percentage points for the natural frequency
and probability formats, respectively. The strong improvements in
performance for both formats decreased the odds ratio to 2.5, although
this still indicates a strong natural frequency facilitation effect. When
visual aids are used for conditional probability formats they enhance
performance to a similar level as natural frequency formats without
visual aids. However, given that visual aids improve performance
on natural frequency formats to the same degree, it appears that
they may have an independent effect to that of format. Visual tools
have been used throughout history to convey meaning and represent
relations between concrete and abstract concepts, are beneficial for
understanding concepts in mathematics and problem-solving more
broadly, and tend to be spontaneously produced when individuals
attempt to solve probability problems (B. Tversky, 2001; Zahner
& Corter, 2010). In this connection, visual aids have been shown
to improve comprehension of health risks in risk communications
(Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Garcia-Retamero &
Cokely, 2013).
There have been several recent studies that have explored the
features of visual designs related to performance on natural frequency
formats. Micallef et al. (2012) explored different Euler diagrams and
frequency grids that varied whether or not the area of the differ-
ent regions was proportional to the quantities represented in the
problem. They tested six different variations and found that none
of the variations were superior to one another, and only slightly
improved performance rates compared to a natural frequency text.
However, performance rates across formats in this study were gener-
ally poor. Khan, Breslav, Glueck, and Hornbaek (2015) investigated
the different qualities of visualisations that could facilitate perfor-
mance on Bayesian inference problems, again only with respect to
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natural frequency formats. Khan et al. (2015) distinguished between
visualisations that emphasised branching or information structure
(e.g., trees), nested-set relations (e.g., Euler diagrams), and frequen-
cies or the quantities involved (e.g., icon arrays), and developed
two hybrid diagrams that combined branching with frequency (a
Sankey diagram) or branching that illustrated all sets (a double-tree).
The frequency grid and double-tree diagrams resulted in the best
performance (20 percent of participants answered correctly in both
conditions), however performance was similar across conditions.
Unfortunately, owing to the small samples of studies exploring visual
aids, we were not able to explore the specific features of the visual
aids that were more or less likely to facilitate performance in the
present meta-analysis.
Subset analysis: Chances with natural sampling Studies in-
vestigating the facilitative effect of chances with natural sampling
also suggest that the interpretation of chances as frequencies rather
than as a single event improves solution rates (Brase, 2008, 2014). In
the present study, natural frequency representations demonstrate
superior performance to chances with natural sampling. The second
panel of Table 2.2 shows the results of a subset analysis of 𝑘𝑐ℎ𝑠 = 18
logits from studies examining chances. For this subset analysis,
we used the same model as for the full-sample meta-analysis but
excluded any study characteristics. The lack of study characteristics
as covariates means that the model does not account for large parts
of the systematic variation in observed logits. As a consequence,
the estimated amounts of residual heterogeneity are higher than




= .7) and the null hypothesis of
residual homogeneity is rejected (𝑄 = 78.1, 𝑝 < .0001). The average
performances are estimated at 40 percent and 19 percent, for the nat-
ural frequency and conditional probability format, respectively. The
implied odds ratio is estimated at 2.8. This analysis is based on few
observed logits and does not control for other study characteristics,
so that the estimated proportions should not be compared with the
results of the full-sample meta-analysis. Nonetheless, the results
suggests that although the information structure is the same, single-
event representations may still be a more difficult representation for
participants to solve.
One additional aspect to consider when interpreting this analysis
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is the difference in question format used within these studies. Girotto
and Gonzalez (2001) argued that the question format for natural
frequency versions prompts participants to compute two terms of
the ratio (e.g., those who test positive, and those that test positive
and have breast cancer) whereas probability versions do not, thus
making the solution easier for natural frequency versions (in addition
to information structure). For natural frequency and chances with
natural sampling formats, two step questions that first require partic-
ipants to provide the denominator of the ratio (e.g., people who test
positive) followed by the numerator (e.g., people have breast cancer
and test positive) were better than the standard question format (i.e.,
out of ) for both natural frequency and chances with
natural sampling formats. In all of the studies comparing chances
with natural sampling and natural frequency formats the two part
question was used and may explain the higher performance for both
formats in these studies (Brase, 2008; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sirota,
Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015b). Only Brase (2008) used
a two part question form when comparing normalised chances and
natural frequency formats, limiting our ability to test the moderator
in the present meta-analysis.
Methodological factors. Methodological factors were found to ac-
count for differences in performance for the different formats, sug-
gesting that some of the variation in the natural frequency facilitation
effect reported across studies may result, in part, from differences in
study design. As we will see, some of the methodological moderators
do not affect both formats in the same way, thus distorting the facili-
tation effect relative to a typical experimental setup. The results can
therefore guide methodological decisions in future empirical work.
Both formats Study designs that involved participants receiving
one or more conditional probability problems and one or more
natural frequency problems appeared to help performance for natural
frequency but hinder performance for conditional probability formats.
Exposing participants to both formats (e.g., in a within-subject design)
is estimated to increase performance for natural frequency formats by
13 percentage points on average, and slightly decrease performance
for conditional probability formats; this combination increases the
odds ratio to 16.2, which is substantial. One potential explanation for
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these effects is that solving both types of formats may interfere with
the strategies applied to subsequent problems. In some cases, this may
have an advantage whereas in other cases it may not. As the majority
of studies that used multiple format designs also counterbalanced
the order of problems, we are unable to test any order effects, and no
order effects were reported in these studies.
Additional problems Performance on natural frequency and
conditional probability formats improved with the number of prob-
lems that participants were required to solve. The experimental set-up
expressed in the baseline proportions assumed that each participant
was given only one problem. Assuming linearity, the model estimates
that each additional problem increases performance, on average,
by around 1 percentage point for natural frequency format and .5
percentage points for the conditional probability format. Because
some studies have their participants solve ten Bayesian problems,
implying an increase in performance by 10 and 5 percentage points,
respectively, the estimated effect due to practice can be considerable.
In such cases, the odds ratio would decrease to 5.3. It may be that
further opportunities to solve problems may increase the potential
for one to try out different solution strategies that turn out to be
successful for at least one of the problems or that the underlying
structure of problems is more likely to be recognised. However,
our hypotheses about the reason for this effect is purely speculative;
rather we stress that methodological differences can account for some
of the variation across studies.
Strict scoring criteria Contrary to the results of McNair and
Feeney (2014), there was no effect of a stricter scoring criteria on
performance rates, as defined in the current study. McNair and Feeney
(2014) compared scoring that involved either an exact estimate or
an exact estimate +/−5 percentage points for conditional probability
problems. In the reviewed studies, the +/−% range varied across
studies from 1 − 5 percentage points (Bramwell et al., 2006; Chapman
& Liu, 2009) making it difficult to determine an appropriate cut-off
value to indicate greater or lesser leniency. Nevertheless, in the
present study we sought to compare lenient against the strictest
scoring criteria which we determined to be one that required not
only a correct estimate but also a correct protocol to support the
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solution. The justification for these scoring criteria, as stated by the
authors of the reviewed studies, was to ensure that a correct estimate
was not a result of a guess or an alternative, non-Bayesian strategy.
However, the strictness of the scoring criteria had a negligible effect
on performance in both formats, with a decrease of 2 and a slight
increase of 1 percentage points for natural frequency and probability
formats, respectively. These estimates, particularly for the natural
frequency format, are imprecise and may change when additional
studies that employ strict coding criteria are included.
Subset analysis: Incentives Of the 𝑘 = 226 logits in the full
sample, data on incentives is available for only 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑐 = 165 logits,
of which 115 use show-up fees, 12 use performance pay, and 38
use neither. For this reason, we could not include incentives in the
full-sample meta-analysis but examined them in a separate analysis
that does not include other study characteristics as covariates. The
model used for aggregating the logits is the same as before with
incentive included as the only covariate. Again, the amounts of





= 1.9) and the null hypothesis of residual homogeneity is
rejected (𝑄 = 1373.5, 𝑝 < .0001). The third panel of Table 2.2 shows
the effects of incentives. The proportions for experiments without
incentives are estimated at 41 percent for the natural frequency format
and 10 percent for the conditional probability format. Unlike a show-
up fee, which appears to have a negligible effect, performance pay is
estimated to increase performance by 23 and 11 percentage points,
respectively, again without controlling for differences in study designs,
which complicates comparisons with the full-sample meta-analysis.
There were only two studies that systematically examined the
effect of performance-based incentives (Brase, 2009a; Ferguson &
Starmer, 2013, representing a total of 12 logits), with many studies
incentivising participants with the award of course-credit or payment
of a show-up fee. As stated previously, the two studies that inves-
tigated the effect of performance-based incentives on performance
across formats found contradictory effects: Brase (2009a) found incen-
tives facilitated performance on natural frequency problems whereas
Ferguson and Starmer (2013) found a general effect of incentives
irrespective of format. Unfortunately, owing to the limited stud-
ies on performance-based incentives we cannot resolve this conflict.
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Rather, we can conclude that, similar to studies in other domains,
performance-based incentives may generally improve performance
across formats (Cerasoli et al., 2014).
Individual characteristics. Owing to only a few studies examining
numeracy, we could only include experts as a moderator in the full-
sample meta-analysis. However, we conducted a subset analysis on
studies that included effects for low and high numerate participants.
Experts Natural frequencies benefit experts and non-experts
alike, and the results of the meta-analysis do not suggest that partici-
pants with greater educational or professional experience are better
able to solve problems presented in either format, as compared to
lay samples. The slight increases in performance in both formats are
imprecisely estimated and may change direction as further studies
comparing expert and novice samples accumulate. However, we ac-
knowledge that a limitation to our analysis is the reduction of a broad
range of samples to a dichotomy of samples that were presumed to be
experts and those that were presumed to be non-experts, although,
the distinctions were consistent with arguments made within the
literatures reviewed. Medical professionals, management execu-
tives and university or postgraduate students are often described as
comprising more expert, educated samples. While we found that a
broad range of samples were used across studies, the majority were
based on university students, consistent with the general criticism
of research in the behavioural sciences that studies tend to be based
almost entirely on university student samples (Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010). Expanding research to include more diverse
samples could provide valuable insights into how Bayesian reasoning
is learned and evolves over time. In particular, we think that a greater
focus on Bayesian reasoning in children is warranted in order to
explore developmental trajectories, for example, to elucidate which
mathematical concepts are influential in revealing solution strategies
(see, e.g., Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006) or to learn where difficulties first
emerge and how they can be targeted. In this connection, further work
on older adults, who may suffer from cognitive declines with age,
would be important from a more applied perspective, particularly
given that older adults are increasingly faced with the implications
of medical test results.
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Subset Analysis: Numeracy Of the 𝑘 = 226 logits in the full
sample, data on numeracy is available for only 𝑘𝑛𝑢𝑚 = 52 logits.
For this reason, we could not include numeracy in the full-sample
meta-analysis but examined it in a separate analysis that does not
include other study characteristics as covariates. The model used
for aggregating the logits is the same as described earlier with
only numeracy included as a covariate. The lack of other study
characteristics as covariates means that the model does not account
for large parts of heterogeneity. As a consequence, the amounts of





= 1.0) and the null hypothesis of no residual heterogeneity
is rejected (𝑄 = 267.5, 𝑝 < .0001). The bottom panel of Table 2.2
shows the effects of numeracy. Ignoring differences due to other
study characteristics, for participants with low numeracy scores it is
estimated that 26 percent achieve the correct solution for the natural
frequency format and 4 percent for the conditional probability format,
resembling the baseline proportions in the full-sample meta-analysis.
The performance of participants with high numeracy scores exceeds
those of participants with low scores by 25 percentage points in the
natural frequency format and 11 percentage points in the conditional
probability format. These effects appear large but ignore differences
in study design and cannot be directly compared to effect estimates
from the full-sample meta-analysis11. Additional studies on the effect
of numeracy are required for other covariates be to included in such
an analysis, and for reducing the current imprecision of the estimated
effect of numeracy.
Nevertheless, our analysis shows that natural frequency formats
continue to offer an advantage over conditional probability formats
for low numerates and this difference is maintained for high numer-
ates. These results support prior work showing a general format
effect for natural frequencies (Hill & Brase, 2012; Johnson & Tubau,
2013) and do not suggest that the effect is stronger for high numerates
11There is, however, reason to assume that any effect estimated in this meta-analysis
underestimates the effect of numeracy because all studies included here are based
on median-splits in which group assignment to numeracy groups is based on the
sample median score. When the distribution of test scores in the sample does not
reflect the population distribution, this procedure may be biased because (some of)
those below the sample median may fall above the population median. More accurate
results can be obtained using “hard” cutoffs as are common in clinical research where




(Chapman & Liu, 2009). Johnson and Tubau (2013) suggested that
numeracy and information format can interact with the complexity
of problems, for example in terms of information segmentation (e.g.,
in the gemstone problem described above) and verbal complexity, to
impede performance for low numerates who may be more affected
by such manipulations. Unfortunately, we were unable to examine
other moderators used in these studies to draw any conclusions about
interactions with verbal or computational complexity manipulations
(Johnson & Tubau, 2013). There were also few studies that examined
claims involving other measures of cognitive ability. In this view,
Johnson and Tubau (2015) introduce a broader mathematical frame-
work that takes into account individual differences in other areas,
such as text comprehension and problem-solving abilities, to explore
insights into solution strategies for Bayesian inference problems. We
discuss this framework further below.
2.6 General Discussion
The results of the meta-analysis demonstrate that the natural fre-
quency facilitation effect is fairly robust and is largely retained with
respect to a range of individual, methodological, and problem repre-
sentation moderators. Visual aids and short menu formats were the
most influential moderators of the effect, enhancing performance for
both natural frequency and conditional probability formats. These
results suggest that not only is information structure an important
component of the effect but that helping participants to visualise the
information structure of the problem can improve performance. The
computational complexity of the problems themselves also affects
performance: adding additional cues or cue values does reduce
performance rates across problems as anticipated, but adding an
additional hypothesis can increase performance if the features of the
problem allow one to ignore one or more of the hypotheses. The
influence of methodological factors on performance rates, such as
small improvements when individuals complete multiple problems
or both formats, suggests that further insights could be gained from
examining training or transfer effects across problems.
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2.6.1 Limitations of the Meta-Analysis
Like all meta-analyses, the present meta-analysis is only as good as
is the data available and most limitations of primary studies apply
to their meta-analysis. For example, we were unable to analyse
every moderator that has been tested across studies, as there were
too few performance estimates for many potential moderators. For
this reason, the meta-analysis does not do justice to the more subtle
differences in study designs, although we attempted to control for
the most important differences. Inevitably, there are more differences
than the ones accounted for here and even among those, gaps in the
available evidence lead to imprecise estimates.
Furthermore, some of the moderators included in the meta-
analysis likely remain understudied. Given the variety of samples,
problem representation manipulations, and methodologies utilised
across studies, we had to collapse some of the coding categories as
there was too little data to allow us to explore all potential coding
categories in our analyses (e.g., adults versus children). In each
case, we have attempted to justify collapsing coding categories given
theoretical or methodological arguments found within the literature.
We have also made sure to note caveats to any results involving the
affected coding categories. Nonetheless, it remains possible that as a
result subtle differences between these categories were overlooked.
2.6.2 Theory Building: Bridges or Fences?
The literature on the natural frequency facilitation effect has been
enriched but also hindered by theoretical debates that foster the cur-
rent dichotomy: ecological rationality framework versus nested-sets
theory. In a recent theoretical review of Bayesian reasoning with
natural frequencies, Brase and Hill (2015) criticised the persistence
of the two “camps” into which many researchers place themselves,
arguing that progress depends on researchers engaging in integration
rather than competition. Similarly, Johnson and Tubau (2015) have
pushed for theory integration and proposed a framework for un-
derstanding Bayesian word problems that connects problem solving
with mathematical cognition. In the following section, we discuss
the implications of the results for the respective theories and make
recommendations as to where further work can help to strengthen or
clarify the premises of the theories or promote theory integration.
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Ecological not evolutionary rationality framework. The computa-
tional analysis of Bayesian inference problems originally put forward
by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) is supported by the results of
the meta-analysis in that short menu probability formats offered an
advantage over standard conditional probability formats. Further,
the improvement on short menu natural frequency formats suggests
that simplifying even elementary arithmetic operations or specify-
ing only the joint frequencies can facilitate the selection of relevant
information. The results also suggest a role for visual displays in
facilitating cognitive operations, a finding that connects to a vast
literature on the development and use of visualisations for supporting
thought (B. Tversky, 2001, 2011; Zahner & Corter, 2010). Although
some proponents of the ecological rationality framework argue that
specific types of visualisations may be most beneficial for Bayesian
reasoning problems from an evolutionary perspective (see Brase,
2009b), others have not made specific predictions. We anticipate that
proponents would argue that the more relevant question would be
to ask which visual tools are most effective for different cognitive
problems (see Zahner & Corter, 2010, for examples of different types
of visual aids that are generated for different types of probability
problems). Literature on the emergence of visual aids from a cultural
or educational perspective may provide insights to guide research
here.
Some of the criticism aimed at the ecological rationality framework
as it has been applied to Bayesian reasoning is that the framework
has not adequately addressed the question of how information about
the occurrence of joint events is acquired or accumulated, nor has it
offered a clear explanation for why some participants continue to have
difficulty with natural frequency formats. This criticism could also
be aimed at nested-sets theory. We turn to work on the description-
experience gap (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig &
Erev, 2009) to examine this criticism. Research on the description-
experience gap emerged in consideration of contradictory findings
related to how participants made decisions on the basis of probability
distributions (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). When participants were given
the opportunity to sample event occurrences, from which probabilities
and payoffs can be inferred, common errors found in studies that
simply provide probabilities diminish or disappear. For example, base
rates are more likely to be used when experienced rather than simply
described (Koehler, 1996). Like others (Hoffrage, Krauss, et al., 2015;
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Schulze & Hertwig, 2016), we wonder whether natural frequencies
offer an intermediate solution by improving on conditional probability
formats such that the information is presented in a format that more
closely resembles how the information is naturally acquired, but
that stops short of providing people with the understanding of
information structure that coincides with experience. For example,
in line with related work on experience-based probability learning
tasks, experience may facilitate the construction of a causal model
(see, e.g., Sobel et al., 2004). We return to this aspect below when
discussing future directions.
One of the most fundamental premises of the ecological rationality
framework is the question of how cognitive processes map onto
structures, or the ecological aspect of the framework (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 2007), yet this has received the least attention in research
on Bayesian reasoning (see Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hafenbrädl
& Hoffrage, 2015). Rather, much of the criticism of the theory
resides in objections to an evolutionary argument regarding the
potential for the human mind to have evolved a frequency-processing
mechanism (Navarrete & Santamaria, 2011). This argument is not
wholly supported by proponents of the theory, but nevertheless
has become much more central to the debate than the ecological
argument on which it is was originally based. At this point, we
think it is pertinent to emphasise the response of Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage (2007) to the many different interpretations of the ecological
rationality framework put forward by Barbey and Sloman (2007):
The evolutionary perspective ... provides a general frame-
work for finding the right questions... An ecological frame-
work postulates that thought does not simply emerge
inside the mind. Every theory of reasoning needs to
specify both cognitive strategies and the environmental
structures under which these strategies work well (p.266).
We wonder whether some of the debate between the ecological
rationality framework and nested-sets theory would dissipate should
the strict modularity view lose its emphasis.
Clarification of nested-sets theory. Given that nested-sets theory
and the ecological rationality framework make similar arguments on
the importance of the nested information structure to the facilitation
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effect of natural frequencies, the two theories can also draw on similar
results from the meta-analysis to support their premises. For example,
the facilitative effect of short menu formats supports the premise
of nested-sets theory that clarifying the nested-set structure of the
problem can improve performance. Although the theory justifies
the benefits of short menu formats on the basis of their ability to
help participants visualise the subset structure, the mechanism by
which this is revealed is not entirely clear. Mandel (2007) proposes
that representations that reveal nested-sets and minimise computa-
tional complexity will enhance performance (holding transparency
constant), which he refers to as the complexity principle of nested-sets
theory. It is not clear how this principle differs from the computa-
tional argument made by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). Further,
it is not clear how the theory accounts for the reduction in the nat-
ural frequency facilitation effect given short menu formats; the set
structure is clarified in the same way in short menu versions of both
formats.
Similarly, the prediction that visual aids can improve performance
on conditional probability problems is supported in the present meta-
analysis. Visual aids could enhance performance to a level similar to
natural frequencies without visual aids. Given that visual aids also
improved performance for natural frequency formats, we wonder
whether the theory would argue that visual aids and natural frequency
formats have an additive effect or whether the different methods
for revealing subset structures build on one another. Mandel (2007)
suggests that nested-sets relations can be clarified through different
modalities (which he called the multi-modal principle), however, to
our knowledge relations between these modalities has not been
clarified. For instance, in relation to visual aids, the theory falls short
of discussing whether the relative size or structure of the visual aid
is important for clarifying the subsets (e.g, see Moro et al., 2011), or
whether any visual design that illustrates subsets is sufficient.
One argument mounted in favour of nested-sets theory is that it has
broader applications, such that transparent nested-set manipulations
can facilitate deductive reasoning as well (Amitani, 2015; Barbey &
Sloman, 2007). For example, Euler circles showing the subset structure
of syllogisms can facilitate solutions (Sloman et al., 2003). Mandel
(2007) alludes to the fact that there can be multiple ways in which the
clarity of a representation can be improved, however, details of the
range of strategies have not been elaborated. In fact, some proponents
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of the theory emphasise that any manipulation that draws one’s
attention to the nesting of events will facilitate reasoning (Lesage et
al., 2013). Unfortunately, this claim allows the theory to accommodate
a broad range of results in support of its premises without providing
explanations for the mechanisms (whether these are the same or
different across representations). For example, in what ways can
nested-set relations be made transparent? In which modalities? Is
there a hierarchy of manipulations and how do different modalities
operate in connection with one another? The theory needs to imply
conditions for testing these mechanisms. On the other hand, the
ecological rationality framework has also been criticised for not being
able to explain how variations in the transparency of nested-sets, for
example, textual manipulations, affect performance (Mandel, 2007).
At this point, we are inclined to agree with Mandel (2007) in
his description of nested-sets theory as an assemblage of empirical
findings collected in rebuttal to the frequentist mind perspective.
Barbey and Sloman (2007) attempted to align the theory with dual-
process models of reasoning to suggest that the deliberate rule-based
system induces the use of rules about elementary set operations
when set relations are transparent, although this dual process view
is not wholly supported (Evans & Elqayam, 2007; Lagnado & Shanks,
2007; Mandel, 2007; Samuels, 2007). Sloman et al. (2003) allude to
the fact that the ability to reason in relation to sets and subsets,
including their relations and their relative sizes, is necessary for
many problems (including those under primitive conditions, such
as sharing resources) yet argues that claims of adaptiveness do not
provide any further explanatory power. Yet, how did we come to
operate so well on set relations? Nested-sets theory would benefit
from further explication of its key propositions and principles, and
from addressing the ecological nature of its predictions.
In summary, one of the major points of difference between the
ecological rationality framework and nested-sets theory is the empha-
sis that evolutionary theory has in the foundations of the respective
theories. Yet, it tends to be the proponents of nested-sets theory who
continue to point to strong evolutionary claims within the ecological
rationality framework, more so than its proponents. Rather, we
think that a focus on the ecological aspect of the ecological rationality
framework generates more interesting research questions. In any case,
the two theoretical perspectives are broader than their application
to Bayesian reasoning problems, which offer an environment for
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testing the predictions of the respective theories. However, if these
predictions are ill-specified, this limits the insights that can be gained
from this research.
2.6.3 Future Directions
The research reviewed in the present meta-analysis represents just
a small part of research on Bayesian reasoning. While elementary
Bayesian textbook problems have offered an experimental paradigm
for testing theories, they represent a small world and this no doubt
limits the breadth of questions that can be addressed about Bayesian
inference. Indeed, research within this paradigm led to the important
insight that information representation matters to Bayesian reasoning
and allowed researchers to explore the importance of information
structure relative to other factors (e.g., numeracy, visual aids). How-
ever, we can still not offer a coherent explanation for why, in some
cases, the majority of participants have difficulties with Bayesian
reasoning problems as they have been studied here. Schulze and
Hertwig (2016) suggest that differences in research methodology
can help to explain some of these findings, for example, the finding
that children are good intuitive statisticians but adults are not (e.g.,
employing experienced-based versus descriptive methods, respec-
tively). We discuss ways in which research within this paradigm
can be improved to generate further insights into the information
representations that boost probabilistic inference.
Where and when do difficulties in Bayesian reasoning arise? In
the reviewed studies, Bayesian reasoning has typically been defined
as the ability to provide a correct probability estimate given the
information provided. Focusing on this endpoint has limited our
ability to understand how or determine why many of the interventions
reviewed in our meta-analysis do or do not work (McNair, 2015). We
discuss two opportunities to build on insights from research with
Bayesian textbook problems to explore how representation can affect
how people process the information and to explore differences across
a range of performance criteria.
First, the use of a narrow criterion to evaluate performance on
these descriptive tasks restricts arguments about Bayesian inference to
a rather narrow mathematical definition and detracts from other po-
tential questions (Domurat, Kowalczuk, Idzikowska, Borzymowska,
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& Nowak-Przygodzka, 2015; McNair, 2015; Wu et al., 2017). For
example, given the different information formats, are people able to
make the correct choice or inference given the information provided,
irrespective of whether or not they can calculate a correct estimate?
The results of Wu et al. (2017) and Domurat et al. (2015) suggest that
making a correct choice does not necessarily imply that one calculates
an exact estimate. Wu et al. (2017) employed an information selection
task that required participants to select which of two tests had a
better chance of answering a specific query (i.e., which of two genetic
tests was most effective for identifying a species) presented either
in natural frequency, conditional probability, or visual formats. The
authors found no relation between probability judgement errors and
choices, such that lower probability judgement errors were not neces-
sarily associated with better choices. Similarly, Domurat et al. (2015),
employing a natural sampling approach for participants to learn
probabilities, found that the majority of participants made choices
that satisfied Bayes’ theorem despite participants’ verbal reports
suggesting that non-Bayesian solution strategies were often applied.
These results highlight how different performance criteria can lead
to different conclusions about people’s capabilities. It is an open
question as to whether the information formats and the moderators
examined in the present meta-analysis would have similar effects
given different performance criteria.
Second, focusing on the difficulties that arise during the solution
process can help identify the features of information representations
that underlie the facilitation effect. Questions related to process
have not played a central role in many studies despite the fact that
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) included both performance and
process measures in their original study. Their analysis of the visual
analogs and solution strategies participants wrote down while solving
Bayesian reasoning tasks helped them to identify cognitive shortcuts
that could lead to solution rates similar to Bayes’ theorem given
specific features of the problem. Process measures represented
an important part of their ecological analysis, to identify cognitive
mechanisms and to identify when cognitive shortcuts could lead
to correct solutions, for both conditional probability and natural
frequency formats. However, only recently has there been renewed
interest in the processes leading up to a correct solution rather than on




For instance, Sirota, Vallée-Tourangeau, Vallée-Tourangeau, and
Juanchich (2015), McNair (2015), and Johnson and Tubau (2015)
have suggested that we draw on theories in the field of problem-
solving and mathematical cognition for insights into how people
approach and solve Bayesian reasoning problems. For example,
Sirota, Vallée-Tourangeau, et al. (2015) suggest decomposing the
question “What facilitates Bayesian reasoning?” into “What facilitates
the insight?" or understanding of information structure, and “What
facilitates the computation?”. Similarly, McNair (2015) suggests that
focusing on process can help to identify cognitive abilities that are
influential in early stages of the problem-solving process, and may
indicate a lack of formal knowledge, and those that occur later and
indicate a lack of ability to apply knowledge. Johnson and Tubau
(2015) propose that text comprehension and problem solving are
interrelated processes, and that understanding the relation between
these processes is central to improve our understanding why and at
which point of the process different intervention strategies, such as
natural frequencies, work. In the following section we suggest how
different research methodologies offer opportunities to gain these
insights.
Broadening methodological scope. A resounding criticism of work
on Bayesian reasoning with elementary word problems is that these
tasks are limited in what they can tell us about how people acquire,
learn, or represent information about the occurrence of joint events
(Brase & Hill, 2015; Girotto & Pighin, 2015; Mandel, 2014; Vallée-
Tourangeau, Sirota, Juanchich, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015). For
instance, in textbook tasks estimates are typically provided, and
multiple estimates are not collected across time. Our understanding
of probabilistic inference from descriptive tasks can be improved by
incorporating different research methodologies, potentially leading
to insights into theories and the assumptions on which they rest (as
an example, consider research on the description-experience gap,
Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
To test an assumption of the ecological rationality framework
about how participants learn joint frequencies of events, Leach (2002)
provided participants with either summary estimates of the relation
between one of two symptoms and one of two diseases in a descriptive
task, or with patient record cards that contained information about
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symptoms and diseases in an experiential natural sampling task. In
both conditions, participants made highly accurate posterior proba-
bility estimates about the relation between symptoms and diseases.
Similarly, Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, and Vallée-Tourangeau (2015)
found that participants who received natural frequency or conditional
probability text formats improved when these were accompanied by
interactive cards displaying the joint occurrences of events, although
performance was superior when the text represented natural frequen-
cies. For both formats, the interactive cards allowed participants to
see the subset structure or the relation between hypotheses and data.
As far as we are aware, this is the only study that combines interactive
sampling of joint events with a conditional probability descriptive
information format. Experience-based methodologies could also be
employed to explore updating or revision of posterior probabilities
given new information.
Further, process tracing methods such as eye-tracking and verbal
or written protocols can be employed to examine where attention is
focused, to gauge the weight a reasoner is giving to different pieces
of information, or to identify when in the process deviations occur
(Johnson & Tubau, 2015; McNair, 2015). Another promising line of
research is to assess the prior distributions people have for different
types of real events (Mandel, 2014). In this connection, Obrecht,
Anderson, Schulkin, and Chapman (2012) asked obstetricians and
gynaecologists to estimate the probability of Down syndrome given
a positive test result and subsequently, to report estimates of the base
rate (babies with Down syndrome), hit rate (positive test result given
Down syndrome), and false-alarm rate (positive test result given
no Down syndrome) in either natural frequencies or conditional
probabilities. Cognisant of differences in the physician’s personal
experiences, Obrecht et al. (2012) examined accuracy in terms of
whether the participants’ base rate, hit rate, and false-alarm rate
estimates were consistent with their posterior probability estimate.
Posterior probability estimates were more consistent when informa-
tion was requested in natural frequencies as opposed to conditional
probabilities, a finding that generates questions about how people
store information about the occurrence of joint events. There are
many opportunities for research on Bayesian reasoning to broaden
its methodological scope and explore a variety of research questions
on information structure and reasoning through descriptive tasks.
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2.6.4 From Textbook Problems to Real World Applications
At this point, it is important to remember that the study of Bayesian
reasoning using word problems emerged in consideration of real
world contexts where information is communicated in similar for-
mats (e.g., Eddy, 1982). As Navarrete, Correia, Sirota, Juanchich, and
Huepe (2015) emphasise, we should not lose sight of the ultimate goal
to foster understanding in contexts where probabilistic inference from
description problems is required. A few studies have sought to exam-
ine the effect of information representation formats in groups who
are required to make these types of probabilistic inferences in a given
domain, for example: medical professionals (Ben-Shlomo, Collin,
Quekett, Sterne, & Whiting, 2015; Bramwell et al., 2006; Gigerenzer,
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007; Hoffrage &
Gigerenzer, 1998), managers (Hoffrage, Hafenbrädl, & Bouquet, 2015),
and advanced law students and professional jurists (Lindsey, Hertwig,
& Gigerenzer, 2003). Attempts to improve probabilistic inferences
through training participants to translate probabilities into natural
frequency representations (as opposed to rule-based training using
Bayes’ rule) have generally been shown to be effective over the longer
term (Kurzenhäuser & Hoffrage, 2002; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001;
Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015a). However, we are
unaware of more formalised efforts to implement training in curric-
ula. Further, a better understanding of the errors participants make
with each format and the implications of these errors on inference
is needed. For example, future work could focus on the different
cognitive shortcuts participants make and identify the conditions
under which these shortcuts can approximate correct solutions (e.g.,
see Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hafenbrädl & Hoffrage, 2015).
2.6.5 Conclusions
The facilitative effect of natural frequencies is robust and our meta-
analysis identified conditions under which performance on condi-
tional probability problems can be improved further. Thus, although
there remains room for improvement on natural frequency formats,
the results of the meta-analysis suggest that natural frequencies are
favourable to conditional probability formats. Even though short
menu formats and visual aids can improve performance in both natu-
ral frequency and conditional probability formats, these moderators
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are still better used with natural frequency formats, with visual aids
offering the strongest advantage to performance. We had hoped to
examine the relative benefits of different visual designs but were
limited by the number of studies that have explored different design
features and thus, further work is needed to establish which visual
aids are most effective and why (although see Böcherer-Linder &
Eichler, 2016 Wu et al., 2017, and Khan et al., 2015, for exceptions).
There is also preliminary evidence to suggest that higher numer-
acy and performance-based incentives can improve performance on
Bayesian inference tasks. However, there is a lack of comparative
studies examining these moderators, as well as non-university sam-
ples (e.g., children or experts), and textual manipulations aimed
at improving problem comprehension (as opposed to texts aimed
to emphasise set relations). The meta-analysis also identified how
variations in performance could be explained by differences in study
designs, such as when participants complete both problem formats.
We suggest that current research methodologies employed in the
study of elementary textbook tasks can be extended to incorporate
more experience-based and process-tracing approaches. However,
what we have learned from the many studies included in our review is
that not only can natural frequencies improve Bayesian inference, but
that there is still ample room for improvement. We hope that future
work will focus not only on different performance criteria but on the
processes leading up to the correct solution as well, with the aim
to understand why many participants continue to have difficulties
solving Bayesian inference tasks. Ultimately, future work will move
beyond the current theoretical dichotomy of the ecological rationality
framework and nested-sets theory to focus on integration, not only
between but also beyond these two perspectives.
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Table 2.A
Relevant Data Used in Meta-Analysis
short 2+ 3 prob. freq. enum. mult. vis. show perf. strict both high add.
Estimate format 𝑐 𝑖 menu cues hypot. quest. quest. pop. events aid fee pay scor. formats num. exp. probs.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)
A) exp 1: standard F 14 16 N N N N N N Y N Y N Y Y — Y 14
A) exp 1: standard P 5 25 N N N N N N Y N Y N Y Y — Y 14
B) exp 1: short F 15 15 Y N N N N N Y N Y N Y Y — Y 14
B) exp 1: short P 8 22 Y N N N N N Y N Y N Y Y — Y 14
Hoffrage and Gigerenzer (1998)
A) ⌀ all four problems F 11 13 N N N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
A) ⌀ all four problems P 2 22 N N N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
Krauss et al. (1999)
A) version 1 vs 3 F 22 19 N Y N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
A) version 1 vs 3 P 5 36 N Y N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
Mellers and McGraw (1999)
A) exp 1: Nat, standard F 13 33 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
A) exp 1: CP, standard P 3 39 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
B) exp 1: Nat, joint F 9 33 Y N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
B) exp 1: CP, joint P 1 38 Y N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
C) exp 1: Sys, standard P 7 28 N N N N Y Y N N N N N N — Y 0
D) exp 1: Sys, joint P 7 37 Y N N N Y Y N N N N N N — Y 0
E) exp 2: Nat, standard F 10 121 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
E) exp 2: CP, standard P 5 117 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
F) exp 2: Nat, joint F 24 115 Y N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
F) exp 2: CP, joint P 15 81 Y N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
G) exp 2: Sys, standard P 7 131 N N N N Y Y N N Y N N N — Y 0
Evans et al. (2000)
A) exp 3: NF easy F 8 20 N N N Y N N N N — — N N — Y 7
A) exp 3: CP hard P 5 21 N N N Y N N N N — — N N — Y 7
Fiedler et al. (2000)
A) exp 1: incompatible F 14 35 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N N — Y 3
A) exp 1: incompatible P 9 36 N N N Y N Y N N Y N N N — Y 3
B) exp 1: common F 24 29 Y N N Y N Y N N Y N N N — Y 3
B) exp 1: common P 20 31 Y N N Y N Y N N Y N N N — Y 3
Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (2000)
A) example 1, apps in medicine F 43 53 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
A) example 1, apps in medicine P 13 83 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
Macchi (2000)
A) PF F 12 18 N N N N N Y Y N — — Y N — Y 0
A) NPP P 2 28 N N N N N Y Y N — — Y N — Y 0
B) NPF P 1 29 N N N N Y Y N N — — Y N — Y 0
Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (2001)
A) exp 2: strict, trees, test2 F 18 6 N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 6
A) exp 2: strict, trees, test2 P 18 6 N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 6
Lindsey et al. (2003)
A) law students, p(profile) F 51 76 N N N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
A) law students, p(profile) P 1 126 N N N Y N Y Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
B) jurists, p(profile) F 20 7 N N N Y N Y Y N N N N Y — Y 0
B) jurists, p(profile) P 3 24 N N N Y N Y Y N N N N Y — Y 0
Yamagishi (2003)
A) exp 1: viz F 34 13 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
A) exp 1: viz P 30 13 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
B) exp 1: no viz F 17 23 N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
B) exp 1: no viz P 7 31 N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
C) exp 2: viz F 33 10 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
C) exp 2: viz P 34 8 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
D) exp 2: no viz F 25 20 N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
D) exp 2: no viz P 5 36 N N Y N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
E) exp 3: viz a F 160 42 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
E) exp 3: viz a P 157 40 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
F) exp 3: viz b F 141 60 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
F) exp 3: viz b P 119 79 N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
Hoffrage and Gigerenzer (2004)
A) med students, short menu F 63 33 Y N N N N N Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
A) med students, short menu P 39 57 Y N N N N N Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
O’Brien et al. (2004)
A) exp 2: curta F 12 13 Y N N N Y N Y N — — N N — Y 0
A) exp 2: curta P 3 22 Y N N N Y N Y N — — N N — Y 0
B) exp 2: padrao F 3.5 22.5 N N N N Y N Y N — — N N — Y 0
B) exp 2: padrao P .5 25.5 N N N N Y N Y N — — N N — Y 0
Bramwell et al. (2006)
A) pregnant women F 3 18 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
A) pregnant women P 1 21 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
B) companions F 3 17 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
B) companions P 3 17 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
C) midwives F .5 20.5 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
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Relevant Data Used in Meta-Analysis (continued)
short 2+ 3 prob. freq. enum. mult. vis. show perf. strict both high add.
Estimate format 𝑐 𝑖 menu cues hypot. quest. quest. pop. events aid fee pay scor. formats num. exp. probs.
C) midwives P .5 22.5 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
D) obstetricians F 13 7 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
D) obstetricians P 1 20 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
Zhu and Gigerenzer (2006)
A) exp 1: adults F 17 6 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 6
A) exp 1: adults P 11 12 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 6
B) exp 2: adults F 23 7 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 9
B) exp 2: adults P 17 13 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 9
C) exp 2: 4th grade F 6.5 24.5 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — N 9
C) exp 2: 4th grade P .5 10.5 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — N 9
D) exp 2: 5th grade F 13.5 17.5 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — N 9
D) exp 2: 5th grade P .5 10.5 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — N 9
E) exp 2: 6th grade F 14.5 16.5 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — N 9
E) exp 2: 6th grade P .5 10.5 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — N 9
Brase (2008)
B) exp 1: NF F 9.5 19.5 N N N N Y N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
B) exp 1: Normalized P .5 28.5 N N N N Y N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
Konheim-Kalkstein (2008)
A) exp 1: correct solutions F 7 24 N N N Y N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
A) exp 1: correct solutions P 2 29 N N N Y N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
B) exp 4: lo num F 2 16 N N N Y N Y N N — — N N N Y 0
B) exp 4: lo num P 1 23 N N N Y N Y N N — — N N N Y 0
C) exp 4: hi num F 9 26 N N N Y N Y N N — — N N Y Y 0
C) exp 4: hi num P 8 23 N N N Y N Y N N — — N N Y Y 0
Brase (2009a)
A) course req., no viz F 12.5 39.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
A) course req., no viz P .5 50.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
B) course req., viz F 21 31 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
B) course req., viz P 14 36 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
C) flat pay, no viz F 14 34 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
C) flat pay, no viz P 2 45 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
D) flat pay, viz F 16 32 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
D) flat pay, viz P 13 36 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N — Y 0
E) var. pay, no viz F 23 19 N N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
E) var. pay, no viz P 4 38 N N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
F) var. pay, viz F 28 14 N N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N — Y 0
F) var. pay, viz P 17 25 N N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N — Y 0
Chapman and Liu (2009)
A) medical, lo num F 5.5 60.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y 0
A) medical, lo num P .5 87.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y N Y 0
B) car, lo num F 9.5 78.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
B) car, lo num P .5 65.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
C) medical, hi num F 26 66 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y Y Y 0
C) medical, hi num P 1 91 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y Y Y 0
D) car, hi num F 29 63 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
D) car, hi num P 7 85 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
Galesic, Gigerenzer, and Straubinger (2009)
A) older adults, hi num F 3 10 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y N 1
A) older adults, hi num P 2 7 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y N 1
B) younger adults, hi num F 15 28 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y 1
B) younger adults, hi num P 4 38 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y 1
C) older adults, lo num F 2.5 9.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N 1
C) older adults, lo num P .5 14.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N 1
D) younger adults, lo num F 1.5 12.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N Y 1
D) younger adults, lo num P .5 17.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N Y 1
Misuraca et al. (2009)
A) ⌀ cond. 1-4 vs 5 F 27.5 93.5 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
A) ⌀ cond. 1-4 vs 5 P .5 30.5 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — Y 0
Moro et al. (2011)
A) exp 1: NF F 7.5 14.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
A) exp 1: Nested-sets CP P .5 21.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
D) exp 2: gemstone, viz F 13 5 N N N N N N Y Y Y N N Y — Y 0
D) exp 2: gemstone, viz P 1 20 N N N N N N Y Y Y N N Y — Y 0
E) exp 2: gemstone, no viz F 16 2 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
E) exp 2: gemstone, no viz P 1 22 N N N N N N Y N Y N N Y — Y 0
Siegrist and Keller (2011)
A) exp 1: mammography F 15 117 N N N N N N Y N — — Y N — N 0
A) exp 1: mammography P 1 133 N N N N N N Y N — — Y N — N 0
B) exp 2: mammography F 9 68 N N N N N N Y N — — Y N — N 0
B) exp 2: mammography P 1 70 N N N N N N Y N — — Y N — N 0
C) exp 3: ⌀ social & cookie F 55 81 N N N N N N Y N — — Y N — N 1
C) exp 3: ⌀ social & cookie P 9 61 N N N N N N Y N — — Y N — N 1
Tsai, Miller, and Kirlik (2011)
A) NF F 6 6 N N N N N N Y N Y N Y N — Y 5
A) CP P 4 8 N N N N N N Y N Y N Y N — Y 5
Hill and Brase (2012)
A) exp 2: ⌀ med & NB, lo num F 1.5 32.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N Y 1
A) exp 2: ⌀ med & NB, lo num P .5 37.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N Y 1
B) exp 2: ⌀ med & NB, hi num F 10 36 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y 1
B) exp 2: ⌀ med & NB, hi num P 2 45 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y 1
C) exp 3: ⌀ med & NB, lo num F 1 49 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N Y 1
C) exp 3: ⌀ med & NB, lo num P 1 58 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N Y 1
94
A Data of Meta-Analysis
Relevant Data Used in Meta-Analysis (continued)
short 2+ 3 prob. freq. enum. mult. vis. show perf. strict both high add.
Estimate format 𝑐 𝑖 menu cues hypot. quest. quest. pop. events aid fee pay scor. formats num. exp. probs.
D) exp 3: ⌀ med & NB, hi num F 9 38 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y 1
D) exp 3: ⌀ med & NB, hi num P 3 38 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N Y Y 1
Ferguson and Starmer (2013)
A) experts, incentive, short F 8 3 Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
A) experts, incentive, short P 8 5 Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
B) novices, incentive, short F 15 7 Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
B) novices, incentive, short P 4 19 Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
C) experts, incent., standard F 9 3 N N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
C) experts, incent., standard P 1 7 N N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
D) novices, incent., standard F 11.5 14.5 N N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
D) novices, incent., standard P .5 24.5 N N N N N N Y N N Y N N — Y 0
E) experts, no incent., short F 8 4 Y N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
E) experts, no incent., short P 1 9 Y N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
F) novices, no incent., short F 16 18 Y N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
F) novices, no incent., short P 5 28 Y N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
G) experts, no incent., stand. F 6 6 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
G) experts, no incent., stand. P 1 11 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
H) novices, no incent., stand. F 11 24 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
H) novices, no incent., stand. P 1 33 N N N N N N Y N — — N N — Y 0
Johnson and Tubau (2013)
A) exp 1: complicated, hi num F 20 6 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
A) exp 1: complicated, hi num P 2 24 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
B) exp 1: complicated, lo num F 6.5 16.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
B) exp 1: complicated, lo num P .5 22.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
C) exp 1: simple, hi num F 30 4 N N Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
C) exp 1: simple, hi num P 12 22 N N Y N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
D) exp 1: simple, lo num F 12 3 N N Y N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
D) exp 1: simple, lo num P 1 14 N N Y N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
E) exp 2: long, hi num F 16 5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
E) exp 2: long, hi num P 4 16 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
F) exp 2: long, lo num F 9.5 11.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
F) exp 2: long, lo num P .5 23.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
G) exp 2: short, hi num F 18 2 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
G) exp 2: short, hi num P 5 16 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 0
H) exp 2: short, lo num F 17.5 6.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
H) exp 2: short, lo num P .5 20.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N Y N Y 0
Lesage et al. (2013)
A) exp 1: total sample, relative F 18.5 23.5 N N N N N Y N N Y N N N — Y 1
A) exp 1: total sample, relative P .5 42.5 N N N N N Y N N Y N N N — Y 1
B) exp 1: no tot.samp., relative F 17 26 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 1
B) exp 1: no tot.samp., relative P 2 41 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 1
C) exp 1: total sample, absolute F 18 26 Y N N N N Y N N Y N N N — Y 1
C) exp 1: total sample, absolute P 15 29 Y N N N N Y N N Y N N N — Y 1
D) exp 1: no tot.samp., absolute F 27 14 Y N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 1
D) exp 1: no tot.samp., absolute P 13 30 Y N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 1
E) exp 2: relative F 18 24 N N N N N N N N N N N N — N 1
E) exp 2: relative P 6 44 N N N N N N N N N N N N — N 1
F) exp 2: absolute F 30 21 Y N N N N N N N N N N N — N 1
F) exp 2: absolute P 21 26 Y N N N N N N N N N N N — N 1
Friederichs et al. (2014)
A) NF, no viz F 11 18 N N N Y N N Y N — — N N — Y 2
A) CP, no viz P 5 29 N N N Y N N Y N — — N N — Y 2
Sirota, Juanchich, and Hagmayer (2014)
A) exp 2: med & children’s F 86 65 N N N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 3
A) exp 2: med & children’s P 30 121 N N N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 3
Binder et al. (2015)
A) mammography, no viz, task 1 F 1.5 19.5 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
A) mammography, no viz, task 1 P .5 22.5 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
B) mammography, viz tree, task 1 F 8.5 15.5 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N — N 0
B) mammography, viz tree, task 1 P .5 20.5 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N — N 0
C) economics, no viz, task 1 F 11 10 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
C) economics, no viz, task 1 P 1 20 N N N N N N Y N N N N N — N 0
D) economics, viz tree, task 1 F 11 9 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N — N 0
D) economics, viz tree, task 1 P 1 20 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N — N 0
Hill and Brase (2015)
A) MTurk, ST F 9.5 31.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — N 2
A) MTurk, ST P .5 37.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — N 2
B) MTurk, ⌀ BC & CF F 10 30 N Y N N N N N N Y N N N — N 2
B) MTurk, ⌀ BC & CF P 1 36 N Y N N N N N N Y N N N — N 2
C) online, ST F 1.5 45.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
C) online, ST P .5 46.5 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
D) online, ⌀ BC & CF F 4 42 N Y N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
D) online, ⌀ BC & CF P 1 45 N Y N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
E) paper, ST F 7 42 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
E) paper, ST P 1 47 N N N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
F) paper, ⌀ BC & CF F 5.5 44.5 N Y N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
F) paper, ⌀ BC & CF P .5 48.5 N Y N N N N N N Y N N N — Y 2
Hoffrage, Krauss, et al. (2015)
A) exp 1: 2 hyp, 3 cue values F 18.5 14.5 N Y N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
A) exp 1: 2 hyp, 3 cue values P .5 32.5 N Y N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
B) exp 1: 3 hyp, 1 dichot cue F 12 20 N N Y N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
B) exp 1: 3 hyp, 1 dichot cue P 3 29 N N Y N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
C) exp 1: 2 hyp, 2 dichot cues F 11.5 21.5 N Y N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
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Relevant Data Used in Meta-Analysis (continued)
short 2+ 3 prob. freq. enum. mult. vis. show perf. strict both high add.
Estimate format 𝑐 𝑖 menu cues hypot. quest. quest. pop. events aid fee pay scor. formats num. exp. probs.
C) exp 1: 2 hyp, 2 dichot cues P .5 32.5 N Y N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
D) exp 1: 2 hyp, 3 dichot cues F 12 20 N Y N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
D) exp 1: 2 hyp, 3 dichot cues P 1 31 N Y N N N N Y N — — Y Y — Y 1
Hoffrage, Hafenbrädl, and Bouquet (2015)
A) undergraduates, all tasks F 53 79 N N N N N N N N — — Y N — Y 1
A) undergraduates, all tasks P 19 108 N N N N N N N N — — Y N — Y 1
B) junior executives, all tasks F 23 34 N N N N N N N N — — Y N — Y 1
B) junior executives, all tasks P 18 45 N N N N N N N N — — Y N — Y 1
C) senior executives, all tasks F 11 19 N N N N N N N N — — Y N — Y 1
C) senior executives, all tasks P 7 24 N N N N N N N N — — Y N — Y 1
Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, and Vallée-Tourangeau (2015)
A) exp 1&2: lo interact., hi num F 17 11 N N N N N N Y N N N N N Y Y 2
A) exp 1&2: lo interact., hi num P 3 24 N N N N N N Y N N N N N Y Y 2
B) exp 1&2: hi interact., hi num F 20 6 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y 2
B) exp 1&2: hi interact., hi num P 21 12 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y 2
C) exp 1&2: lo interact., lo num F 7 10 N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y 2
C) exp 1&2: lo interact., lo num P 1 17 N N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y 2
D) exp 1&2: hi interact., lo num F 12 7 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y 2
D) exp 1&2: hi interact., lo num P 4 8 N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N Y 2
E) exp 3: standard F 7.5 10.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
E) exp 3: standard P .5 17.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
F) exp 3: fleshed out F 5.5 13.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
F) exp 3: fleshed out P .5 18.5 N N N N N N Y N Y N N N — Y 0
Notes: 𝑐 and 𝑖 denote the number of correct and incorrect responses, respectively; when 𝑐 = 0 or 𝑖 = 0, 0.5 was added to all counts of the
same experiment; Y denotes the presence and N denotes the absence of a study characteristic; effects from studies including chances formats
(Brase, 2008; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015a) are excluded; table includes only the moderators
used in the analyses.
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Ever since Simon (1955) initiated the behavioral revolution in eco-
nomics, its poster child has been satisficing. Satisficing refers to the
observation that agents make choices with the help of aspiration
levels that do not necessarily coincide with utility maximization. The
normative appeal of utility maximization has led many to dismiss
satisficing uniformly as an undesirable quirk of human behavior. In
this article, we distinguish two separate research traditions that can
be traced back to Simon’s (1955) original visions of satisficing but are
largely disconnected today. Reviewing both traditions, we integrate
them within a framework for understanding decision making beyond
utility maximization.
Specifically, we argue that the rationality of satisficing strategies
depends on the class of decision environment. Broadly, environments
can be divided into two classes. Under risk, optimization sets the
rational benchmark and satisficing can yield suboptimal decisions.
Under uncertainty or intractability, where the optimal action cannot
be determined, satisficing can outperform complex strategies, includ-
ing rational choice models. Satisficing has been examined in both
types of decision environments, resulting in two distinct and largely
unconnected literatures.
In section 3.1 we trace the historical trajectory of the notion of
satisficing and provide a conceptual overview of the meaning of the
term. In section 3.2, we provide a review of the two traditions in
research on satisficing that have evolved. In section 3.3, we propose a
unifying framework to study when and why satisficing can be rational
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and what that means. Section 3.4 closes with four methodological
conclusions, advocating competitive out-of-sample tests to evaluate
decision strategies under uncertainty and intractability.
3.1 Satisficing
3.1.1 Historical Context
In his seminal contribution to economics, Herbert Simon advocated
and developed a model of bounded rationality, positing that “the
task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind
of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information
and computational capacities that are actually possessed by organ-
isms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such
organisms exist.” (Simon, 1955, p.99). The period in which this paper
was published was characterized by the popularization of neoclassical
rational choice theory, or global rationality, as Simon referred to it.
This body of theories includes von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
(1944) and Savage’s (1954) work on expected utility theory and the
work by (Nash, 1950) on equilibrium in non-cooperative games. Com-
mon to these theories is the assumption of an agent who has complete
information about the available alternatives, including perfect fore-
sight about all possible consequences and sufficient knowledge of the
probabilities with which they occur. Agents are then predicted to act
as if they were solving an optimization problem to maximize expected
utility. M. Friedman (1953, p.15) maintained that such an assumption
is justified, irrespective of whether it is deemed realistic, because
“the relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is
not whether they are descriptively ‘realistic’, for they never are, but
whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in
hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether the
theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate
predictions”. Compared with this approach, Simon’s differed in two
respects: First, his interest was in models of agents’ actual decision
processes, not only of their outcomes. Second, he was interested in
situations “where the conditions for rationality postulated by the
model of neoclassical economics are not met” (Simon, 1989, p.377).
The early responses in economics to Simon’s writings were twofold.
On the one hand, the proposition of bounded rationality evoked
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vigorous defenses of rational choice theory1. At the same time, many
economists were somewhat open to the notion of bounded rationality.
This group included Robert Solow, who — reviewing Simon’s (1957)
book “Models of Man: Social and Rational”, which expands on his
1955 paper — found himself “torn between an impulse to display
the interdisciplinary scope of my ignorance by commenting on every
essay and a more rational disposition to fight it out along the main
line” (Solow, 1958, p.81). Although the book received very positive
reviews by some economists (e.g., Shubik, 1958), Simon’s departure
from the neo-classical economic canon presumably made it difficult
for many economists to incorporate his ideas into their theorizing.
For the years up to 1969, we found only 35 citations of Simon’s
1955 article on Web of Science. Only during the 1970s did his early
contributions start to gain recognition in the economic literature.
Inspired by Simon’s being awarded the 1978 Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economic Sciences, a community of economists and psycholo-
gists dedicated their work to studying the behavioral foundations
of economic theory, which developed into behavioral economics.
Today, Simon’s work is often cited as the predecessor of Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1974) work on heuristics and biases. However, not until
1981 did Tversky and Kahneman begin to relate their work to Simon’s
study of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer, 2004). Yet bounded ratio-
nality does not mean the same in both programs. To Simon, it meant
the study of behavior in situations where the conditions assumed in
neoclassical economics are not met, whereas Kahneman and Tversky
assumed that these conditions are met and that deviating behavior
implies a lack of rationality. Simon (1985, p.297) made this difference
between them clear: “Bounded rationality is not irrationality.”
At the same time, both approaches to behavioral economics can
be characterized as empirically falsifying the assumptions underlying
neoclassical economic theory (for complementary reviews on the
topic, see Crawford, 2013; Harstad & Selten, 2013; Rabin, 2013). Unlike
Simon, however, the heuristics-and-biases program attributed behav-
ioral deviations from neoclassical theory to flaws in people’s minds
rather than to potential flaws in the application of the theory. This
allowed contemporary behavioral economics to retain the underlying
norm of an agent who integrates all information and maximizes utility.
1For an overview of the arguments put forth in favor of rational choice theory over
the years as well as the counter-arguments, see (Conlisk, 1996).
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Simon’s writings, in contrast, were followed by research that studied
decisions beyond the domain of rational choice theory, including the
work by Cyert and March (1963) on the behavioral theory of the firm,
Winter’s (1971) work on evolutionary economics, and the work by
Gigerenzer and colleagues on fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer,
Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). These analyses
are based on a satisficing agent and study the decision processes,
routines, and rules of thumbs that agents and organizations actually
use when facing complex and dynamic environments that provide
only limited information.
Winter (1971) provides a quote of Simon as a central source for
his own inspiration:
“The equilibrium behavior of a perfectly adapting or-
ganism depends only on its goals and its environment;
it is otherwise completely independent of the internal
properties of the organism (...) [T]o predict the short-run
behavior of an adaptive organism, or its behavior in a com-
plex and rapidly changing environment, it is not enough
to know its goals. We must also know a great deal about
its internal structure and particularly its mechanisms of
adaptation.” (Simon, 1959, p.255)
That is, equilibrium strategies derived from a stylized representation
of the world, specifically its incentive structure, can substantially differ
from the strategies that agents actually use to navigate an uncertain
and complex world. Going back to V. L. Smith (1962), there is a
substantial literature in economics demonstrating that equilibrium
also obtains with naïve, merely privately informed agents (for a
review, see V. L. Smith, 2008). Gode and Sunder (1993) even find
that zero-intelligence traders, who randomize within their budget
constraints, produce allocative efficiency. Much of the work in
behavioral economics does not make a clear distinction between
the individual and the aggregate levels of analysis but, in contrast
to Friedman, interprets the methodological tool of homo economicus
literally and sets out to refute it.
In order to account for differences between an equilibrium per-
spective and the actual behavior of an agent, V. L. Smith (2008)
proposes a distinction between two types of analyses2. The first, con-
2The principal distinction between two such rational orders can already be found
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structivist rationality, applies deductive reasoning from first principles:
It identifies the incentive structure and deduces the equilibrium by
sufficiently abstracting and simplifying. In contrast, an analysis of
ecological rationality proceeds empirically by determining the decision
strategies used by agents and then evaluating the performance of
that strategy competitively against other relevant strategies in the
given context. The term ecological rationality thereby refers to the
degree to which a strategy is adapted to the environment, evaluated
in terms of a fitness measure such as profit or accuracy of predictions
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999).
In the present article, we examine satisficing through the lens of
ecological rationality. This perspective, yet uncommon in economics,
offers a framework for thinking about decision strategies in a broader
way. As we will argue, it explains how Simon’s early writings inspired
two largely distinct research traditions. Because this perspective
examines strategies relative to the environment, we include a short
primer on different degrees of uncertainty that lead to fundamentally
different classes of decision environments.
3.1.2 Risk, Ambiguity, Intractability, and Uncertainty
Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) use a dichotomy of two broad
categories of environments, both of which are characterized by the
absence of certainty: risk and uncertainty. Whereas risk is commonly
understood, uncertainty has been assigned different meanings. In
order to define those relevant for this article, we begin with the
terminology of Savage (1954) developed in “Foundations of Statistics,”
in which he axiomatized subjective expected utility theory. Building
on this terminology allows us to offer a more detailed definition of
different kinds of uncertainty (see also Table 3.1).
Savage defines a decision problem as a pair {𝑆, 𝐶}, where 𝑆 is
the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of all future states of the
world and 𝐶 the exhaustive set of their consequences associated
with each alternative. The alternatives or actions are defined on
{𝑆, 𝐶}, and each state s in 𝑆 has an assigned probability . Choice
under certainty means that for each alternative, there is only one
state with probability 1; all others have probabilities 0. Choice under
in the writings of A. Smith (1776/1976, 1779/1981), Hume (1739/2000), and later von
Hayek (1937, 1945), as well as Savage (1954) and Simon (1955, 1956).
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Table 3.1
Decision Environments
Decision Environment Under Risk
Alternative State 1 State 2 State 3 · · · State M
𝑝 = 𝑝1 𝑝 = 𝑝2 𝑝 = 𝑝3 · · · 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑀
𝑎1 𝑐1,1 𝑐1,2 𝑐1,3 · · · 𝑐1,𝑀
𝑎2 𝑐2,1 𝑐2,2 𝑐2,3 · · · 𝑐2,𝑀

















𝑎𝑁 𝑐𝑁,1 𝑐𝑁,2 𝑐𝑁,3 · · · 𝑐𝑁,𝑀
Decision Environment Under Ambiguity
Alternative State 1 State 2 State 3 · · · State M
𝑝 =?? 𝑝 =?? 𝑝 =?? · · · 𝑝 =??
𝑎1 𝑐1,1 𝑐1,2 𝑐1,3 · · · 𝑐1,𝑀
𝑎2 𝑐2,1 𝑐2,2 𝑐2,3 · · · 𝑐2,𝑀

















𝑎𝑁 𝑐𝑁,1 𝑐𝑁,2 𝑐𝑁,3 · · · 𝑐𝑁,𝑀
Decision Environment Under Uncertainty
Alternative State 1 State 2 State 3 · · · ??
𝑝 =?? 𝑝 =?? 𝑝 =?? · · · 𝑝 =??
𝑎1 𝑐1,1 𝑐1,2 𝑐1,3 · · · ??
𝑎2 𝑐2,1 𝑐2,2 𝑐2,3 · · · ??

















?? ?? ?? ?? · · · ??
risk means that more than one state has non-zero probability and
that the probabilities attached to each state are known; the expected
utility of an alternative is the sum of the consequences multiplied by
their respective probabilities over all possible states. A situation of
ambiguity is identical to this apart from the probability distribution
not being known, as in the gambles underlying the Ellsberg paradox
(Ellsberg, 1961; see also Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). What these
three situations — certainty, risk, and ambiguity — have in common
is that the complete set of alternatives, future states of the world, and
consequences is known. Such problems are said to be well-defined.
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A well-defined problem can be tractable or not. Any decision
problem under certainty, risk, and ambiguity is considered computa-
tionally intractable (with subdivisions into NP-hard, NP-complete,
etc.) if the set of alternatives or states is so large that the best one
cannot be identified by mind or machine. This means that no effi-
cient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithm exists to solve it (e.g., Garey
& Johnson, 1979). Examples include games such as chess and Go.
To understand the order of magnitude of this limitation, note that
chess has approximately 10120 unique sequences of moves or games,
a number greater than the estimated number of atoms in the universe
(Shannon, 1950). Many important tasks are intractable, including
scheduling, capital budgeting, and itinerary problems, among oth-
ers (Markose, 2005; Papadimitriou & Steiglitz, 1998). Savage (1954,
p.16) is explicit that intractable problems are outside of the domain
of expected utility theory. Solving intractable problems requires a
different kind of decision theory, in both descriptive and normative
terms, that includes heuristic strategies.
The final class of problems involves degrees of what we call un-
certainty, which has elsewhere been termed radical or fundamental
uncertainty (King & Kay, 2020). In economics, the terms ambiguity
and uncertainty are commonly used interchangeably (Etner, Jeleva,
& Tallon, 2012). However, the distinction between them is funda-
mental. Ambiguity means that a problem is well-defined, that is,
the exhaustive set of alternatives, possible states, and their conse-
quences is known. Uncertainty, in contrast, means that the problem
is ill-defined, that the exhaustive set of states of the world and their
consequences is not knowable or foreseeable at the point of decision
making. Savage (1954, p.16) lists as an example planning a picnic,
where events can occur that one cannot know ahead of time. He
points out that expected utility theory cannot and should not be
applied under uncertainty.
One of the contributions of this article is to relate these classes of
situations to satisficing. In section 2, we will show that there are two
different traditions of satisficing, one assuming well-defined situa-
tions such as risk and the other addressing situations of uncertainty
and intractability. First, however, we define the basic concepts of
satisficing.
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3.1.3 Satisficing: Definition
To illustrate his vision of bounded rationality, Simon spends a good
portion of his landmark 1955 article describing a satisficing decision
strategy. Such a strategy, he posits, is more descriptive of human
decision processes than the traditional model of rational choice, for
which he sees “a complete lack evidence that, in actual human choice
situations of any complexity, these computations can be, or are in
fact, performed” (Simon, 1955, p.104). His alternative model consists
of two elements that are characteristic for choice processes: (i) the
aspiration level, which is a simplified value function that can be
adapted over time, and (ii) search.
The first element, a direct simplification of neoclassical theory, is
perhaps the most controversial element of his proposal. Consistent
with our earlier notation, Simon (1955, p.104) suggests that “[o]ne
route to simplification is to assume that [the value function] 𝑉(𝑠)
necessarily assumes one of two values, (1; 0), or one of three values,
(1; 0;−1), for all 𝑠 in 𝑆. Depending on the circumstance, we might
want to interpret these values, as (a) (satisfactory or unsatisfactory),
or (b) (win, draw or lose).” A binary value function implies the use
of an aspiration level, which refers to the minimum level of a given
scale of interest that is acceptable to the agent in order to choose
an alternative. The term aspiration level has a long tradition in
psychological theory (Gardner, 1940), appearing first in German (as
“Anspruchsniveau”) in work by Dembo (1931) and then in English
(as “level of aspiration”) in work by (Lewin, 1935). Although Simon
first defines the aspiration level in terms of the value or utility of an
alternative, he later maintains that it is more realistically set separately
for each attribute under consideration (cf. Simon, 1955, p.109–110).
When choosing among different houses, for example, agents may
have multiple aspiration levels, one for each attribute such as price,
floor size, location, or number of rooms, etc. instead of one aspiration
level for the overall utility of each alternative. In this view, agents are
not assumed to integrate different attributes on a cardinal scale but
instead to evaluate each attribute separately. This explicitly allows
for incommensurability, the proverbial comparison of apples and
oranges where one cannot readily compare two attributes on the
same scale.
Aspiration levels do not necessarily remain constant over time.











Figure 3.1: Aspiration-level adaptation. Aspiration levels for alternatives 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , 𝑎3 with two
attributes, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2, initially set at 𝐴1 and 𝐴2, which defines the set of acceptable alternatives
(shaded area). At 𝑡 = 𝑡1, 𝐴1 is lowered to 𝐴′1 while 𝐴2 remains. Alternative 𝑎1 lies below both
aspiration levels and is never chosen, whereas 𝑎3 is always chosen and 𝑎2 is chosen only after 𝑡1.
aspiration level, the agent may adjust the level and then proceed to
examine the next alternative until one is encountered that fulfills
the most recent aspiration level. For an illustration, consider Figure
3.1, which extends Figure II of Simon (1955). Aspiration levels for
alternatives 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , 𝑎3 with two attributes, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2, are initially
set at 𝐴1 and 𝐴2, which defines the set of acceptable alternatives
(shaded area). At 𝑡 = 𝑡1, 𝐴1 is lowered to 𝐴′1, while 𝐴2 remains. This
adjustment redefines the set of acceptable options from the shaded
area to the shaded and dotted areas. Alternative 𝑎1 lies below both
aspiration levels and is never chosen, whereas 𝑎3 is chosen at all times
and 𝑎2 is chosen only after 𝑡1.
The division into acceptable and unacceptable alternatives could
be interpreted as a choice of a less-than-optimal alternative. Simon
(1955) addresses such concerns by pointing out that the dichotomy of
the value function can reflect preferences (e.g., as an approximation to
a value function with sufficiently strong decreasing marginal returns)
but can also be considered an element to navigate the environment,
for example, in situations where alternatives are decided upon se-
quentially. Note that this implies that the alternative chosen is the
“best so far”, a phrase that Simon later said is a better summary of
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the satisficing idea than the common notion of an alternative that is
“good enough” (Gigerenzer, 2004).
The second element of Simon’s satisficing assumes that the agent
has to search for information. Simon points to two possibilities
for exploration. First, the agent is unaware of the complete set of
alternatives and discovers alternatives sequentially. Second, the agent
is aware of all alternatives but is agnostic about the complete set of
states of the world that each alternative entails. The agent can search
either externally by acquiring additional pieces of information or
internally by picturing the consequences of different alternatives. In
both cases, information gathering leads agents to sequentially explore
alternative-state combinations.
Both elements of satisficing, aspiration level and search, jointly
define the decision process in situations where the agent cannot
fully explore the space spanned by alternatives and states3. The
aspiration level governs both the quality of the alternative chosen
and the duration of the search process — even in situations where
the cost of gathering information is not known to the agent. Setting
the aspiration level therefore is at the heart of a satisficing model.
Generally, models of aspiration level setting and adaptation can
take many forms, ranging from computationally intensive methods,
including Bayesian approaches, to simple ones. Although Simon
himself derived a computationally intensive method in the appendix
of his 1955 paper (see also Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2001; Wall, 1993),
he notes that such a method is psychologically implausible given
agents’ typical lack of necessary information and the complexity of
the models. Instead, he posits that an agent “will set his acceptance
[level] quite high, watch the distribution of offers he receives, and
gradually and approximately adjust his acceptance [level] downward
or upward until he receives an offer he accepts — without ever making
probability calculations.” (Simon, 1955, p.117). Simon’s basic model
of aspiration-level adaptation can be summarized as follows:
3Simon provides the example of a chess player pondering the next move by
simulating internally how the game would continue under different alternatives until
a move is found that clearly leads to a winning position. He points out that this
particular task is only manageable by using a satisficing strategy, as it reduces the
space of alternatives from an estimated 1024 to fewer than 100 moves to be considered.
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Step 1: Set an aspiration level.
Step 2: Continue search until finding the first alternative that meets
or exceeds the aspiration level.
Step 3: If no alternative meets the aspiration level within a fixed
period, adapt it by a particular value and return to Step 2.
In his article of 1955, Simon leaves his class of models unnamed and
only later introduces the term satisficing, in a follow-up article in
Psychological Review (Simon, 1956). In that article, he shows how
an organism with very limited cognitive capabilities can successfully
apply a well-adapted satisficing strategy to maintain its subsistence.
Although the organism in the article of 1956 relies solely on a satisfic-
ing strategy, Simon highlights that the satisficing model is but one
strategy for many realistic decision situations; other situations may
call for different strategies (Simon, 1955, p.104).
3.2 Two Traditions of Satisficing
Ever since Simon’s inception of the term satisficing, it has been
used widely and diversely in the literature, which has produced a
fragmented understanding of it. In its most general sense, satisficing
is defined simply as the antithesis of optimization, without imposing
additional constraints on the decision model. By this definition,
any decision model that does not rely on optimization techniques
“satisfices”. We could not find this interpretation of satisficing in
Simon’s early writings, but it emerged later (e.g., Simon, 1979), after
the term had become emblematic of his more general critique of
rational choice theory.
We argue that satisficing has been understood in two different
ways, each of which originates in the writings of Simon. Both
research traditions make use of aspiration levels in their decision
models, albeit in different ways. The key difference between these
two traditions lies in the different decision environments they assume:
Whereas one tradition is primarily concerned with decisions under
risk, with and without search, the other tradition examines search-
based decisions under uncertainty and intractability. In this section
we give an overview of both these traditions and their relevant
literature selectively highlight some of the central contributions.
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3.2.1 Satisficing Under Risk
The first of these research traditions examines satisficing under risk,
where all information is available. On the basis of Simon’s conception
of satisficing above, we make a distinction between models that focus
on aspiration levels only and those that model both aspiration levels
and search. Although models in the former group lack one of our
defining elements, they represent a widespread interpretation of the
term.
Models Without Search
We begin with the group of static models, which is rooted in Simon’s
proposition of a simplified binary value function. However, over time
more diverse implementations have emerged; Table 3.2 classifies this
diverse set of models into broad categories.
One straightforward means of introducing aspiration levels into
the neoclassical framework has been to modify the utility function.
In place of a standard Bernoulli function (Bernoulli, 1738/1954) of
concave curvature, utility functions are modified to accommodate
aspiration levels. Borch (1968) was one of the first to put forth a model
of a decision maker seeking to minimize the probability of bankruptcy.
A decision maker in this model seeks to have positive wealth and
chooses courses of action that jointly maximize the probability of
achieving this outcome. Such a maximization is computationally
equivalent to maximizing Simon’s (1955) step-utility function, which
assumes a value of zero for all outcomes below the aspiration level
and a value of one for all outcomes at or above the aspiration level.
The problem with models of successful probability maximization
lies in their coarseness. Assuming that each alternative exceeding the
aspiration level yields the same amount of utility appears somewhat
counter-intuitive. One attempt to overcome this issue is presented
by Diecidue and van de Ven (2008). Rather than introducing a step
utility function, their model maintains and augments a concave utility
function: The value of an alternative is described by the sum of the
expected utility of the alternative, its probability of success, and its




𝑝𝑒 𝑢(𝑐𝑒) + 𝑃(𝑐+) − 𝑃(𝑐−) (3.1)
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Table 3.2
Models of Satisficing without Search
Approach Reference Keyword
Utility Function Charnes and Cooper (1963) binary utility
Borch (1968) binary utility
Fishburn (1977) risk preferences
Payne et al. (1980, 1981) risk preferences
Brown and Sim (2009) risk preferences
Brown et al. (2012) risk preferences





utility with reference point
Köszegi and Rabin (2006) utility with reference point
Preference Orders Jamison and Lau (1973) semi-orders
Krishnan (1977) semi-orders
Lioukas (1984) semi-orders
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) semi-orders
van Rooĳ (2010) semi-orders
Aleskerov et al. (2007) interval orders
Choice Rules Manzini et al. (2013) lexicographic semi-orders
Strategic Interaction Wierzbicki (1982) principal-agent problem
Haller (1985) principal-agent problem
Pazgal (1997) cooperation
Oechssler (2002) cooperation
Güth et al (Güth, 2010; Güth
et al., 2010)
games
Papi (2012, 2013, 2018) consumer choice in
monopoly
where 𝑐𝑒 denotes the payoff conditional on event 𝑒 that occurs with
probability 𝑝𝑒 , 𝑐+ and 𝑐− denote the set of payoffs above and below
an aspiration level, respectively, and  and  are constant behavioral
quantities. Here, 𝑐+ and 𝑐− are defined by an aspiration level.
Whereas the models by Diecidue and van der Ven use expected
utility theory as a starting point, prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) represents a more
radical departure from traditional economic theory. Importantly,
prospect theory uses a reference point that separates the domain
of gains from that of losses. Gains are valued along a conventional
concave function, and losses are valued along a convex function that
is steeper in slope than the gain function. The reference point has
been interpreted as an aspiration level (e.g., Heath, Larrick, & Wu,
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1999); exceeding it yields returns in a conventional concave fashion,
whereas falling short of it yields disproportionately negative returns.
An alternative approach to modeling satisficing modifies the
preference relation underlying the utility function. In this literature,
satisficing is most commonly understood in terms of semi-orders
(Luce 1956), a class of preference orderings that allow for intransitive
indifference relations of the following type: 𝑎1 ∼ 𝑎2; 𝑎2 ∼ 𝑎3; 𝑎1 ≻ 𝑎3.
That is, an agent is indifferent between 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 and between 𝑎2
and 𝑎3 in paired comparisons, albeit preferring 𝑎1 over 𝑎3. This
intransitive relationship is implied by the differential threshold of
vision or touch formulated in Weber’s law 𝑗𝑛𝑑 = 𝛿𝑣𝑣 , where 𝑗𝑛𝑑 is
the just-noticeable difference, 𝑣 the value of the stimuli, and 𝛿𝑣 the
change in the stimuli. Similarly, Luce (1956) contends that such
indifference relations occur when agents are only able to distinguish
alternatives that are sufficiently distinct and shows that semi-orders
are consistent with maximizing a generalized form of utility function.
van Rooĳ (2010) argues that satisficing gives rise to a preference
semi-order, resulting from agents’ inability to distinguish alterna-
tives above the aspiration level. Like a binary utility function, this
interpretation of satisficing emphasizes the perceived equivalence
of different alternatives. However, as A. Tversky (1969) points out, a
semi-order can result from a lexicographic choice rule. By this choice
rule, attributes are examined in a fixed order: Initially, alternatives are
ranked according to the first attribute; only if they are too similar is
the second attribute considered. Similarity is usually assessed using
a threshold that can be interpreted as an aspiration level. For instance,
Manzini and Mariotti (2007, 2012) develop axiomatic characteriza-
tions of choice data that are consistent with the use of lexicographic
choice rules. Using this framework, Manzini et al. (2013) characterize
a specific lexicographic procedure in which a satisficing strategy is
applied at the first stage, followed by a maximization procedure on
the selected subset if no unique solution is found beforehand.
Overall, static models of satisficing under risk use expected utility
theory as a starting point and modify it to incorporate an aspiration
level and make the theory more consistent with observed behavior.
Their similarity to expected utility theory enables satisficing to be
contrasted with utility maximization, where satisficing is often un-
derstood as perceived equivalence of two alternatives that objectively
differ in quality. In this modeling approach, satisficing is considered
a deviation from rational choice.
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Models of Search
The second branch of satisficing under risk is characterized by the
use of aspiration levels in the context of search. Here, an agent is
initially unaware of the full set of available alternatives and needs to
explore them sequentially. Depending on the search problem, the
agent can either recall alternatives discovered earlier or only select
the alternative that was last examined. Even if earlier alternatives
can be chosen, search may be costly, resulting in a trade-off between
investing in further exploration and exploiting current knowledge.
Given limited resources such as time, it can be advantageous to
terminate search before exploring all available alternatives (Caplin &
Dean, 2015; Gabaix, 2014; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003).
Risky search implies that the agent may be unaware of the available
alternatives but has meta-information, e.g., regarding their distribu-
tion or the cost of search. The first model of search under risk was
developed by Simon. In the appendix of his 1955 paper, firmly within
the rational choice tradition, he develops an optimal search model
that relies on an aspiration level for selling a house. Each day the
agent receives a price offer from a known distribution. The agent sets
the reservation price, or aspiration level, such that it maximizes the
expected value. Following this example, Stigler (1961) popularized
the topic of search in economics, emphasizing optimal search. At
the same time, the topic of search rose to prominence in statistics,
with the theory of optimal stopping (DeGroot, 1970). A common
finding in this literature is that optimally behaving agents should
continue search until finding an alternative that meets a fixed utility
threshold, or aspiration level, similar to Wald’s (1948) approach to
statistical inference. During the 1970s, this sequential paradigm was
also adopted by economists who then used reservation prices as
aspiration levels to characterize optimal search (e.g., Rothschild, 1974;
Telser, 1973). Since then, models of optimal search under a range of
assumptions made aspiration-based stopping rules a tradition in eco-
nomic and statistical theory staying within the tradition of expected
utility theory (e.g., Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995, 2001; Rubinstein &
Salant, 2006).
In search problems without recall, agents can observe the value of
an alternative directly but alternatives are only available sequentially.
A classic problem in this literature is the secretary problem, where
the goal is to choose the best alternative from a random sequence, of
111
Chapter 3 Satisficing: Integrating Two Traditions
which only the most recently seen alternative is available for choice.
As Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) demonstrate analytically, the optimal
strategy is a satisficing strategy. When each alternative is described
solely by its rank within the observed sample, the chances of choosing
the best alternative are maximized when the agent examines the first
percent of the sequence, uses the best alternative encountered so far
as an (implicit) aspiration level, and then selects the first alternative
exceeding this aspiration level. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) describe
a computationally more intensive satisficing strategy for maximizing
the probability of choosing the best alternative. Abstracting from
the classical secretary problem, Dudey and Todd (2001) introduce
additional goals beyond the probability of finding the best alternative,
such as maximizing the expected value of the chosen secretary.
According to their results, achieving these goals requires shorter
search than would be necessary to maximize the probability of
finding the best alternative. This divergence in goals, they argue, may
explain the finding that experimental participants search less than
necessary to find the best alternative. The search models presented
here are derived deductively. They are obtained from the properties
of the decision problem by determining the optimal decision strategy
that achieves a given goal. Notably, these optimal responses often
take the form of a satisficing model.
When studying whether people use an aspiration level, the em-
pirical challenge is that it is not sufficient to rely merely on observed
outcomes, as M. Friedman (1953) postulates. This challenge provides
the motivation for studying the decision process in terms of (i) the
search process identifying the information sequentially inspected by
the agent, (ii) the stopping rule specifying the aspiration level that
terminates search, (iii) and the decision strategy specifying how the
agent derives the decision from the information inspected (Gigerenzer
et al., 2011; Handel & Schwartzstein, 2018).
Caplin, Dean, and Martin (2011) are among the first to empirically
demonstrate the use of aspiration levels akin to Simon (1955) in an
incentivized experiment. Participants need to infer the values of the
alternatives based on attributes represented by positive or negative
numerical values, facilitating commensurability, and to indicate
their preferred alternative at any given moment. The authors show
that a satisficing model best describes behavior: Participants switch
from lower- to higher-value alternatives, indicating that information
is being absorbed on an item-by-item basis. Search stops when
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participants encounter an alternative that exceeds their aspiration
level.
The empirical evidence consistently shows that participants do
not choose the best alternative that would be possible in the event
of omniscience. However, if people have the opportunity to learn
through experience, they are able to approximate an optimal stopping
rule (Goldstein, McAfee, Suri, & Wright, 2020; Hey, Permana, &
Rochanahastin, 2017; Manski, 2017) which includes the response
time when searching internally (Navarro-Martinez, Loomes, Isoni,
Butler, & Alaoui, 2018). Taking the sequential nature of search into
account, participants generally choose the best alternative among
those observed (Bearden & Connolly, 2007; Caplin & Dean, 2011;
Caplin et al., 2011; Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, & Rangel, 2011), thereby
meeting the requirement of rational choice theory for sequential
search (Caplin & Dean, 2011). That is, people do indeed choose the
“best so far”.
3.2.2 Satisficing under Uncertainty and Intractability
As noted in the previous section, Simon (1955) was the first to develop
an optimal search model that uses an aspiration level. Yet he suggests
that this is inadequate in many settings:
“It is interesting to observe what additional information
the seller needs in order to determine the rational accep-
tance price, over and above the information he needs once
the acceptance price is set. He needs, in fact, virtually
complete information as to the probability distribution
of offers for all relevant subsequent time periods. Now
the seller who does not have this information, and who
will be satisfied with a more humbling kind of rationality,
will make approximations to avoid using the information
he doesn’t have.” (Simon, 1955, p.117)
One way to address such a situation is by applying heuristics. Since
the 1970s, the term heuristics has acquired a negative connotation
in economics, psychology, and management, referring to the short-
comings of human reasoning (A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In
computer science, however, it is used in in line with its original
Greek meaning “to find out or discover” to describe comparatively
simple algorithms for making intelligent inferences with incomplete
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information in situations of uncertainty or intractability4. We follow
this tradition and use the term to describe simple decision processes
that use limited information.
Heuristics are typically derived from observation of expert de-
cision making in natural environments that are often fraught with
uncertainty. To assess the performance of strategies under uncer-
tainty, one cannot rely on the axioms of rational choice theory, which
apply solely to situations of risk. Instead, one can assess quality
by comparing performance among a set of strategies, for example,
that of rational choice strategies with satisficing heuristics. In these
comparisons, heuristics often perform surprisingly well or even out-
perform highly complex strategies, vindicating their use by experts.
Determining the conditions under which strategies work well under
uncertainty forms the subject of the study of ecological rationality. In
other words, heuristics provide the answer to the question of how
decisions are made, while ecological rationality is the answer to the
question of why a given strategy works well.
Heuristics are often specified in terms of the three elements
highlighted before: a search rule, a stopping rule, and a decision
rule (Gigerenzer, 1996b). Using this taxonomy, we can characterize
satisficing models more precisely as decision models that (i) search
through alternatives or attributes and (ii) use an aspiration level in
their stopping rules. Learning and adaptation can lead agents to rely
on specific classes of strategies tailored to classes of decision problems.
The resulting assemblage of strategies represents an “adaptive toolbox”
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). We will review several classes of decision
problems along with classes of satisficing heuristics (see Table 3.3 for
an overview; heuristics are ordered by their appearance in the text).
Aspiration-level adaptation
V. L. Smith (1962) observed a paradox: Markets quickly converge to
equilibrium even though agents operate under information conditions
that are much weaker than specified by the theory that characterizes
the aggregate market. But what are the decision strategies that agents
actually use in such a context to solve the problem? Addressing
4The first textbook on heuristics in computer science was written by Pearl (1984),
who, like Simon, received the Turing Award, the highest honor in the field of computer
science and often compared to the Nobel Prize; see Lucci and Kopec (2015) for an
up-to-date treatment.
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Table 3.3
Classes of Satisficing Heuristics






by alternatives 𝑎𝑖 𝑎𝑖1 > 𝐴1; if after
time 𝑡 search could
not be stopped,






by alternatives 𝑎𝑖 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 > 𝐴𝑗 for all






𝐴𝑡 : time passed
since last event
by alternatives 𝑎𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑡 > 𝐴𝑡 Classify 𝑎𝑖 into one
of two categories
Tallying
𝐴𝑗 : minimum val-
ues on multiple at-
tributes
by attributes 𝑥 𝑗 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 > 𝐴𝑗 for 𝑘 out
of 𝑛
Classify 𝑎𝑖 into one
of two categories
Fast-and-frugal Trees
𝐴𝑗 : minimum val-
ues on ordered at-
tributes
by attributes 𝑥 𝑗 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 > 𝐴𝑗 for first
𝑗 that permits ex-
iting the tree
Classify 𝑎𝑖 into one
of two categories
Take-the best / Δ-inference
𝐴𝑗 : minimum
value of difference
in 𝑥 𝑗 between 𝑎1
and 𝑎2
by attributes 𝑥 𝑗 in
order of validity
first attribute for








by attributes 𝑥 𝑗 in
random order
for each 𝑥 𝑗 , elim-
inate all 𝑎𝑖 with




Notes: 𝑎𝑖 denotes alternative 1, 2, ..., 𝑖 , ..., 𝑁 , 𝑥 𝑗 denotes attribute 1, 2, ..., 𝑗 , ..., 𝑛, 𝑎𝑖 𝑗
denotes the value of alternative 𝑎𝑖 on attribute 𝑗, 𝐴𝑗 denotes the aspiration level for 𝑥 𝑗 ;
for ease of presentation, we assume that the aspiration level is a minimum rather than
a maximum value and is lowered when adapted.
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this puzzle, Artinger and Gigerenzer (2016) conduct an analysis
investigating both constructivist and ecological rationality by studying
pricing in the online used car market, which is characterized by a large
degree of uncertainty. They find that the market is well fitted to the
aggregate data by an equilibrium model by Varian (1980) that captures
both observed price dispersion and average price in the tradition
of a constructivist analysis. Unlike the equilibrium model, the
aspiration-level adaptation heuristic, originally proposed by Simon
(1955), correctly predicts the actual dynamic setting of the price. This
heuristic is virtually used by all dealers, who initially start with a
high aspired price 𝐴1 and lower it at fixed time intervals 𝑡, usually
by a predetermined margin 𝛿, until a car sells. The aspiration-level
adaptation heuristic systematically captures observed phenomena
such as high initial price, price stickiness, and the “cheap twin
paradox” whereby two highly similar cars at the same dealership
have a different price tag due to the simple fact that the price of the
car that has been on offer for longer has been reduced after a fixed
time interval.
Artinger and Gigerenzer (2016) show that the parameters the
dealers use — the initial price 𝐴1, the duration t that the price is
held constant, and price reduction 𝛿 — vary systematically with the
local market conditions, an indication of the ecological rationality
of aspiration-level adaptation pricing. Specifically, the higher the
population density in the local market and number of dealerships,
the shorter the duration t that the price is held constant. In a more
densely populated area with more competition, a dealer can more
quickly infer that a car is unlikely to sell for a given price, whereas in
less densely populated areas with less competition the price needs to
be held constant for a longer time.
Pricing offers an illustration of a simple heuristic that formulates
an aspiration level on one attribute, the price, and adapts it if necessary.
Camerer et al. (1997) hypothesize that taxi drivers terminate their
shifts after earning a daily income target. However, if there is an
increase of demand on a given day, and taxi drivers could predict it,
this would imply that drivers stop their shift too early. Subsequent
research has tested this hypothesis by comparing the descriptive
powers of neoclassical and reference-dependent versions of utility
theory (e.g., Crawford & Meng, 2011; Farber, 2008, 2015). However,
Artinger, Gigerenzer, and Jacobs (2020a) find that hourly earnings per
driver are barely predictable and therefore hypothesize that drivers
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use some form of heuristic rather than strategies that rely on rational
expectations, such as utility theory. To test their hypothesis, the
authors compare two utility models and four satisficing heuristics
in predicting taxi drivers’ shift ends. They find that the behavior of
the vast majority of drivers is best predicted by satisficing heuristics
that terminate shifts after working for a fixed number of hours or
after earning a fixed amount of income. The authors speculate that
the choice of the aspiration variable reflects which attribute drivers
prioritize, whereas the aspiration level is chosen based on experience
such that a reasonable balance of income and leisure is reached. Both
heuristic models use fixed aspiration levels that are not adapted over
time. Similarly, Berg (2014) reports that developers of high-rise office
building and malls decide in favor of an investment if they can get at
least “X% return” in two or three years, that is, a return that exceeds
an aspiration level 𝐴 for a time 𝑡.
Multi-attribute aspiration-level adaptation
In other situations such as academic job search, several attributes
are relevant, for instance, prestige of the institution, salary, location,
quality of local schools, and spouses’ and family preferences. In
addition, some of these attributes cannot be traded for others but
may be perceived as incommensurable. For these situations, Selten
(1998; Sauermann and Selten, 1962) provides a solution that closely
follows Simon’s (1955) aspiration-level adaptation heuristic (Table
3.3). Agents have an aspiration grid for a set of 𝑛 incommensurable
attributes. After each alternative 𝑎𝑖 is examined, aspiration levels
𝐴 𝑗 are adapted for some attributes 𝑗 according to a ranking that is
affected by preferences and may change as search progresses. When
the aspiration for a specific attribute is not met by the examined
alternative, it is lowered; otherwise it is increased. When no further
increases are feasible, the alternative that meets all aspiration levels
is chosen.
In an experimental set-up, Stüttgen, Boatwright, and Monroe
(2012) use an eye-tracking device that enables monitoring the search,
stop, and decision process for choices among brands of instant
noodles with which participants are familiar. Such a naturalistic task
makes it possible to investigate a situation with multiple, potentially
incommensurable attributes. They test the predictive accuracy of
two different models: one based on expected utility and the other on
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Simon’s (1955) aspiration-level heuristic, albeit without adaptation,
where an agent forms aspiration levels for each attribute separately.
The satisficing model predicts the observed data much more closely
than the utility model does, suggesting that even in such a mundane
task, incommensurability is at work. In particular, when an alternative
is found that meets all aspiration levels, search is concluded after a
verification phase in which the agents acquire additional information.
Hiatus heuristic
Aspiration levels can also be used for predicting whether an event
observed in the past will occur again in the future. A case in point
is that marketing practitioners often rely on the hiatus heuristic,
predicting that customers will make further purchases if they have
made a purchase within the past 𝑡 days, otherwise not (Table 3.3).
Here, the aspiration level At refers to time passed. This practice
contrasts sharply with the Pareto-NBD model (Schmittlein, Morrison,
& Colombo, 1987), a stochastic model that also predicts future pur-
chases. Using purchasing data from three industries, Wübben and
von Wangenheim (2008) set out to demonstrate the superiority of the
stochastic model but find that the hiatus heuristic yielded the same
or better out-of-sample predictions than did the Pareto-NBD model
(see also Persson & Ryals, 2014).
Theirs is not an isolated finding. An exclusive reliance on recency,
that is, the time since the last event occurred, which ignores all other
variables, has long been considered irrational yet has been observed
in many different domains (e.g., Gallagher, 2014; Kunreuther, 1976;
Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Slovic, Kunreuther, & White, 1974). Using
60 different data sets across many different domains, Artinger, Kozodi,
Wangenheim, and Gigerenzer (2018) show that the hiatus heuristic is
the single best strategy for predicting future events such as purchases,
outperforming logistic regressions and highly sophisticated machine
learning methods such as random forests that make use of recency,
frequency, and any other available information.
Tallying
Predicting the next president of the US is a problem entailing high
uncertainty about voters’ behavior. In November 2016, when predic-
tion markets, polls, and big data analytics predicted Hillary Clinton’s
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victory by a large margin, Lichtman (2020) instead predicted that Don-
ald Trump would win. Using a tallying heuristic, Lichtman’s model
has correctly predicted all presidential elections since 1984. The
heuristic considers 13 attributes that Lichtman calls “keys”, which
comprise yes-no questions such as whether the incumbent party
holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives after midterm
elections than it did after the previous midterm election, whether
the incumbent-party candidate is the sitting president, and whether
real annual per capita economic growth during the term equals or
exceeds mean growth during the two previous terms. The tallying
rule is:
Keys to the White House: If six or more attributes are
negative, then the challenger will win.
Note that there is no attempt to estimate the weights of the attributes
or their covariances; all are given equal weight and simply counted.
Unlike in aspiration-level adaptation, where the attributes are given
and search takes place by evaluating alternatives, here the alternatives
are given and search takes place by evaluating attributes. Search is
then stopped when 6 out of 13 attributes are negative. As an aside,
12 of the 13 attributes concern the party holding the White House
and its candidate, and only one is about the challenger. This logic
implies that voters did not vote for Trump; they instead voted against
the previous governing party and its candidate.
Åstebro and Elhedhli (2006) report evidence that a tallying heuris-
tic for classifying early stage ventures performs at least as well as
computationally intensive models, while being faster and requiring
less information. The heuristic first tallies the positive and negative
attributes of a specific venture. If the tally of the positive attributes
exceeds the aspiration level and the tally of the negative attributes
falls short of the aspiration level, a venture is classified as promising.
Testing the strategy competitively against a linear model, the authors
found that the satisficing strategy reached a predictive accuracy of
83%, compared with 79% for the linear model. Similarly, Jung, Con-
cannon, Shroff, Goel, and Goldstein (2020) show that a system of
bail decisions based on tallying leads to recommendations that are
as accurate as those of complex machine learning systems, but less
costly and more transparent.
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In general, consider a choice between alternatives 𝑎1 and 𝑎2, and
𝑛 binary or continuous attributes 𝑥 𝑗 with aspirations levels 𝐴 𝑗 . The
prediction or choice is made by a simple rule:
Tallying: Choose 𝑎1 if 𝑎1, 𝑗 ≥ 𝐴 𝑗 , for at least 𝑘 out of 𝑛
attributes. Otherwise choose 𝑎2.
Note that aspiration-level-adaptation requires that all 𝐴 𝑗 are met,
whereas tallying requires that only some 𝑘 with (𝑘 ≤ 𝑛) of 𝐴 𝑗 are met.
That makes it possible to consider a larger number of attributes and
determine whether a critical subset is met. Tallying is compensatory,
treating the attributes equally and exchangeable. In contrast, the next
class of heuristics treats these in a non-compensatory way: if the first
aspiration level is met, search is stopped and a decision is made.
Fast-and-frugal trees
In classification problems, an agent needs to assign an alternative
to one of several classes according to its attributes. One class of
heuristics that addresses these problems are fast-and-frugal trees
(Martignon, Katsikopoulos, & Woike, 2008). Fast-and-frugal trees
order attributes sequentially and define aspiration levels for each
of them. Unlike other classification trees, however, fast-and-frugal
trees can reach a decision after each attribute is examined. That is,
for attributes that are split at their aspiration levels, they have 𝑛 + 1
exits for 𝑛 attributes, of which the first 𝑛 − 1 attributes have one exit
each and the final one has two. Thus, a fast-and-frugal tree has 𝑛 + 1
exits, while a full tree has 2𝑛 exits. These two features, order and
aspiration levels, prevent estimation error or even intractability with
large numbers of attributes.
For illustration, consider Figure 3.2, which displays a decision tree
by Aikman et al. (2020) developed for the Bank of England to identify
banks at default risk. This tree uses 𝑛 = 3 attributes, leading to
𝑛+1 = 4 exits overall. The first attribute that is examined is the bank’s
leverage ratio. If this ratio falls short of the aspiration level of 4.1%,
the bank is immediately classified as vulnerable, without inspecting
subsequent attributes. Only when the leverage ratio is at least 4.1% is
the next attribute examined, the market-based capital ratio, which
can also lead to an immediate decision. The sequential nature of the
fast-and-frugal tree models a form of incommensurability: If a bank
has an extremely poor leverage ratio, an excellent loan-to-deposit
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ratio cannot compensate for that. This is analogous to many other
real-life systems: A healthy liver cannot compensate for a failing heart.
The exit structure of the fast-and-frugal tree reflects the cost structure
of misclassifications (Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011). The bank
classification tree has a “red flag” exit after each attribute and thereby
minimizes misses at the cost of false alarms compared to the three
other possible trees with the same order of attributes but different exit
structures. In principle, there are two means of parameterizing the
heuristic: by estimating the parameters statistically or by a combined
method in which an expert determines the attributes, their order, and
the exits and then determines the thresholds for each variable using
statistical methods. Aikman et al. (2020) show that the statistically
estimated fast-and-frugal tree is better than a logit model at predicting
vulnerable banks and that the combined method outperformed both.
The construction of fast-and-frugal trees, as well as of tallying models,
and their predictive accuracy relative to regression and machine
learning models is explained by Katsikopoulos, Şimşek, Buckmann,
and Gigerenzer (2020).
Take-the-best, 𝛿-inference, and elimination-by-aspects
Consider a choice problem where the agent needs to select one
alternative from a set based on the attributes of each alternative but
does not know the overall value or utility of each alternative. For
example, an agent wants to identify the house with the highest quality
based on attributes such as price, floor size, location, or number of
rooms. Here, the agent knows the available options but does not know
the outcome (quality) and needs to infer it from the given attributes,
where the relation between attributes and quality is not or is only
partially known. This meets the definition of uncertainty with regard
to outcomes; the alternatives are known. When choice is between
two alternatives, the take-the-best heuristic can be used (Gigerenzer,
1996b). This strategy examines attributes lexicographically, that is,
they are ordered by their validity, defined as the percentage of correct
inferences made by that attribute alone. If the two options have
identical values for the attribute, it is ignored and the next attribute
is examined. Search through attributes stops as soon as one is found
that discriminates, that is, when the difference in value exceeds the
aspiration level of zero. Once such an attribute is found, no further
attributes are examined, and the decision is based solely on the one
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Figure 3.2: Fast-and-frugal tree for bank classification.
discriminating attribute. Whereas take-the-best is limited to decisions
with binary attributes, 𝛿-inference (Luan et al., 2014) can be used
when attributes are continuous.
Testing the performance of take-the-best and 𝛿-inference shows
that these heuristics are surprisingly powerful in prediction. Across
20 different data sets, ranging from school dropout rates to property
prices, take-the-best was less accurate than multiple regression in
choice from seen alternatives (data fitting) but more accurate in choice
from unseen alternatives, that is, in out-of-sample testing (Czerlinski,
Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999). Similarly, comparing take-the-best
with machine learning models such as classification-and-regression
trees (CART) and support vector machines shows that take-the-best
can match or even outperform these in an out-of-sample setting, while
using less information (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2008, 2012). Luan et al.
(2014) and Luan, Reb, and Gigerenzer (2019) found that 𝛿-inference
yields better out-of-sample performance than linear regression and
machine learning models such as random forest across 20 additional
122
3.2 Two Traditions of Satisficing
datasets, irrespective of whether the aspiration level was set optimally
(based on past data) or to its most robust value.
When alternatives abound, direct comparisons may no longer be
feasible. With more than three alternatives available, the number of
possible direct comparisons exceeds the number of alternatives. In
these cases, efficiency would not require agents to compare alterna-
tives with one another but instead to assess them individually. This
is done, for instance, by the elimination-by-aspects heuristic, which
forms aspiration levels for each attribute and examines them in the
order of their importance (A. Tversky, 1972). For each attribute, it
eliminates all alternatives that do not meet its aspiration level until
a single alternative remains, which is then chosen. The structure
of elimination-by-aspects resembles the class of consideration-set
heuristics that have been proposed as a strategy for dealing with large
sets of alternatives in research on consumer decisions: Rather than
examining all available alternatives in detail, consumers heuristically
exclude options from detailed analysis. The resulting considera-
tion set is then submitted to detailed examination at a second stage
(e.g., Hauser, Toubia, Evgeniou, Befurt, & Dzyabura, 2010; Hauser
& Wernerfelt, 1990; Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, &
Gigerenzer, 2010). Hauser (2014) reviews various heuristics that have
been proposed for the formation of consideration sets, including
satisficing approaches. These heuristic models are highly predictive
of how consumers form small consideration sets (Dzyabura & Hauser,
2011; Yee, Dahan, Hauser, & Orlin, 2007). Consideration sets bear a
resemblance to the choice rules discussed earlier (Manzini & Mariotti,
2007; Manzini et al., 2013), with the difference that the work on choice
rules makes specific assumptions about preference orders, whereas
consideration set heuristics do not assume a specific preference or-
dering. This difference reflects diverging assumptions about the
decision environment: The notion of preference orders assumes a
situation of risk where alternatives can be at least partially ranked
because all necessary information is available to the agent. In contrast,
consideration set heuristics have been devised for situations where
the set of alternatives is simply so large that one cannot meaningfully
deduce an order.
Note that all heuristics listed in Table 3.3 can effectively deal with
incommensurability between attributes and do not need to integrate
them onto a single cardinal scale as in expected utility theory. Search
proceeds on an attribute-by-attribute basis where the value of an
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attribute is evaluated with respect to an aspiration level. This is
also the case for the aspiration-level heuristic, which searches by
alternatives and evaluates these attribute by attribute. Also note
that not all heuristics that deal with decisions under uncertainty are
satisficing heuristics. For instance, 1𝑁 , which allocates an investment
equally over N assets, relies neither on an aspiration level nor on
search. Its rationale is to reduce error from estimating asset weights
and the covariance matrix (DeMiguel, Garlappi, & Uppal, 2009).
Heuristics for well-defined but intractable problems
The above examples address uncertainty. However, even if the com-
plete set of alternatives, possible future states of the world, and
consequences is known, intractability surprisingly quickly makes
rational choice infeasible and a heuristic strategy becomes an effective
solution. Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg (2006) show this
by comparing two different conditions that resemble such a mundane
task as selecting a television characterized by a few attributes. The
first condition is simple: Facing three alternatives with only one
attribute each and a stochastic payoff, the decision maker sequentially
explores the attributes and the values that realize, and in turn the
value of an alternative. In this condition, information acquisition is
costly, and the agent can stop acquiring information at any time. The
Gittins-Weitzman index solves the problem optimally by establishing
a complete sequence with which to explore the products and their at-
tributes (Gittins, 1979; Weitzman, 1979). The more complex condition
is characterized not by three but by eight alternatives with not one
but nine attributes. In the experiment, the attributes are positive or
negative numerical values, which facilitates commensurability and
which participants get to know during a sequential search process.
Gabaix et al. (2006) report that the complex task is computationally
intractable for the rational choice model because the problem suffers
from the curse of dimensionality (see also González-Valdés & de
Dios Ortuzar, 2018; Salant, 2011). However, they show that partic-
ipants in a laboratory experiment employed the directed cognition
heuristic, a simple, myopic strategy that looks just one step ahead
instead of solving the complete sequence. It can solve not only the
simple problem but also the complex problem that rational choice
cannot address. The heuristic proceeds as follows: First, it compares
the value of stopping search immediately and the expected value
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of stopping immediately after the next attribute. This is a myopic
calculation because it does not incorporate the possible consequences
of continuing search beyond the realization of the next attribute.
Second, the heuristic inspects the attribute with the highest expected
value. Third, the first two steps are repeatedly executed until the
costs of searching and inspecting another attribute outweigh the
expected value of the next most attractive attribute, which represents
the aspiration level.
Myopic search is a general tool for finding good solutions to
intractable problems. Examples are scheduling problems in trans-
portation, where the task is to find the shortest route through cities,
beginning and ending at the same city. For 50 cities, finding the short-
est route would require searching through more than 1062 possible
routes. Heuristics such as the nearest neighbor algorithm — move to
the nearest unvisited city — can provide excellent solutions where
the best one cannot be found (Lucci & Kopec, 2015).
Behavioral Theory of the Firm
The use of an aspiration level as a heuristic decision strategy was
already at the core of Simon’s dissertation, published in 1947 un-
der the title “Administrative Behavior”. Here, Simon was primarily
concerned with firms; a more general decision context is found in
his seminal paper of 1955. Nonetheless, it was “for his pioneering
research into the decision making process within economic organi-
zations” that Simon was awarded the 1978 Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economic Sciences. His work was developed further (March &
Simon, 1958) and ultimately inspired the “behavioral theory of the
firm” (Cyert & March, 1963). In its analysis of the fundamental
decisions of the firm, such as price, output, and resource allocations,
it lays “an explicit emphasis on the actual process of decision making
as its basic research commitment” (Cyert & March, 1963, p.19). This
stands in sharp contrast to traditional economic theory that focuses
on market level outcomes and classically models firms as rational
actors.
The theoretical foundations on which behavioral theory of the
firm builds in order to understand the actual decision processes are
a) satisficing instead of maximization, where the first alternative
that is satisfactory with respect to an aspiration level is chosen; b)
search for information when not all possible outcomes of any choice
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alternative can be anticipated; c) the use of robust rules in the face
of uncertainty, circumventing predictions about the distant future.
Its quest is to align models as closely as possible with the empirical
observations of both the output that organizations produce and the
process they use (for a review, see Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio,
2012). The theory has risen to prominence particularly in the domains
of organization and strategy (March, 1981, 1991; Winter, 2000).
The behavioral theory of the firm predicts that an aspiration level
is a function of recent performance, past historical aspiration levels,
and recent performance of other firms. To understand organizational
learning processes, models of aspiration formation have been devel-
oped that are clearly rooted in the tradition of bounded rationality.
In economics, models of this form have a long history as adaptive
expectations (e.g., Chow, 1989; Sterman, 1987) or adaptive learning
(e.g., Jacobs & Jones, 1980). The main difference is that in expectation
models, aspiration levels are not explicitly modeled but subsumed
in an overall function. An ecology of learning organizations and
competition yields a continuous adaptation process. Search is initially
local; if no solution is found that yields satisfactory performance, a
broader search ensues (Levinthal & March, 1981). If this does not
yield a satisfactory outcome, the aspiration level is adapted.
The behavioral theory of the firm has also inspired research in
economics, giving rise to the field of evolutionary economics (Nelson
& Winter, 1973, 1982), which examines industrial evolution (e.g.,
Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000). Nelson and Winter (1982) model the
evolution of an industry with firms using particular rules or routines
in situations where the world is characterized by complexity and
uncertainty. Routines emerge as a response to an adaptive process
where no optimal solution can be found ex-ante. A firm uses a
given routine as long as its output remains above an aspiration level;
only when the output falls below this does it engage in exploration
for an alternative routine (Winter, 1971). Such behavior necessarily
results in companies failing to survive, as shown for instance by
Witt (1986). Comparing three algorithms in a multi-period market
competition, where the first maximizes expected profits, the second
uses an aspiration level and satisfices when setting prices, and the
third algorithm is based on simple reinforcement learning, Witt
shows that the survival of an algorithm strongly depends on the
initial conditions and that optimization does not dominate the other
algorithms. Given uncertainty, Heiner (1983, 1989) formally shows
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that that firms will adapt only a limited number of simple decision
rules. Rules are added solely if they exceed an aspiration level, which
refers to the reliability with which the rule will generate profitable
future actions. The larger the degree of uncertainty, the fewer the
rules.
The rich body of empirical research on firms operating under un-
certainty shows that they rely on various forms of satisficing (Artinger,
Petersen, Gigerenzer, & Weibler, 2015). Much of this research con-
cerns the actions of firms and the evaluation of performance with
regards to an aspiration level. Aspirations determine whether past
performance is framed as a success or failure, which influences subse-
quent strategic decisions (Lant, 1992). The first to provide empirical
evidence for the use of an aspiration level in the formation of organi-
zational goals is Lant (1992). In a laboratory experiment, she uses a
management game employed by companies for inhouse training that
captures the complexity and dynamics that managers frequently face.
Teams of MBA students and managers from an executive program
compete over multiple rounds of producing and selling two types
of consumer products. After teams set their own goals, they make
strategic and resource allocation decisions on a range of different
variables. The underlying software uses a complex nonlinear algo-
rithm that simulates a competitive market in a multidimensional,
interdependent world. Lant (1992) observes the goals, or aspiration
levels, that the teams set in terms of their targeted sales as well as
their actual performance. Her findings indicate that the teams are
best described as satisficing, whereas the rational expectation model
receives relatively little support (see also Audia & Greve, 2006; Lant
& Shapira, 2008). The results by Lant (1992) have been replicated in a
study by Mezias, Chen, and Murphy (2002), who use field rather than
laboratory data of decision makers in a financial services company.
Following Lant (1992), considerable evidence has accumulated on the
use of aspiration levels in evaluating and guiding firm performance
in such diverse contexts as R&D expenditures, outsourcing, and firm
growth (e.g., Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, &
Chuang, 2005; Berg, 2014; Bolton, 1993; de Boer, Gaytan, & Arroyo,
2006; Greve, 1998, 2008; D. Miller & Chen, 1994). Blettner, He, Hu,
and Bettis (2015) study the process of aspiration adaptation in a lon-
gitudinal data set from the news magazine industry. They find that
when constructing an aspiration level, organizations largely focus on
their own past performance and whether they achieve the goals they
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set for themselves. When they are close to bankruptcy, however, they
start focusing on competitors’ performance.
In summary, considering the search process is an important ele-
ment in evaluating the quality of individuals’ and firms’ decisions.
Given search, empirical evidence shows that agents do choose the
alternative that is “the best so far”. Given alternatives with two or
more potentially incommensurable attributes, heuristics dispense
with the need to integrate these by applying aspiration levels. Heuris-
tics can be powerful tools to make good decisions given uncertainty
or intractability. But what exactly are the conditions under which
heuristics perform well?
3.3 A Framework for Integration
As we have argued in the previous section, satisficing strategies are
investigated within two distinct research traditions. These traditions
differ in the assumed decision environment (risk versus uncertainty)
and arrive at different conclusions about the rationality of satisficing:
Although models of satisficing under risk without search conclude
that satisficing is not commendable because it produces systematic
mistakes, satisficing strategies given uncertainty or intractability are
often found to yield better decisions than those by alternative models.
There are two possible explanations for such divergent findings that
allow for integration of these two different traditions: (i) cost-benefit
trade-off in information acquisition and in information processing,
and (ii) the bias-variance trade-off, which provides a framework
to understand what type of strategy is best given the information
available, beyond the costs of search and computation.
3.3.1 Cost-Benefit Trade-off
Operating on the basis of limited information can be a result of the
costs of information search. Given such costs, it can be beneficial
to stop search early and make a decision based on a limited sample
such that people deliberately decide not to know (for a review in an
applied context, see Hertwig & Engel, 2016). Since at least the work
of von Hayek (1945), economists have studied the trade-off between
learning costs and decision quality. Agents in general do indeed
choose the better alternatives or, as Simon would put it, the best so
far (Bearden & Connolly, 2007; Caplin et al., 2011; Reutskaja et al.,
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2011). Costs of information acquisition can also rationalize some
apparent mistakes in the field. For instance, Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft (2009) find that agents buy unnecessarily expensive products
due to search costs. Similarly, costs for information acquisition also
explain why agents visit only a relatively small number of websites
before an online purchase (Santos, Hortaçsu, & Wildenbeest, 2012).
Search costs feature in several models in the form of information
cost functions (e.g., Caplin & Dean, 2015; Sims, 2003; Verrecchia,
1982). These models have in common that they allow determining the
optimal trade-off between benefits and costs of search. At the same
time, however, they make some strong assumptions about agents’
knowledge and the degree of complexity of the environment.
Similarly, operating with a simple decision strategy can result
from the costs of computation. As shown, for instance, by Gabaix et al.
(2006) and Salant (2011) and other work mainly in computer science
(for a review, see Lucci & Kopec, 2015), computing an optimal solution
can entail substantial costs or even quickly prove to be infeasible.
People are inherently sensitive to such costs of computation. Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson (1988) show that when the cost of computation
is increased by introducing time pressure, agents switch to a simpler
strategy. Experimental work concludes that humans tend to trade off
benefit and cost of cognitive effort rationally (Kool & Botvinick, 2014;
Lieder, Griffiths, & Hsu, 2018; Lieder et al., 2014). This suggests that
apparent mistakes can be rationalized in terms of computational costs.
Formal models that trade off computational benefits and costs have
been developed particularly in computer science and specifically in
research on artificial intelligence (for a review, see Gershman, Horvitz,
& Tenenbaum, 2015). Such models start with a meta-level analysis
of the ideal balance between computational effort and the quality
of alternatives. Yet, as Gershman et al. (2015) stress, calculating an
optimal solution in terms of costs and benefits of computation is
frequently challenging. Few decision problems admit an analytic
solution, and many problems are computationally intractable. In
addition, Conlisk (1996) points to the problem of infinite regress:
If computation is costly, then optimizing computation is costly ad
infinitum.
Like search costs, computational costs provide a reason why
satisficing and simple strategies that require little information can
perform so well, albeit trading a reduction in costs for a reduction
in accuracy. At the same time, section 3.2.2 reported a number of
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findings where heuristics perform on par or even outperform complex
alternative models from, among others, operations research and
machine learning, while reducing costs of search and computation
at the same time. The performance criterion in many cases was
predictive accuracy, without accounting for search and computational
costs, which would have boosted the performance advantage of the
heuristic even more. This calls for an alternative explanation.
3.3.2 Bias-Variance Trade-off
An alternative reason why heuristics can perform so well concerns
the trade-off between bias and variance. This trade-off explains why
a model with fewer parameters can yield more accurate predictions
than does a nested model with more parameters. The trade-off
provides the explanation why a simple model such as a heuristic can
outperform a complex model simultaneously in terms of accuracy
and other performance metrics.
A model’s predictive accuracy is grounded in a basic statistical
relation between bias and variance. Suppose the task is to predict
𝑦, the value of an unseen item, based on its observables 𝑥. Value 𝑦
was generated by an unknown function 𝑦(𝑥, 𝑄), which combines the
observables using a fixed but unknown parameter set 𝑄. A model
𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞) is used to predict the value 𝑦. To this end, a learning sample
is randomly drawn from the population of items generated by 𝑦(𝑥, 𝑄)
and is used to calibrate 𝑞, the parameter set of the model 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞).
Based on this parameter set, a prediction about 𝑦 is made, say 𝑚(𝑥, ?̂?).
The error in prediction can be assessed in many ways, among which
the mean squared error is a common choice (Geman, Bienenstock, &
Doursat, 1992). The mean squared error in predicting item can be
decomposed as follows:
error = bias2 + variance + 𝜖 (3.2)
where 𝜖 denotes the irreducible error that cannot be eliminated even
if the generating function 𝑦(𝑥, 𝑄) were known. An example of 𝜖 is
unsystematic measurement error. In contrast to 𝜖, bias is a systematic
error of model 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞). To better understand this, suppose there are
𝐿 possible independent learning samples of a given size, and each is
used to fit the parameters of model 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞) and calculate a prediction
about 𝑦, yielding a set of predictions 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞1̂), 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞2̂)...𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞?̂?).
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Bias is the difference between the average of these predictions and
the expectation of the generating function:
bias2 = {𝐸𝑛[𝑚(𝒙 , ?̂? 𝑖)] − 𝐸[𝑦(𝒙 ,𝑸)]}2 , (3.3)
where 𝐸𝑛[𝑚(𝒙 , ?̂? 𝑖)] denotes the expectation with respect to differ-
ent learning samples and 𝐸[𝑦(𝒙 ,𝑸)] denotes the expectation with
respect to unsystematic error. Error from bias reflects a systematic
misspecification of model 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞) relative to the generating function
𝑦(𝑥, 𝑄). Variance, in contrast, arises from a lack of knowledge of the
model’s parameter values and the need to infer them from a limited
sample of data. Formally, variance refers to the average variation of
an individual prediction 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞𝑖) around the average prediction:
variance = 𝐸𝑛[{𝑚(𝒙 , ?̂? 𝑖) − 𝐸𝑛[𝑚(𝒙 , ?̂? 𝑖)]}2], (3.4)
Error from variance reflects the sensitivity of the model to idiosyn-
crasies of the sample used for calibrating its parameters. An illustra-
tion is provided in the upper panel of Figure 3.3. In it, the center of the
target is the expectation of the unknown generating function, the best
possible prediction. The black dots represent different predictions of
𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞) based on different learning samples that yield different esti-
mates of 𝑞, and the gray dot is the average of these predictions. The
model on the left has low bias and accurate average predictions but
high variance, and its predictions fluctuate strongly with parameter
estimates; the model on the right has higher bias but lower variance
in predictions.
In general, a model that aims to maximize predictive accuracy
needs to control both the bias and the variance components of the
prediction error. Bias is reduced to the degree that model 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑞)
resembles the generating function 𝑦(𝑥, 𝑄). One means of achieving
lower bias is to add free parameters to the model. However, each
additional parameter increases (or at best keeps constant) the variance
component of the prediction error, provided that these models are
nested. Thus, there is a trade-off between bias and variance. The lower
panel of Figure 3.3 shows the point of the minimum prediction error
for two different sample sizes given a set of free parameters estimated
from the data. To the left of the point, including fewer parameters
implies higher total error; to the right of it, more parameters imply
higher total error. The exact location of the point is determined by
factors affecting variance, such as the mathematical nature of the
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Figure 3.3: Bias and variance. Upper panel: The center of the target is the expectation of the
unknown generating function, the best possible prediction. The black dots represent different
predictions of 𝑚(𝒙 , 𝒑) based on different learning samples that yield different estimates of 𝒑.
The gray dot is the average of these predictions. The model on the left has a low bias and accurate
average predictions but a high variance, and predictions fluctuate strongly with parameter
estimates. The model on the right has higher bias but low variance in predictions. Lower panel:
Bias diminishes but variance increases in the number of parameters. There exist a number of
parameters that minimize total error, the position of which depends on many factors, including
the size of the learning sample.
parameters (additive, multiplicative, etc.) and the size of the sample
used to calibrate the parameters. With more data available, the model
can “afford” more parameters while keeping its bias and variance in
balance.
The trade-off between bias and variance is well known in statistics
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and machine learning. However, empirical economics is divided in its
view (e.g., Yatchew 1998; Varian 2014; Mullainathan and Spiess 2017).
On the one hand, large parts of empirical economics are concerned
with accurately estimating model parameters. Here, the goal is to
obtain unbiased parameter estimates to evaluate, for instance, policy
interventions and only rarely to predict (but see also Kleinberg et
al. 2015). Overfitting is usually addressed by using tools such as
the Bayesian information criterion or regularization. Yet controlling
for overfitting does not seem to be a perfect safeguard. For instance,
Artinger et al. (2018) and Luan, Reb, and Gigerenzer (2019) com-
petitively test heuristics against regularized regression and random
forests, models designed to be robust to overfitting. They find that the
heuristics predict better than the more complex models, particularly
in smaller samples. On the other hand, parts of microeconomics and
most of behavioral economics focus on comparing theories. This
line of work rarely conducts out-of-sample tests of these theories but
instead typically compares the in-sample fit (e.g., Starmer 2005; D.
Friedman et al. 2014). As the bias-variance trade-off illustrates, this
practice can be misleading. Instead, theory comparison should follow
two principles set out by Friedman in 1953:
(i) Theories need to be tested on prediction, not on how
well they fit data: “The ultimate goal of a positive science
is the development of a ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields
valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about
phenomena not yet observed” (M. Friedman, 1953, p.7).
(ii) Theories should be tested competitively by comparing
their predictions: “The question whether a theory is
realistic ‘enough’ can be settled only by seeing whether it
yields predictions that are good enough for the purpose in
hand or that are better than predictions from alternative
theories” (M. Friedman, 1953, p.41).
Given an uncertain environment, agents — like scholars who seek
high accuracy — require strategies that balance bias and variance
(Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2015; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). We
examine now what this conclusion implies for satisficing in different
informational environments.
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3.3.3 Satisficing and the Bias-Variance Trade-off
Environments of risk allow for constructivist analysis. Under risk, the
only error one can make is due to bias, whereas error due to variance
is by definition not possible. With full information about the decision
environment, scholars and agents are able to derive the optimal path
of action. No inference about the decision environment is required
and variance from estimation becomes irrelevant. Consequently,
the prediction error, and hence quality of choice, depends solely on
the bias of the decision strategy. In these situations, satisficing is
suboptimal compared with unbiased strategies such as mathematical
optimization.
Environments of uncertainty require a different approach, the anal-
ysis of the ecological rationality of strategies (Selten, 2001; V. L. Smith,
2008). In an environment of uncertainty, where the problem is
ill-defined and the exhaustive set of states of the world and their con-
sequences is not knowable or foreseeable, the best strategy cannot be
foreseen. Thus, the study of ecological rationality under uncertainty
compares strategies to determine which one likely performs better in
what environment and, importantly, why. To do that, it analyzes both
sources of error, bias and variance. The best-performing decision
strategy does not reduce bias to zero, but finds a balance between the
two kinds of errors. Here is the place for heuristics, whose simplicity
can reduce error due to variance, such as by needing fewer free
parameters. Given uncertainty, the optimal trade-off between bias
and variance is hard to estimate. Instead, it requires two method-
ological approaches: competitive testing of strategies, and testing on
out-of-sample prediction.
Consider first the ecological rationality analysis of bias. So far,
we have assumed that lower exposure to variance is paid for with
increased bias. However, the amount of bias depends crucially on the
statistical structure of the decision environment. When the structure
of the heuristic matches the structure of the decision environment, the
bias of a heuristic can be surprisingly low. To illustrate, consider the
hiatus heuristic defined earlier, which predicts whether a customer
will make future purchases or not (Table 3.3). Can we identify
conditions under which the bias of this heuristic is the same as that
of linear models? Consider a simple example. Assume a linear
strategy with 𝑛 binary attributes 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , ..., 𝑥𝑛 with values of either
+1 or −1, where the positive value indicates future purchases. All
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of the weights of the attributes are positive and, like beta weights,
reflect the additional contribution to the higher ranked attributes.
The linear rule infers that the customer will make future purchases if
𝑦 > 0, otherwise not. If the following condition holds, the bias of the
hiatus heuristic (or similar one-reason heuristics) is the same as that
of a linear model:
Dominant attribute condition: The ordered weights𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , ..., 𝑤𝑛






If there is a dominant attribute, the heuristic performs as well as and
even better than the linear model because the latter incurs further
error from variance (Artinger et al., 2018). Similarly, it can be shown
analytically that the take-the-best heuristic has the same bias as a linear
model when the weights of the linear model are non-compensatory
(Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).
Non-compensatory attributes condition: Each weight, 𝑤 𝑗 ,





In these situations, the choice made by a linear decision rule is
determined exclusively by the attribute with the highest weight (see
also Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). The take-the-best heuristic exploits
such an environmental property by employing a non-compensatory,
lexicographic decision strategy. This property leads take-the-best
and a linear decision rule to have identical bias in non-compensatory
environments. In addition to identical bias, lower variance leads
heuristics to outperform linear models in prediction.
How often do these conditions hold in the real world? Şimşek
(2013) examines 51 natural environments, ranging from car and house
prices to the salaries of college professors. For 93% of the paired
comparisons in half of the data sets, she finds that linear models
yielded the same decisions as lexicographic models that decided on
the basis of the first discriminating attribute.
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As to variance, the larger the sample size and the smaller the
number of free parameters, the lower the error by variance in gen-
eral. Heuristic strategies, including satisficing heuristics, tend to
have fewer free parameters than do estimation-and-optimization
strategies. Heuristics and optimization strategies are rarely nested,
which complicates a-priori comparisons of their exposure to variance.
The results of competitive performance tests, however, suggest that
satisficing heuristics can be less susceptible to differences in training
data and offer more robust predictions. It is important to realize
that these conclusions are relative to the amount of training data
used to compare these strategies. Şimşek and Buckmann (2015) show
for 63 data sets that heuristics can be effective when training data
is limited but their advantage vanishes as the size of the learning
sample increases. The work by DeMiguel et al. (2009) illustrates that
the necessary sample size can be very large. For portfolio selection,
they compare the 1/𝑁-heuristic, which allocates an investment equally
over 𝑁 assets, with the mean-variance model (Markowitz 1952) and
a range of modern variants (see also Wang, Wu, Yang, Wang, & Wu,
2015). They showed for a training data of 10 years that none of the
sophisticated models was able to consistently outperform 1/𝑁. Indeed,
for 𝑁 = 25 assets, the mean-variance model requires about 250 years
of stock data to outperform the simple 1/𝑁-heuristic, and for 𝑁 = 50
assets, 500 years are required, assuming that the same stocks, and
the stock market itself, still exist.
The informational requirements of parameter-rich models are
an important factor for understanding their performance under
uncertainty. The derivation of these models under assumptions of
sufficient information often ignores the important role of variance.
With remarkable prescience, Simon (1981, p.44) alludes to this issue,
writing: “Although uncertainty does not [...] make intelligent choice
impossible, it places a premium on robust adaptive procedures instead
of strategies that work well only when finely tuned to precisely known
environments.” In many situations of uncertainty, both agents and
scholars cannot obtain an exhaustive representation of the decision
environment at hand and therefore cannot determine the optimal
course of action. To find the best possible strategy therefore involves
a competitive test of different strategies, as already highlighted by
M. Friedman (1953).
Experts, such as car dealers or marketing managers, can generate
high-performing, simple heuristics. With sufficiently large datasets,
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there are also statistical techniques available to generate such simple
heuristics. Jung et al. (2020) for instance develop a technique based
on regularization that generates transparent and easy to understand
heuristics that perform en-par with black-box machine learning
models such as random forest. Regularization, for instance using the
Stein estimator (James & Stein, 1961), the Lasso estimator (Tibshirani,
1996), or ridge regression (Hoerl & Kennard, 1970), reduces the
exposure of the models to error due to variance. Specifically the Stein
estimator, which is a biased estimator of the mean, can be shown to
dominate the ordinary least squares approach in terms of a strictly
better mean squared error.
There is an important caveat. The bias-variance dilemma assumes
a stable population from which repeated samples are drawn. An
example would be an agent playing a lottery with unknown probabil-
ities who is given the opportunity to sample each alternative before
choosing one. Here, agents may be able to estimate the relevant
parameters of their decision environment before applying an opti-
mization strategy, such as any form of utility maximization. Yet many
situations contain more radical forms of uncertainty. The decision
environment may be unstable and leave the agent without reliable
learning samples for parameter estimation or the causal structure
of the environment may be unknown. The problem may also suffer
from computational intractability. Under these circumstances, agents
are forced to employ some form of simplification in order to obtain
a mathematical representation of the decision problem from which
they can optimize. Because optimization strategies are only optimal
relative to their assumptions or the sample they were estimated in,
there is no guarantee that the decisions they yield are indeed opti-
mal. Simon (1979) succinctly observes in his Nobel Prize speech that
“decision makers can satisfice either by finding optimal solutions for
a simplified world, or by finding satisfactory solutions for a more
realistic world. Neither approach, in general, dominates the other,
and both have continued to co-exist in the world of management
science”. These alternative methodologies correspond to the two
traditions of satisficing: optimal solutions assuming a situation of
risk, and heuristic solutions assuming an uncertain world.
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3.3.4 Integrating Two Research Traditions using the Bias-Variance
Trade-off
This article set out to review advances in our understanding of
satisficing and identified two research traditions. We refer to these as
satisficing under risk and satisficing under uncertainty. Satisficing has
been studied under both conditions, albeit in two largely unconnected
literatures. Both have their roots in Simon’s 1955 article, the first in
the appendix, the second in the main text. For both classes of models
the motivation is the same, namely to introduce aspiration levels and
search in order to reflect what actual decision makers do. Models of
satisficing under risk use rational choice theory as a starting point and
then proceed to make modifications in line with a satisficing strategy
to account for additional behavioral variance. Typically that requires
strong assumptions about what decision makers know or can know
about the future in order to use the optimization calculus. Moreover,
in many of these models, only aspiration levels are considered, search
is ignored, and satisficing is viewed as a failure to act rationally.
Models of risk with aspiration levels and optimal search need to
make additional strong assumptions about what can be known, such
as complete information about the relevant probability distributions
(e.g., the probability distribution of offers for all future time periods;
see Simon, 1955) and the future cost of search in order to calculate an
optimal stopping point.
Satisficing under uncertainty refers to situations in which these
assumptions are not met or cannot be met. Uncertainty includes situa-
tions where the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of alternatives,
or future states, cannot be known, meaning that the relevant prob-
ability distributions are also unknown. To model decision making
under uncertainty, we have used the bias-variance trade-off, and its
key insights are that good models need to have not only low bias but
also low variance and that there is a trade-off between the two sources
of error. Variance arises in situations where unknown parameters
need to be estimated; it does not arise in situations of risk, where the
parameters (including probability distributions) are assumed to be
known. Heuristics can reduce variance by using few free parameters,
or even none (as in the hiatus heuristic with a fixed hiatus or in 1/𝑁),
and thus can lead to more accurate predictions or decisions than more
complex models. At the same time, they are fast, transparent, and
reduce search costs. In situations of uncertainty, satisficing heuristics
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are no longer sub-optimal, they can be the best one can do. But
deciding which heuristic to choose in which situation requires careful
study of the match between heuristic and environment, that is, by an
analysis of their ecological rationality.
Thus, both traditions have their relevance, but in two quite differ-
ent classes of problems. Against this dualism, one might argue that
in situations of uncertainty, one could use the bias-variance dilemma
to calculate the optimal trade-off between bias and variance in the
same way as when using satisficing under risk, where the optimal
stopping point is a trade-off between expected costs and benefits
of further search. That would indeed reduce uncertainty to risk.
To calculate the bias, however, one would need to know the “true”
function that generates the data, which cannot be known in situations
of uncertainty. Similarly, one could argue that all situations should
be treated as ones of uncertainty. For instance, even in apparently
certain conditions, unforeseeable events may happen or rules might
be gamed. Yet that attempt towards reduction would be equally mis-
taken: Models are not unrealistic per se; they can be realistic for one
class of problems and not for others. Moreover, both traditions have
a different yet complementary approach to rationality, corresponding
to Smith’s (2008) distinction between constructivist rationality and
ecological rationality.
Although Simon’s original article planted the seeds for two dif-
ferent research traditions, their diverging methodologies and con-
clusions are not contradictory. Instead, the review has shown how
these differences parsimoniously follow from the classes of decision
environments they address. Under risk, where all the relevant infor-
mation is known, optimization strategies are superior to satisficing
strategies and rational choice theory constitutes an obvious starting
point. Given intractability when the problem is well-defined, or un-
certainty when the problem is ill-defined, no single class of decision
strategies is generally superior to another and models are derived
from observation rather than function.
3.3.5 A Revised Understanding of Heuristics and Biases
One common view characterizes heuristics solely in terms of their
bias (e.g., A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This view does not
distinguish between risk and uncertainty and routinely concludes
that agents’ lack of computational capabilities leads them to make
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decisions that are not in their own interest. Generalizing the results
of such studies to decision making under uncertainty when the
problem is ill-defined is more complicated than commonly assumed.
The bias-variance trade-off implies that some degree of bias can be
appropriate when the relative scarcity of data leads to potentially
unbiased but unreliable parameter estimates. Under such conditions,
biased decision strategies can yield better decisions than do unbiased
ones. For example, Harry Markowitz used the 1/𝑁 heuristic for
his retirement investments in place of calculating a mean-variance
portfolio. Without an empirical test of the predictive accuracy of
the 1/𝑁 heuristic, one likely would conclude that Markowitz relied
on a suboptimal strategy. Would one also attribute this to cognitive
limitations, as is usually the case for other agents’ apparently biased
decisions (see also D. Friedman, 1998; D. Friedman, Pommerenke,
Lukose, Milam, & Huberman, 2007; Loomes, Starmer, & Sugden,
2003)?
Several phenomena often interpreted in the literature as biases
(in the sense of systematic errors of judgment) have been shown to
correspond to correct judgments in situations of uncertainty. One
group of phenomena comprises judgments of randomness, such
as coaches’ alleged hot-hand fallacy (J. B. Miller & Sanjurjo, 2018)
and people’s alleged erroneous intuitions about chance, including
the belief in the law of small numbers (Hahn & Warren, 2009). In
earlier studies, these judgments were compared to known population
probabilities rather than, correctly, to sample probabilities. A second
group of phenomena include so-called errors in judgments of low
versus high risk, such as overestimation of small risks and underesti-
mation of large risks (Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005) and
overconfidence (Pfeifer, 1994), which again look like systematic errors
(bias) but are in fact largely due to unsystematic error (variance). In
general, people appear to be quite sensitive to the difference between
risk and uncertainty, including small and large samples (Gigerenzer,
2018; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010).
Expanding on Simon’s observation that agents use simple strate-
gies because of the mind’s computational limitations, we propose that
humans use heuristics because they can yield good decisions under
uncertainty or intractability. Under uncertainty, their performance
needs to be judged according to their ecological rationality, that is, by
their success in achieving a defined criterion, not by principles of logic
or consistency. Consistency and success are two different criteria,
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which are sometimes uncorrelated (Berg et al., 2016). Moreover, a
survey of violations of consistency found little to no evidence that in
an uncertain world, coherence violations incur material costs, or if
they do, that people would fail to learn (Arkes, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig,
2016). Whereas risky environments allow for general verdicts on the
rationality of specific strategies, such generalizations are misguided
in uncertain environments.
3.4 Discussion
The term satisficing has been used to mean many things. Sometimes,
it is seen as sub-optimal, while at other times it seems optimal, or
at least better than other strategies. In this article, we addressed
this situation and have argued that there are two different research
traditions that contend with two different types of problems, risk and
uncertainty. In situations of risk, satisficing is suboptimal if search
is ignored. However, when agents need to search for information,
as considered by Simon (1955), satisficing can help to solve the cost-
benefit trade-off. In situations of uncertainty, satisficing can also
help to solve the bias-variance trade-off, which can lead to more
accurate decisions than with more complex strategies. Although both
research traditions examine distinct classes of environments, they can
learn from each other. Specifically, we identify four methodological
principles and related areas for fruitful future research on satisficing.
First, we encourage future research in both traditions to study
how well decision theories make predictions, such as out-of-sample.
We found very few studies that tested their decision models beyond
data fitting, despite Friedman’s (1953) endorsement of predictive
accuracy. The bias-variance decomposition demonstrates how in-
sample tests give undue advantage to parameter-rich models that
prove inexpedient in predicting behavior.
Second, models of satisficing under uncertainty are currently
limited in scope. To date, few of these models specify how aspiration
levels are formed and how they are adjusted, although this process
appears to be of theoretical importance, particularly in decisions
guided by preferences (but see Blettner et al., 2015; Cyert & March,
1963). The satisficing heuristics presented here were tested on in-
ference problems for methodological convenience, although most
of these strategies can be applied to decisions involving preferences.
141
Chapter 3 Satisficing: Integrating Two Traditions
V. L. Smith (1962) already highlighted the disconnect between ratio-
nal choice models that correctly predict market outcomes in a context
where agents do not have the information available that the models
assume. Yet little is known how the aggregate level of analysis inter-
acts with the individual level when agents face uncertainty (but see
Artinger & Gigerenzer, 2016; Gode & Sunder, 1993; Jamal & Sunder,
2001).
Third, models of satisficing under risk remain largely within the
realm of as-if theories, where additional parameters are added to a
rational choice model to better account for behavior (e.g., Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Köszegi & Rabin, 2006). The rational benchmark
under risk also depends on the assumed structure of preferences
and is not synonymous with rational choice theory. Models of the
decision process rather than of decision outcomes could help uncover
agents’ preference structures, which in turn helps build a coherent
theory of choice under risk.
Finally, we encourage further study of decisions given uncertainty,
particularly when the problem is ill-defined and the exhaustive set
of states of the world and their consequences is not knowable or
foreseeable. Over the past years, technological advances have con-
tributed considerably to the rise of machine learning, a branch of
computer science distinctly concerned with building algorithms for
decisions without full access to information. The rise of this field
testifies to the fact that the problem of decisions under uncertainty
poses larger problems than commonly acknowledged in normative
economics. We therefore encourage competitive tests of specific deci-
sion strategies in their natural decision environments. A systematic
use of competitive tests can in turn lead to formal analyses of the
structural characteristics of environments that regulate the relative
advantages of one class of strategies over another. We believe that
this research strategy presents a feasible path to a normative theory
for decisions under uncertainty.
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How Do Taxi Drivers Terminate Their Shifts
when Earnings Are Hard To Predict?
This chapter is published as a working paper and being prepared for
submission as: Artinger, F., Gigerenzer, G. & Jacobs, P. (2020), How
Do Taxi Drivers Terminate Their Shifts when Earnings Are Hard To
Predict?.
In the late 1990s, Colin Camerer, Linda Babcock, Richard Thaler, and
George Loewenstein (1997) proposed that taxi drivers conclude shifts
after reaching their daily income target. This target-income hypoth-
esis has initiated a fierce debate because it implies that increased
hourly earnings lead to shorter shifts as the daily income target is
reached more quickly. Yet if drivers can predict an increase in hourly
earnings on a given day, this should, all else equal, incentivize them to
work longer. Alternatively, if drivers can predict a decrease in hourly
earnings, they should stop labor earlier and consume more leisure.
To be able to adjust their labor supply in this fashion, however, drivers
need to be able to predict future hourly earnings with sufficient
precision. Expected utility models assume that drivers act as if they
can make such accurate predictions, based on the assumption of
“rational expectations.” In this paper, we examine the extent to which
hourly earnings can actually be predicted by forecasting algorithms,
including machine learning techniques. We find that earnings are
hard to predict, and assess how drivers decide when to terminate a
shift under these circumstances. Finally, we discuss the implications
for modeling human behavior under uncertainty, specifically the
intertemporal substitution of labor and leisure.
Camerer and colleagues presented an analysis of the wage elas-
ticity of New York City cab drivers’ labor supply based on shift
data. The wage elasticity describes the relation between percentage
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changes in working hours and percentage changes in income. Taxi
drivers were deemed useful to study because their hourly earnings
fluctuate, implying that their shift earnings and lengths can be used
to estimate their wage elasticity. Common sense suggests that this
elasticity should be positive: With higher wages, drivers should be
willing to work longer as the opportunity costs of leisure increase.
Surprisingly, Camerer and colleagues found a negative elasticity
across different samples of taxi drivers. In light of these findings, the
authors speculated that drivers may use a daily income target.
In response to the findings by Camerer et al. (1997), expected
utility theory was modified to include an income target. By this
interpretation, drivers reach a decision by comparing the utility of
terminating the shift with the expected utility of continuing the
shift and then choosing the path that yields higher utility. Unlike
neoclassical theory, the utility function includes a particular income
target as a reference point. At this reference point, the marginal
utility of income decreases, which implies that additional income
above the reference point is valued less than below it. For example,
building on the seminal model of reference-dependent preferences
by Köszegi and Rabin (2006), Crawford and Meng (2011) describe a
utility function that includes both an income and a duration target.
Their model retains the neoclassical utility framework and adds or
subtracts utility based on whether income or working hours are below
or above their respective reference points.
Both the negative wage elasticity and its explanation using
reference-dependent utility models have attracted considerable criti-
cism. Most prominently, Farber (2005) criticized the focus on shift
duration and earnings and reported results from an analysis of each
trip within a shift. Using a large dataset of New York City cab drivers,
Farber (2008) was able to estimate a model of shift termination that
takes the end of each trip as a decision point to decide whether to
terminate a shift or not. Farber finds that the probability of shift
termination increases discontinuously at a reference income, but also
notes that these reference points have little effect on decisions because
they are either too high or too unstable. Following this example,
subsequent analyses have derived and estimated shift termination
models from neoclassical or reference-dependent utility theory. For
example, Crawford and Meng (2011) estimated the parameters of
their model using Farber’s trip data. Because the neoclassical model
is nested within the reference-dependent utility model, the authors
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used statistical tests on their parameter estimates to conclude that
their model offers better fit of the data than neoclassical theory.
Most recently, Farber (2015) used the full record of taxi trips in
New York City over a period of five years to examine several aspects of
the reference-dependent utility model. His analysis addresses three
points. First, he decomposes the variance in average hourly earnings to
demonstrate that aggregate hourly earnings are, on average, possible
to predict with sufficient precision. In models assuming that the
reference point is set at the anticipated level of earnings, this implies
that there is little room for reference dependence to play a role as it
only affects deviations from the reference point. Second, he estimates
a shift termination model and finds that termination probabilities are
weakly related to previous earnings. Third, his wealth of data permits
him to estimate elasticities for individual drivers. which he finds to
be mostly positive. Farber concludes that there is little evidence that
reference dependence is an important factor determining the labor
supply of NYC taxi drivers.
Overall, the literature on taxi drivers’ labor supply has focused on
a specific paradigm, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically,
the literature has primarily studied the distinction between reference-
dependent and neoclassical utility models. This is presumably due
to several factors, including the prominence of utility models in eco-
nomics and the analytical convenience of nested models. Empirically,
the existing literature has initially used aggregate estimations of the
wage elasticity but then started to examine individual drivers’ behav-
iors in more detail. However, the general approach has remained the
same: A sample of data is fitted using a regression model, and the
confidence intervals of one or two variables are used to distinguish
between competing models of behavior.
To date, the literature has neglected the more fundamental ques-
tion of whether utility theory provides the best framework to model
taxi drivers’ shift decisions. To shed light on this issue, we first ask
whether individual drivers can indeed predict hourly earnings with
meaningful precision. As we will elaborate in the second section, if
such predictability fails, the assumption of rational expectations can
still be made but yielding successful decisions is no longer guaran-
teed. In order to investigate to what extent prediction is possible,
we use a dataset of 3,500 drivers and more than 11 million trips in
Hamburg, Germany, which we describe in the third section. In the
fourth section, we initially replicate Farber’s earlier decomposition
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of hourly earnings at the aggregate level and then proceed with an
analysis at the individual level. We then compare the predictive
accuracies of various prediction models commonly used in machine
learning, including regularized regression. Across both analyses we
find that the predictability of hourly earnings is minimal. Based
on these results, we hypothesize that drivers’ shift choices are not
consistent with the predictions from utility models.
An alternative to utility models are satisficing models in the
form of simple heuristic models. For an uncertain environment
where the agent cannot determine with sufficient precision the full
distribution of possible consequences, Savage (1954), one of the
founding fathers of expected utility theory, already suggested that
the theory no longer applies. Instead, Herbert Simon (1955) pointed
out that agents’ behavior is described by satisficing models that
dispense with estimating utilities for the possible courses of actions.
Heuristic satisficing models are characterized by two components,
a search process and an aspiration level (Artinger, Gigerenzer, &
Jacobs, 2020b). The bare income target hypothesis proposed by
Camerer et al. (1997) constitutes such an satisficing model without
the need to integrate it into a utility model. By this model, drivers
formulate a daily aspiration level on shift earnings and terminate
their shift after reaching the aspiration level. The fifth section of this
paper reports a competitive test of different utility and satisficing
models for predicting when drivers end their shifts. We find that the
overwhelming majority of shifts and drivers are best predicted by
satisficing models with aspiration levels on shift earnings or duration.
In contrast, fewer than one percent of drivers are best predicted by
utility maximization. The final section discusses these findings and
broader implications for modeling behavior under uncertainty.
4.1 An Alternative to Rational Expectations
The dominant paradigm to model the intertemporal substitution of
labor and leisure is based on utility theory. Taxi drivers face the
problem of deciding when to terminate their labor on a given day
and are modeled as agents who compare the utilities of terminating
and continuing the shift. These models share the assumption that
leisure and income are commensurable and that agents are able to
map their subjective value of these two goods on a single continuous
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utility function. This function allows agents to calculate the utilities
of both terminating and continuing the shift.
Whereas the utility of terminating a shift can be computed from
cumulative shift earnings and shift duration, the utility of continuing
the shift is based on predicted shift income and duration. If drivers
knew the probability distribution of their future earnings, they
could be modeled as forming “rational expectations” about these
earnings and using mathematical optimization to maximize their
expected utility. John Muth (1961) was the first to coin the term
“rational” expectations whereby agents use the relevant economic
theory in forming expectations about macroeconomic variables. To
date, the term has seen different definitions as the concept has been
applied to diverse settings. In the case of taxi drivers, expectations are
formed about individual drivers’ earnings rather than macroeconomic
outcomes and are based on empirical induction rather than theoretical
deduction. That is, drivers need to predict their future earnings rather
than derive their value from a theory. We argue that if such prediction
is not possible with sufficient precision, the formation of rational
expectations does not guarantee high decision quality. To unfold
this argument, we consider two different definitions of “rational
expectations.”
By one rather stringent definition, expectations are rational if
they are unbiased and based on all information (e.g., Samuelson &
Nordhaus, 1998). However, this definition does not necessarily imply
that agents make the most accurate prediction possible. To clarify
this point, we include a brief decomposition of prediction error into
bias and variance (Geman et al., 1992). This distinction is well known
in empirical sciences, including machine learning, where prediction
is often a central task.
Suppose the task is to predict 𝑦, the value of an unseen item, based
on its observables 𝒙 and a model 𝑚(𝒙 , 𝒑) that is trained on a random
sample of training data of size 𝑛. The error in prediction is measured
by the root mean squared error, RSME, and can be decomposed into
error = 𝑏2 + 𝑣 + 𝑒 , (4.1)
where 𝑏 denotes the bias in the predictions, 𝑣 their variance, and 𝑒
denotes the irreducible error (Geman et al., 1992). To understand bias
and variance, recall that there exist 𝐿 possible learning samples of
size 𝑛, each of which yields its own predictions ?̂?1 , ?̂? 𝑖 , ..., ?̂?𝐿. Bias is
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defined as
𝑏2 = {𝐸𝑛[?̂? 𝑖] − 𝐸[𝑦]}2 , (4.2)
where 𝐸𝑛[·] denotes the expectation with respect to different learning
samples of size 𝑛 and 𝐸[·] denotes the expectation with respect to
unsystematic error. Bias refers to the difference between the average
of the possible learning samples and the true value and reflects a
misspecification of the model. In contrast, variance is defined as
𝑣 = 𝐸𝑛[{?̂? 𝑖 − 𝐸𝑛[?̂? 𝑖]}2] (4.3)
and refers to the variance of possible predictions around their ex-
pected value. Variance therefore reflects the model’s sensitivity to
idiosyncrasies in the learning sample. Artinger et al. (2020b) offer a
more detailed exposition.
Although bias and variance are influenced by multiple factors,
they vary according to the number of model parameters. In general,
bias tends to decrease alongside the number of model parameters,
whereas variance tends to increase alongside the number of model
parameters (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2001), creating a trade-off
between bias and variance. This trade-off has important implications
for model selection: Although unbiased models yield the best in-
sample fit, unbiased models are not necessarily those yielding the best
predictions. Indeed, the bias-variance trade-off implies that models
seeking to reduce bias tend to incur excess error from variance.
However, for prediction, the right balance of these two kinds of
error depends on the particularities of the problem at hand. In
many situations, applying an unbiased model that uses all available
information does not yield the best possible prediction and does not
result in a rational expectation.
By a second, more generous definition, expectations are rational
if “agents do the best they can with what they have” when it comes
to the formation of expectations (Maddock & Carter, 1982, p.41).
This definition permits agents to use any model suitable for a given
prediction problem. It assumes that agents are aware which model
or algorithm yields the best balance of bias and variance and choose
accordingly. Defined in this way, rational expectations ensure that
the agent makes the best prediction possible with the available
information.
However, even in this more general definition, decision models
based on rational expectations do not necessarily yield the best possi-
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ble choices. Rational expectations allow utility maximization to be
based on the most precise predictions. However, utility maximization
does not necessarily yield better choices than alternative decision
strategies that do not require predictions. To see this, it is important
to remember that the agent does not know the probabilistic structure
of the decision problem, but assumes a simplified structure and
estimates the relevant parameters. Both these steps, simplification
and estimation, are potential sources of errors.
First, given a complex and dynamic environment, the agent needs
to simplify the existing structure of the decision problem — either
purposefully to maintain computational tractability or inadvertently
for lack of information. Any claim of optimality therefore refers
to the simplified problem. Depending on the nature and degree
of simplification, the optimal choice in the simplified problem may
differ considerably from the true best choice (Simon, 1979). Second,
the agent needs to estimate or predict the relevant parameters, such
as expectations about future values. The quality of these estimates
depends on the agent’s choice of prediction model but also on the
predictability of the decision environment. Even rational expecta-
tions can remain imprecise when randomness is high and available
information is scarce or irrelevant.
Both the simplification of the problem and the need for parameter
estimation imply that rational expectations are no sufficient condition
for utility theory to yield the best possible choice. In the case of
shift-ending decisions, forming expectations over future earnings is
the Achilles heel of utility theory and of any other decision model
building on such expectations. Therefore, our first analysis exam-
ines the predictability of hourly earnings. If hourly earnings can
be predicted with reasonable accuracy, utility maximization with
rational expectations can constitute the normative benchmark for shift
decisions. However, if earnings are difficult to predict, the adequacy
of utility maximization is questionable in this context.
An alternative approach are heuristic satisficing models. The term
“heuristics” borrows from the computer science literature, referring
to an algorithm that ignores part of the available information to reach
its goal. This disregard can take many forms. Whereas heuristic
algorithms in computer science can remain calculation-intensive
(e.g., Pearl, 1984), heuristic decision models in cognitive science
typically ignore large parts of the available information, resulting in
strategies that are quick to implement and easy to communicate (e.g.,
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Gigerenzer, 1996b; A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Consider, for example, the task of predicting whether an existing
customer will return for a purchase within a one-year time horizon.
This classification task is common in marketing practice to target
advertising efficiently. The task can be solved using the pareto-NBD
model by Schmittlein et al. (1987), which uses the customer’s full
purchasing history to calculate the probability of a new purchase.
In contrast, the hiatus heuristic requires only the time of the last
purchase and predicts a return if that last purchase was after some
threshold, and no return otherwise. This frugality makes the strategy
easily applicable by marketing managers who seem to use it regularly.
Wübben and von Wangenheim (2008) find that this strategy can yield
better decisions than the pareto-NBD model because it is less exposed
to error from variance.
The hiatus heuristic is an example of the broader class of satisficing
heuristics. The common denominator of these heuristics is their use of
an aspiration level to reach a decision. An aspiration level is defined
here as the threshold on one of the variables of interest that satisfies an
aspiration and initiates an action (see also Lewin, Dembo, Festinger,
& Sears, 1944). In the case of the hiatus heuristic, the aspiration level
is the threshold that separates returning customers from those who
do not return. Satisficing heuristics were first described by Herbert
Simon (1955, 1956) and later identified and studied across a range
of decision tasks (for an overview, see Artinger et al., 2020b). The
earnings target described by Camerer et al. (1997) can be modeled
more directly as a satisficing model.
Unlike utility theory, satisficing heuristics do not require agents
to form expectations about the future. We therefore expect these
models to be descriptive of behavior when future hourly earnings are
difficult to predict. In contrast, when hourly earnings are reasonably
predictable, we would expect drivers’ behavior to be better predicted
by utility models. Our second analysis tests this hypothesis and
compares the predictive powers of two different utility models and
four different satisficing heuristics. Before both analyses are presented
in turn, the following section presents an overview of the data used
for analysis.
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4.2 Hamburg Taxi Data
For the purpose of this study, we acquired data for taxi shifts and
trips from Hamburg, Germany. The data used by Farber (2015) are
unfortunately not openly available for the wider scientific community
to analyze. These data comprise a sample of 6,998 drivers, 1,138,726
shifts, and 13,822,310 trips, collected electronically through so-called
fiscal taximeters. These devices are regular taximeters that use the
cellular network to send trip and shift information to a secure server,
where tax authorities can access the data and verify tax statements.
The system is commercially maintained.
The data we obtained span the period from January 1, 2013 to
December 31, 2015. During these three years, participation in the
fiscal taximeter program was voluntary; in exchange for participation,
companies received free devices. This incentive was substantial, as
companies were aware that from 2017 onward the fiscal taximeter
would be mandatory nationwide. Indeed, by the end of 2015, two
thirds of the 3,200 taxis in Hamburg used the fiscal taximeter (Levy,
2015). Importantly for the purpose of this analysis, the sample is
non-random, as companies self-selected into the data sample.
The data consist of two streams of information, one on shifts and
one on trips. The shift stream presents a record of the beginning
and end of a shift, as drivers log in and out of the taximeter. Thus,
a shift can mean any period of time that the driver defines as such.
The shift stream is independent of the trip stream, which keeps a
record of each trip and its associated data. In Hamburg, trips can
result from taxis being hailed on the street, drivers waiting in lines
in places of high demand, drivers accepting trips via smartphone
apps, or drivers cooperating with telephone centers that allocate trips
among members. Together, both streams give an overview of the
entire shift period from the start of the shift to the first trip, to the last
trip, and to the point in time when the driver concluded the shift. For
both shifts and trips we observed the variables described in Table 4.1.
In addition to the taximeter data, we collected data on observables
that we suspected may affect daily demand. First, we identified days
with events that may have caused surges in the demand for taxis.
These were public holidays (32 days in the observation window),
soccer games with Germany playing at the 2014 FIFA world cup (14
days), Hamburg’s annual harbor fair, the biggest in the city (8 days),
strikes in public transportation (17 days), strikes at Hamburg airport
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Table 4.1
Selected Variables Used in Analyses
variable description source
shift data sbeg shift beginning taxi data
send shift end taxi data
searn shift earnings in EUR taxi data
sdur shift duration in minutes taxi data
precip.d daily precipitation per square meter weather record
trip data tid trip ID taxi data
tbeg trip beginning taxi data
tend trip end taxi data
tearn trip earnings in EUR taxi data
tdur trip duration in minutes taxi data
precip.h hourly precipitation per square meter weather record
in common did driver ID taxi data
sid shift ID taxi data
stype shift type taxi data
ctype company type taxi data
new day in new market public record
weekday day of the week public record
(shock) worldcup day with Germany playing world cup public record
(shock) harbor day during annual harbor fair public record
(shock) strike day with strike in public transport public record
(shock) airport day with strike at Hamburg Airport public record
(shock) holiday public holiday public record
(shock) vacation day during Hamburg school vacations public record
(2 days), and school vacations in Hamburg (111 days). Second, we
obtained weather data from the Hamburg weather station, recording
the amount of rain per square meter, both per day (DWD Climate
Data Center, 2018a) and per clock hour (DWD Climate Data Center,
2018b). These data were matched with each shift based on the day
of shift beginning and with each trip based on the clock hour of trip
end. An overview of the additional variables used in the analyses is
given in Table 4.1.
The separation of shift and trip data allowed us to check their
consistency. In a first step, we checked each stream for internal
plausibility, for example, whether trip beginning was before trip
end. In a second step, we combined the two data streams and
checked whether the cumulative trip data were consistent with the
recorded shift data. For example, we tested whether the first and
last trip associated with a given shift fall within the period between
shift beginning and shift end or whether the totals of kilometers or
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earnings per shift matched the cumulative trip data. If determining an
inconsistency, we deleted the corresponding shift and all associated
trips from the dataset, unless we deemed the error to be small and
fixable. This happened in either one of three cases. The first occurred
when the shift data gave the correct trip count and all trips took place
between shift beginning and end but the cumulative earnings did not
match. In this case, shift earnings were set to the cumulative trip total.
Similarly, in the second case the cumulative trip earnings matched
shift earnings and all trips took place within the shift period, but
the number of trips in the shift data was incorrect. Here, we set the
trip count in the shift data to equal the number of trips observed in
the trip data. Finally, when all trips fell within the shift period but
the trip count in the shift data was off by one, we adjusted the trip
count to the number observed in the trip data. In total, we made
adjustments to 327,320 shifts with 5,838,654 trips. In all other cases of
inconsistency, we deleted the corresponding shift and all associated
trips from our data. This happened with 70,178 shifts comprising
937,340 trips.
Two events fall into our observation window that have plausibly
changed market incentives. First, on September 16, 2014, the Hamburg
Senate raised the taxi fare by about eight percent on average1, effective
from October 1, 2014. As in other German cities, taxi fares in
Hamburg are regulated by the local authority and reviewed every
few years. The 2014 increase took place in anticipation of the second
major change in the taxi market, the introduction of a national
minimum wage in Germany. In August 2014, the German government
introduced a nationwide minimum wage of 8.50 EUR per hour,
effective from January 1, 2015. This minimum wage was long expected
and relevant to German taxi markets as many drivers had earned
less than minimum wage. The new minimum wage applied to all
employed drivers but not to self-employed drivers. Taxi companies
with employees responded to the minimum wage in different ways,
from incentives to maximize revenue to regulations that declared
waiting periods as stand-by time. In addition, some companies were
split up, making drivers henceforth self-employed. Because the two
changes are likely to affect taxi drivers’ behavior, we have split the
1Specifically, the base charge increased from 2.90 EUR to 3.20 EUR, the rate for the
first four kilometers increased from 2.20 EUR to 2.35 EUR, for the next five kilometers
from 1.90 EUR to 2.10 EUR and afterwards from 1.40 EUR to 1.45 EUR.
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observation window into two equally long periods. The old market,
from October 2013 to September 2014, is characterized by pre-increase
fares and no minimum wage. The new market, from January 2015 to
December 2015, is governed by increased fares and a minimum wage.
Shifts and trips before October 2013 and in the three months between
these two periods were ignored.
We classified shifts as day and night shifts to examine them
separately where necessary. Specifically, shifts starting before noon
were classified as day shifts, whereas those starting after noon were
classified as night shifts. These two shift types have distinct demand
profiles. Aggregated across all days, peaks in demand occurred
between 7am and 11am, and between 4pm and 10pm. Day shifts
tended to cover the morning peak, and night shifts tended to cover
the evening peak. Because these peaks occurred at different points
during the shifts2, we decided to examine driver behavior separately
for each of them.
We also placed additional restrictions on the data to receive our
final dataset. First, we restricted shifts to those lasting less than 24
hours to exclude drivers who own their car and work long hours with
many mid-sized breaks. Second, we excluded shifts with fewer than
three trips assuming that these were likely concluded prematurely.
Third, we removed shifts that started on days on which the observation
window either began or ended (January 1, 2013 and December 31,
2015) to be sure that shift data were complete. Fourth, we removed
shifts taking place on days with switches to and from daylight saving
time, comprising six days during the three-year period. Finally, we
restricted our analysis to drivers with more than 25 day shifts or
25 night shifts or both to have enough material for out-of-sample
prediction. The final data set consisted of 3,261 drivers with 785,273
shifts and 10,094,685 trips.
Finally, Hamburg taxi drivers work at one of three types of
companies: those with multiple cars and multiple drivers, those
with one car but multiple drivers, and those with one car and one
driver only. We refer to drivers in the last category as single drivers,
as these drivers own their taxi and are not subject to the minimum
wage legislation or the restrictions of a shift schedule. The working
2Figure 4.A in Appendix A shows both the number of shift and trip beginnings
across clock hours, separately for day and night shifts. We observe that in day shifts,
most drivers appear to start their shifts around the time of the first peak, whereas for
night shifts, most drivers start considerably before the evening peak.
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arrangements of these drivers most closely resemble those of New
York drivers. In total, the data comprise 784 single drivers with
260,224 shifts and 2,993,352 trips. Where appropriate, we examine
single drivers separately to see whether findings are an artifact of
employed drivers’ working conditions.
4.3 Can Drivers Predict Next Hour’s Earnings?
The first of our two analyses is an empirical examination of the
predictability of hourly earnings. In one form or another, each utility
model assumes that drivers compare the utility of terminating with
an expected utility of not terminating their shift. That is, these models
assume that transitory wage variation can be predicted with sufficient
precision, such that drivers can form expectations about their utility
if they were to continue driving. We refer to this assumption as the
predictability assumption.
The predictability assumption underlies the normative assertion
that labor supply elasticities ought to be positive. Suppose that hourly
earnings did not vary during the day. Under such a regime, drivers
could choose their working hours as soon as they became aware of the
hourly earnings for the day. However, when hourly earnings fluctuate
in the course of a day, drivers need to decide incrementally whether
the next hour will be worth their time. Whether or not drivers are able
to concentrate their working time on profitable hours then depends
on the predictability of these earnings: If hourly earnings are known
with certainty in advance of each hour, drivers can, in principle,
compare them with past earnings and decide whether the shift is
worth extending. However, if hourly earnings are fully random,
drivers trying to allocate working hours to profitable periods find
themselves unable to do so. Therefore, the normative assertion that
elasticities are positive requires that hourly earnings can be predicted
with a sufficient level of precision.
Farber (2015) has presented a systematic analysis of the predictabil-
ity of hourly income using his data from New York City. To this end,
he calculated the hourly earnings for each of the 43,824 clock hours
in his observation window, averaged across all of the 8,802 drivers on
duty during that hour. He then used two OLS regressions to relate the
variance in average hourly earnings to variation in variables that are
readily observable. The first of these models regressed average hourly
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earnings on a dummy for each year and a dummy for hours after the
fare increase. For this model, the variance of the predicted values
reflects permanent wage variation. The second model regressed
the residuals of the first model on a dummy for each week of the
year, a dummy for each hour of the week, and a dummy for public
holidays. Faber refers to the variance explained by the second model
as transitory but anticipated, whereas the variance left unexplained
by both models is transitory and unanticipated. In his findings,
almost ninety percent of the variance in average hourly earnings
can be anticipated because it is either permanent or transitory but
anticipated. He concludes that drivers can predict hourly earnings
with a sufficient level of precision.
We argue that this conclusion is unwarranted for two reasons.
First, it confuses the aggregate level of analysis with the individual
level. From predictable aggregate earnings we cannot conclude pre-
dictable individual earnings, which are necessarily harder to predict.
Indeed, insurances have evolved around discrepancy between the
predictability of aggregate and individual outcomes. Second, the
in-sample fit of a statistical model yields limited conclusions about
the ability to predict accurately outside of the sample or population.
Because drivers can calibrate their regression model only on past
data, the model’s learning sample may systematically differ from the
sample to which it is applied. Accordingly, the accuracy in out-of-
sample prediction can be substantially lower than in in-sample fitting.
These two shortcomings call for a more detailed examination of the
predictability of hourly earnings. We therefore replicate Farber’s
decomposition analysis and then extend it by an analysis of drivers’
ability to predict their hourly earnings.
4.3.1 Variance Explained in Fitting
To replicate the original analysis by Farber (2015), we calculate
log[earnℎ,𝑖], the natural logarithm of earnings of individual 𝑖 in
clock hour ℎ. We then aggregate across drivers to obtain log[earnℎ],
denoting the natural logarithm of earnings during clock hour ℎ
averaged across all drivers active during that clock hour. This
dependent variable is then modeled as follows
log[earnℎ] = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1yℎ + 𝛼2newℎ + 𝜖ℎ , (4.4)
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where yℎ denotes a dummy for the year and newℎ denotes a dummy
for the new market conditions with increased fares and minimum
wage. The variance of its predicted values log[earnˆ ℎ] represents the
portion of variance in log[earnℎ] explained by permanent changes
in demand. In contrast, the variance of the residuals 𝜖ℎ represent
the portion of log[earnℎ] unexplained by permanent changes. These
residuals are then modeled as follows,
𝜖ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝜷1wℎ + 𝜷2dhℎ + 𝛽3holidayℎ + 𝛾ℎ , (4.5)
where wℎ denotes a vector with 51 dummies for the week of the year,
dhℎ denotes a vector with 167 dummies for the hour of the week,
and holidayℎ denotes a dummy for a public holiday. The variance
in the predicted values of this regression represent transitory but
anticipated variation in log[earnℎ], whereas the variance of the
residual 𝛾ℎ represents transitory and unanticipated variation.
For this analysis, we use data from 2014 and 2015 only. Of the
2×365×24 = 17,520 clock hours between January 1, 2014 to December
31, 2015, there were 15,106 clock hours for which there was at least
one driver active so that we could calculate average earnings. During
the remaining clock hours, no driver in our data was on shift. In
a first step, we estimate equations (4.4) and (4.5) using all available
clock hours, yielding the variance decomposition shown in the first
line of Table 4.2. In this analysis, the total variance in log[earnℎ]
to be explained is 0.023 and around 6 percent of this variance is
due to permanent changes, whereas around 62 percent is due to
anticipated transitory changes. This leaves 32 percent of the variance
unexplained, about three times the share found by Farber (2015).
To understand this result, recall that Farber’s data comprise 8,802
drivers, considerably more drivers than ours — for one because New
York City is much larger than Hamburg and also because our data are
only a subsample of all drivers in Hamburg. For this reason, hourly
earnings are averaged over fewer drivers. In some clock hours, only
one driver is active. We therefore repeat the analysis, considering only
clock hours with a minimum number of active drivers. The results of
these analyses are shown from the second line of Table 4.2 onwards.
As the required minimum number of drivers per hour increases, we
find that the unanticipated portion of the variance decreases. For
example, when considering only clock hours with at least 275 drivers
active, we have 5,316 hours left for analysis with a total variance of
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Table 4.2
Hourly Earnings: Variance Explained in Fitting





Hour Hours Variance Permanent Anticipated Unanticipated
1 15,106 0.02 6.29 61.71 32.00
25 15,022 0.02 6.31 62.72 30.97
50 14,093 0.02 6.06 65.22 28.72
75 13,338 0.02 5.76 67.27 26.97
100 12,573 0.02 5.52 69.42 25.07
125 11,633 0.02 4.99 71.83 23.18
150 10,407 0.02 4.61 74.30 21.10
175 9,187 0.02 4.31 76.63 19.06
200 8,249 0.03 4.32 78.31 17.37
225 7,295 0.03 3.77 80.59 15.64
250 6,335 0.03 3.41 82.68 13.91
275 5,316 0.03 2.89 85.08 12.03
300 4,353 0.03 2.39 86.60 11.01
325 3,565 0.03 2.12 87.64 10.24
350 2,904 0.03 1.84 88.64 9.52
375 2,219 0.03 1.95 89.01 9.05
400 1,568 0.03 0.98 90.14 8.88
individual
drivers 3,435,572 0.70 0.04 4.30 95.66
0.029. Of these hours, the analysis above leaves around 12 percent
unexplained, similar to the findings reported by Farber (2015). We
repeated the analysis with additional variables on demand shocks,
but the results remained virtually identical.
The change in the proportion of unexplained variance illustrates
our argument that high shares of explained variance result from
high levels of aggregation. Such aggregation is useful to estimate
overall demand or some measure of aggregate behavior. However,
we argue that an assessment of individual drivers’ potential to predict
future earnings necessarily has to examine the decision environment
of individual drivers. With an average of 1.6 to 2.2 trips per clock
hour, drivers’ hourly earnings depend crucially on the profitability
of individual trips. To illustrate, consider three passengers reaching
Hamburg central station at 9.24am on the same train, two of whom
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need to get to hotels around the corner and one who needs to get to the
airport outside of the city center. The exact assignment of passengers
to the first three taxis in line outside of the station determines which
driver is looking at a profitable 30- to 40-minute trip to the airport
and which driver spends five to ten minutes on a short trip and lands
up back at the end of the taxi line. Although consequential, this
assignment is random in the sense that it depends on a plethora of
unknown factors, including which passenger exits the train closer
to the escalator or walks faster. One may argue that in the face of
such randomness, the aggregate pattern is the best indicator drivers
have. Although this may be true, it does not imply that a predictable
aggregate pattern is useful for individual drivers. Its usefulness
depends on the magnitude of the pattern relative to the magnitude
of random noise.
To obtain a better picture of the predictability of individual drivers’
hourly earnings, we repeat the variance decomposition once more
without any aggregation across drivers. Instead of log[earnℎ], the
log earnings averaged across drivers, we use the original variable
log[earnℎ,𝑖], the log earnings of an individual driver. This analysis
comprises earnings of 3,435,572 clock hours of individual drivers,
which are modeled as follows, with
log[earnℎ,𝑖] = 𝛼10 + 𝜶11yℎ,𝑖 + 𝛼12newℎ,𝑖 + 𝜖ℎ,𝑖 (4.6)
modeling permanent variation, and
𝜖ℎ,𝑖 = 𝛽10 + 𝜷11wℎ,𝑖 + 𝜷12dhℎ,𝑖 + 𝛽13holidayℎ,𝑖
+ 𝛽14vacationℎ,𝑖 + 𝛽15worldcupℎ,𝑖 + 𝛽16harborℎ,𝑖
+ 𝛽17airportℎ,𝑖 + 𝛽18strikeℎ,𝑖 + 𝛾ℎ,𝑖
(4.7)
modeling anticipated transitory variation, where subscript 𝑖 denotes
the driver and subscript ℎ denotes clock hour, as before. In addition,
we have added all additional dummies of demand shocks listed in
Table 4.1.
The results of this decomposition are shown at the bottom of Table
4.2. As expected, the total variance to be explained is considerably
larger than the variance of average hourly earnings and the portion to
be explained by the models in equations (4.6) and (4.7) is much smaller:
Jointly, only 4 percent of the variance is due to either permanent
or anticipated transitory changes. By implication, 96 percent of
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the variance is transitory and unanticipated. This finding contrasts
starkly with the results obtained earlier for the aggregate level and
appears to be a direct consequence of the level of analysis.
4.3.2 Error in Prediction
As a next step, we recognize that drivers need to generalize from
the past to the future. So far, we have examined predictability by
explained variance in fitting the full set of observations. When
deciding whether to continue a shift, drivers do not have access to
future data points — but need to predict outside of their learning
sample3. Our analysis mirrors this setup and examines the accuracy
in predicting future earnings after each trip, based on a hypothetical
learning sample of past trips.
To this end, we extract all trips that took place (a) after January
1, 2014, (b) at least one hour after shift beginning, and (c) at least
one hour before shift end. For each of these 6,146,600 trips 𝑡, taken
by driver 𝑖, we sum up the earnings of all trips by 𝑖 finishing in the
60 minutes after 𝑡 was completed. This quantity gives the variable
of interest, which we refer to as next-hour earnings. Note that this
approach is not identical to calculating earnings across clock hours,
as more than one trip can end per clock hour. Instead, we follow
Farber (2005) in assuming that drivers use trip ends rather than full
clock hours as decision points for terminating or continuing shifts
and try to predict earnings during the subsequent 60 minutes. To
obtain the learning sample used for prediction, we create for each trip
𝑡 a random sample of 1,000 trips taken by any driver in the 180 days
prior to 𝑡 4. This sample is specific to each trip 𝑡. The learning sample
includes trips of other drivers to reflect exchanges among colleagues
about demand on different days. For each trip in the learning sample,
𝑖 is assumed to be aware of realized next-hour earnings and the
following covariates: earnings in the hour before, average next-hour
earnings after all previous trips of 𝑖, current trip number, current shift
3In fact, one may argue that drivers need to predict outside of their learning
population, depending on the stationarity assumptions one is willing to impose on the
demand function. Consequently, we assume stationarity, such that drivers need to
predict out-of-sample.
4Indeed, we do this separately for trips before and after the fare increase. That is,
for trips after the fare increase, the learning sample is restricted to other trips after the
fare increase.
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Algorithm 4.1
Competitive Test of Models for Predicting Next-Hour Earnings
1 foreach trip 𝑡 do
2 1. select random learning sample of 1,000 trips ending before start of 𝑡,
irrespective of driver;
3 2. record observed next-hour earnings after 𝑡;
4 foreach model 𝑚 do
5 3. calibrate the model on learning sample;
6 4. use necessary covariates to calculate predicted next-hour earnings
for 𝑡;




10 6. calculate for each model the root-mean squared residual across all trips.
earnings, current shift duration, a dummy for the year, dummies for
the week of the year, dummies for the hour of the week, a dummy for
a rainy hour, and dummies for the demand shocks listed in Table 4.1.
In this way, we obtain 6,146,600 trips and their associated learning
samples.
For this analysis, we adopt the perspective of the driver rather
than the omniscient analyst. It differs from the previous analysis
in two respects. First, it uses a limited sample of past trips to make
predictions of future earnings. The error in predicting outside of the
learning sample is typically larger than the error in fitting, particularly
when the learning sample is small. Second, this analysis extends
the number of cues that are available to each driver. Whereas the
variables in the previous analysis reflected permanent changes as
well as demand cycles and shocks, these data are supplemented here
with data of the current shift, such as cumulative shift earnings and
the driver’s average hourly earnings in the past. With the inclusion of
additional variables on the one hand and the change in methodology
on the other, it remains unclear how well hourly earnings can be
predicted.
As explained in section 4.1, accurate predictions require a good
balance of bias and variance. Because the model with the best
balance cannot be determined a priori, we test different candidate
models competitively by feeding each of them with the same data
and comparing the accuracy of their predictions. This approach is
common in machine learning applications where models typically
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span different, non-nested classes of models, from linear models
to non-linear ones such as decision trees or neural networks. The
procedure for this analysis is summarized by Algorithm 4.1.
Two of the five candidate models are regression models. The first
candidate model, REG, is elastic-net regression of all covariates listed
above (Zou & Hastie, 2005). The model is similar to OLS regression
but addresses the exposure of OLS to error from variance by means of
regularization. Regularization refers to a penalty of model complexity
by "shrinking" the estimates, that is by subtracting a function of the
OLS coefficients from the estimated value. Compared with OLS
regression, the elastic net model has two additional parameters, 
and 𝛼, determining the amount and kind of shrinkage, respectively.
In the study at hand, these parameters are determined based on 10-
fold cross-validation from all data, where = 0.001 and 𝛼 = 0.41 were
found to yield the best performance. Because elastic net regression
reduces to OLS when  = 0, the model used here yields predictions
very similar to OLS. The second candidate model we use, LOG, is
similar to model REG but first transforms all continuous variables
into their logarithmic versions and re-transforms the predicted values
back to EUR.
Apart from these computationally intensive models, we also test
three simpler models that ignore part of the available data. These
final three candidate models capitalize on low variance, and each
uses only one variable to predict earnings in the following hour.
Specifically, candidate model PAST uses the driver’s average next-
hour earnings of all past trips to predict earnings in the next hour. In
contrast, candidate model LAST uses earnings of only the previous
hour to predict earnings in the next hour. Finally, candidate model
MEAN does not use any covariate but instead the average next-hour
earnings in the learning sample to predict earnings. In contrast
to the regression models above, these models can, in principle, be
implemented by drivers using no more than pen and paper and basic
arithmetic.
Table 4.3 shows the results. Across all 6,144,973 trips, next-hour
earnings to be predicted are on average 16.85 EUR and vary with
a standard deviation of 13.87 EUR. The standard deviation can be
viewed as the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the mean: If the
average across all trips were known and used to predict next-hour
earnings for all trips, the RMSE of these predictions would be equal to
the standard deviation. For this reason, we use the standard deviation
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as a benchmark for the RMSE of other prediction models.
Consider first the two regression models, REG and LOG, shown
in columns six and seven of Table 4.3. For the REG model, the RMSE
in prediction is 12.41 EUR. Compared with the standard deviation,
this equals an 11 percent reduction in the error. In contrast, the LOG
model yields a RMSE of 14.29 EUR, considerably higher than the
REG model.
Consider next the three simple models in columns eight to ten
of Table 4.3. Whereas model LAST yields errors higher than the
standard deviation, models PAST and MEAN yield predictions similar
in quality to elastic-net regression; the errors of the PAST and REG
models are almost indistinguishable. This finding offers a practical
illustration of the bias-variance trade-off: Despite the fact that the
REG model relies on all of the available data, its predictions are, on
average, hardly better than those of the model that ignores most of
this information. This result indicates that the additional variables,
combined with the linear structure of the regression model, expose it
to higher variance in its predictions.
Irrespective of the model, the findings are sobering. Even the
best model yields predictions that are only slightly better than the
standard deviation of next-hour earnings. This finding implies that
the models tested here are not fit to yield useful predictions for the
task at hand. As is typical of competitive tests, we cannot rule out
the possibility that other models exist that yield better performances
than the ones tested here. However, we have made an effort to
include models that make extensive use of the available data, require
high computational capacities, and take precautions that guard them
against excessive error from variance. Therefore, these findings
document the difficulty of predicting next-hour earnings, irrespective
of the available computational power.
As an additional test of these conclusions, we expand the fore-
casting window. So far, we have assumed that the task is to predict
earnings one hour beyond trip end. However, it may rightly be
pointed out that prediction over one hour may be difficult because it
is too short a timescale. After all, even drivers who spend one hour
taking a short fare and returning to the waiting line may get an airport
trip the next time. Therefore, if the forecasting window is expanded
and drivers form predictions over a longer time horizon, part of
the randomness cancels out. We therefore repeat the analysis and
expand the prediction window. Instead of predicting earnings one
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Table 4.3
Hourly Earnings: Error in Prediction in EUR
Next Hour’s Earnings Model RMSE
Trips Median Mean SD REG LOG PAST LAST MEAN
6,144,973 15.90 16.85 13.87 12.41 14.29 12.58 17.25 13.86
hour ahead, we use the same method to predict the average hourly
earnings of the next two, three, four, or five hours. Although average
next-hour earnings remain stable, the standard deviation is reduced,
as are the RMSEs of most models. With a prediction horizon of five
hours, the RMSE of the best predicting model improves 16 percent
over the standard deviation. This result shows that predicting over
longer time horizons allows the models tested here to yield better
predictions. At the same time, these predictions remain too poor to
conclude that next-hour earnings can be well predicted.
4.3.3 Conclusion: Prediction of Hourly Earnings is Difficult
This first analysis has demonstrated the difficulty for individual taxi
drivers to predict their future earnings. It has shown that the difficulty
is rooted not in drivers’ limitations in computational power but in
a lack of predictability of their decision environment. This finding
illustrates that rational expectations do not imply accurate predictions.
Even if agents were to base their predictions on a state-of-the art
machine learning model, the resulting predictions of their individual
outcomes would remain prohibitively imprecise.
The low level of predictability casts doubt on utility theory as a
model of drivers’ shift choices. Because utility maximization with
imprecise expectations is unlikely to be rational, there remains little
reason to expect shift choices to be consistent with utility theory. At
the same time, it remains true that a test of the assumptions cannot
replace a test of the theory (M. Friedman, 1953). However, as we have
argued above, the existing evidence does not comprise a comparison
of utility theory and alternative models in predicting taxi drivers’
shift choices. The next section therefore addresses the question of
how to best predict drivers’ behavior.
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4.4 How Are Drivers’ Shift Ends Best Predicted?
At the heart of this text is the question of how drivers’ shift ends are
best predicted. Although Camerer et al. (1997) speculated about a
target income, we have not found any test of this hypothesis. Instead,
authors have devised and examined different versions of utility
models that incorporate target incomes within its system of trade-offs.
This narrow selection of models can answer the question of which
version of utility theory is most consistent with observed data, but it
does not yield conclusions about the usefulness of utility theory over
alternative models. In the following, we present two of the utility
models examined before and present four alternative models of shift
termination..
The six models are then compared on their accuracy in out-
of-sample prediction. Previous analyses have unanimously used
in-sample fitting to draw conclusions about the descriptive power of
different theories (e.g., Chou, 2002; Crawford & Meng, 2011; Farber,
2015; Oettinger, 1999). However, the bias-variance trade-off implies
that in-sample fit cannot be used to judge predictive accuracy, as these
two are different measures. Following M. Friedman (1953), we argue
that the ultimate purpose of theories is prediction of unobserved
behavior and focus on an examination of their predictive accuracy. We
therefore employ a competitive out-of-sample test that resembles the
previous analysis. Rather than focusing on the absolute performance
of statistical models, we are now interested in the relative performance
of the different behavioral models.
4.4.1 Candidate Strategies
We have selected the set of six models from different strands of the
literature and modeling approaches. The first approach, common in
economics and much of statistics, models decision outcomes, typically
at some level of aggregation. Models of this kind seek to approximate
observed outcomes as closely as possible, often using linear models
with error terms. The second approach, common in cognitive science
and machine learning, models the decision process. Models of this
kind usually have no error terms and are deterministic in the sense
that they output a specific decision rather than an average or an
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approximation5.
We argue that process models are more natural models of human
decisions than outcome models. These models take the information
available to the agent as input and try to mirror the decision process.
To this end, models need to be defined algorithmically, that is, in the
form of a decision strategy. In the case at hand, a decision strategy
takes as input the information available to the driver at the end of
each trip and decides whether the driver stops after this trip or not.
The predicted shift end can then be compared with the observed shift
end.
The existing literature on taxi drivers’ shift ends proposes utility
models, which are often implemented as outcome models (e.g., Farber,
2005). These models specify the utility function, from which analysts
can derive statistical models to link the probability of a trip end to
environmental factors. The agents’ decision process of comparing
the utility of ending a shift to the expected utility of continuing the
shift is assumed but not explicitly modeled. In particular, the process
by which these expectations are formed is often left unspecified. To
allow for a fair comparison among models, however, the competitive
framework of our analysis requires that models use the same input
variables and output a prediction after each trip. Therefore, we had to
implement the utility models algorithmically and specify how agents
form expectations. Among the many possibilities, ranging from
various forms of regression analysis to random forests, we devised an
algorithm with no additional parameters that builds on the average
of similar past shifts. In light of the fact that the PAST model in the
previous analysis yielded almost identical performance to that of the
REG model, we selected an algorithm that is conservative insofar
as the lack of additional parameters does not expose the strategy
to additional variance. In this way, we could devise an algorithmic
version of all decision strategies considered here and presented in
turn.
S1: Neoclassical Utility The first strategy considered here is the
neoclassical utility model of intertemporal substitution, as presented
by Crawford and Meng (2011). According to this model, driver 𝑖
5Leo Breiman (2001b) saw a similar distinction in modeling approaches in statistics,
which he referred to as algorithmic and data modeling, respectively (see Brighton,
2020, for a discussion).
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compares utilities at the end of each trip 𝑡 and terminates a shift as
soon as the utility of terminating exceeds that of continuing. The
utility of terminating the shift is calculated as follows,
𝑈𝑇𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 −
𝜓
1 + 𝜐 × 𝑑
1+𝜐
𝑡 , (4.8)
where 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑑𝑡 denote the shift earnings and duration at the end of trip
𝑡, respectively, and index 𝑖 is suppressed for brevity. This termination
utility is compared with the continuation utility, which gives the
expected utility from not terminating the shift. The continuation
utility is calculated as follows,
𝐸𝑡[𝑈𝐶] = 𝐸𝑡[𝑟] −
𝜓
1 + 𝜐 × 𝐸𝑡[𝑑]
1+𝜐 , (4.9)
where 𝐸𝑡[·] denotes the expected value after trip 𝑡, 𝑟 denotes shift
earnings, and 𝑑 denotes shift duration. To calculate the expected
values of earnings and duration, driver 𝑖 consults their recollection
of comparable shifts. Among 𝑖’s previous shifts of type 𝑚𝑡 (day or
night) with earnings at least equal to 𝑟𝑡 and duration at least equal
to 𝑑𝑡 , similar ones are identified with the same values on demand
shock, day of the week, and rain. That is, all previous shifts similar
along these dimensions are identified and their shift earnings and
duration are averaged to obtain the expected value for the shift at
hand. If no previous shift has the same combination of demand
proxies, individual variables are removed in reverse order until a
recollection set of minimum size 𝑁 = 1 is found. For example, if
night shift 𝑠 takes place on a rainy Friday without demand shock but
𝑖 has only experienced sunny Fridays without demand shock, these
Fridays are used for comparison (rather than, say, rainy Saturdays)
because rain is the first variable to be ignored. In some rare cases,
there is no comparison set because no previous shift of the same type
was as long or as remunerative. In these cases, the expected values
are calculated as 𝐸𝑡[𝑑] = 𝑑𝑡 + 60 and 𝐸𝑡[𝑟] = 𝑟𝑡 + 60 × 𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 , where 𝑑𝑡
is measured in minutes. If 𝑈𝑇𝑡 > 𝐸𝑡[𝑈𝐶], the shift is predicted to
terminate after 𝑡, otherwise the procedure is repeated after the next
trip, 𝑡 + 1. If the predicted shift end is later than 24 hours after shift
beginning, the prediction is truncated at 24 hours.
S2: Reference Utility The second strategy considered here fol-
lows the same process as the neoclassical utility strategy but uses a
167
Chapter 4 Taxi Drivers’ Earnings and Shift Ends
different utility function to compute 𝑈𝑇 and 𝐸𝑡[𝑈𝐶]. The utility func-
tion used here is described by Crawford and Meng (2011) and based
on Köszegi and Rabin (2006). This function augments neoclassical
utility, which they refer to as consumption utility, by a gain/loss utility
that depends on targets for both shift earnings and shift duration,
as well as a parameter of loss aversion, , which reduces utility
when earnings are below the earnings target or hours are above the
duration target or both. In addition, a parameter  governs how
relevant gain/loss utility is relative to consumption utility.
According to this model, the termination utility is calculated as
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where 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑑𝑡 denote shift earnings and duration at the end of
trip 𝑡, respectively; 𝑅 and 𝐷 denote the earnings and duration
targets, respectively; and index 𝑖 is suppressed for brevity. Again,
this termination utility is compared with the continuation utility,
calculated as follows,
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where 𝐸𝑡[·] denotes the expected value after trip 𝑡, 𝑟 denotes shift
earnings, and 𝑑 denotes shift duration. To calculate the expected
values during each shift 𝑠, driver 𝑖 consults their recollection of
comparable shifts.
Both versions of utility theory follow the conventional economic
approach to decision modeling. Different attributes, here time and
money, are brought onto a common scale, utility, and can be traded
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off against one another. The exact trade-off is governed by a set of
parameters that capture different preferences. In this theory, decisions
respond to changes in demand if these changes are anticipated
through the expected values of shift earnings and shift length.
S3: Earnings Target The third strategy is the first interpretation
of a “raw” income target. In contrast to earlier decision models
inspired by the earnings target, this model defines the target on the
raw earnings scale, not on a utility scale. By implication, working
hours and earnings are incommensurable and cannot be traded off
against one another. The earnings target algorithm is defined as
follows.
Driver 𝑖 evaluates current shift earnings 𝑟𝑡 at the end of each trip
𝑡. If 𝑟𝑡 > 𝜌𝑖 , the shift is ended and the end time of 𝑡 is predicted to be
the shift end. Parameter 𝜌𝑖 is individual to each driver and estimated
from the data. If the predicted shift end is later than 24 hours after
shift beginning, the prediction is truncated at 24 hours.
Strategies S1 – S3 were derived from the existing literature on taxi
drivers’ shift decisions. To expand the set of strategies tested, we
generated additional satisficing strategies by varying the aspiration
variable, that is, the variable on which the aspiration level is defined.
Whereas the earnings target terminates shifts as soon as cumula-
tive shift earnings exceed their aspiration level, the following three
heuristics use time on shift, clock hour, or the hiatus between trips to
terminate a shift.
S4: Duration Target The fourth strategy considered here is the
duration target. This strategy corresponds to a driver with a fixed shift
duration planned at shift start, irrespective of information gathered
and demand observed during the shift. The duration target algorithm
is defined as follows.
Driver 𝑖 evaluates current shift duration 𝑑𝑡 at the end of each trip
𝑡. If 𝑑𝑡 > 𝛿𝑖 , the shift is ended and the end time of the previous trip
is predicted to be the shift end. Parameter 𝛿𝑖 is individual to each
driver and estimated from the data. If the predicted shift end is later
than 24 hours after shift beginning, the prediction is truncated at 24
hours.
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S5: Clock Target The fifth strategy considered here is the clock
target. Similar to the duration target, the clock target strategy makes
decisions based on time, but uses clock time rather than shift duration.
When shifts consistently start at the same time, the two strategies
lead to the same prediction. However, when shifts start at different
times, ending after a specific shift length implies different clock times.
The clock target algorithm is defined as follows.
Driver 𝑖 evaluates current clock time 𝑐𝑡 at the end of each trip 𝑡.
If 𝑐𝑡 > 𝜒𝑖 , the shift is ended and the end time of the previous trip
is predicted to be the shift end. Parameter 𝜒𝑖 is individual to each
driver and estimated from the data. If the predicted shift end is later
than 24 hours after shift beginning, the prediction is truncated at 24
hours.
S6: Hiatus Target The sixth and final strategy considered here
is the hiatus target. Whereas the hiatus heuristic described in the
previous section was defined by the hiatus between two purchases
of the same customer, the hiatus target uses the hiatus between two
subsequent trips, usually by different customers. The heuristic target
algorithm is defined as follows.
Driver 𝑖 evaluates the previous hiatus between two trips, ℎ𝑡 at
the end of each trip 𝑡. If ℎ𝑡 > 𝑖 , the shift is ended and the end
time of the previous trip is predicted to be the shift end. Parameter
𝑖 is individual to each driver and estimated from the data. If the
predicted shift end is later than 24 hours after shift beginning, the
prediction is truncated at 24 hours.
Strategies S3 to S6 are similar in structure but differ in their aspiration
variables. The choice of the aspiration variable can be regarded as
an expression of which goal the driver prioritizes. For example, an
earnings target promises a fixed income, whereas a duration target
promises a fixed shift length. Thus, a driver using a duration target
may be interpreted as valuing a daily routine more than earning a
fixed amount of income. Such drivers may have family obligations that
restrict them from extending their shifts beyond a particular duration.
With the exception of the hiatus target, the satisficing strategies
essentially implement simple goals independent of demand. In
contrast, it appears unrealistic that drivers have preferences over the
hiatus between trips. Instead, they may use waiting time as a signal
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of demand: When demand decreases relative to the number of active
taxis, waiting time should increase on average. The hiatus target
therefore is the only satisficing strategy that responds to changes in
demand.
To corroborate our selection of decision strategies, we conducted
a survey among taxi drivers operating in the Hamburg taxi market.
Drivers were recruited in two ways. First, taxi companies were
approached by email and asked to forward the survey to their em-
ployees. Second, taxi drivers were approached in person in Hamburg
on a sunny day in May outside the observation window of the data.
Participation in the survey was voluntary but incentivized with two
prizes of 100 EUR, awarded at random. Overall, 70 drivers par-
ticipated in the survey. Among other questions, they were asked
to verbalize their strategies for calling it a day. For 27 drivers, the
answers could not be classified because they were too unspecific (e.g.,
"too little demand") or because they referred to traffic and tiredness.
Because traffic is either idiosyncratic or correlates with clock hour,
these answers were ignored. The remaining answers were mapped
onto the strategies above, with 5 drivers mentioning target earnings,
6 drivers mentioning shift duration, 7 drivers mentioning clock hour,
and 16 drivers mentioning the hiatus as a cue. None of the drivers
verbalized the utility maximization strategy. In addition to verifying
the existing candidate strategies, our second goal was to elicit strate-
gies of which we had previously been unaware. Overall, 11 drivers
mentioned new cues. These strategies included a target number of
trips (1 driver), some form of minimum hourly wage (2 drivers), and
some form of minimum number of trips per hour (2 drivers). Five
drivers mentioned market saturation as a cue, mostly in the form of
long lines of cars at taxi stands. Despite these somewhat scattered
responses, it appears that there is no widely used strategy that our
analysis ignores.
4.4.2 Empirical Approach
The purpose of this analysis is to identify for each driver the decision
model that is most predictive of their observed shift ends. In several
respects our analysis differs from much of microeconomic analysis.
We therefore present the empirical approach of this analysis in some
detail and change the terminology from decision strategies to decision
models to underline the descriptive question addressed in this section.
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The empirical strategy in this section is an extension of that in the
preceding section. As before, we use a competitive test to find the
model yielding the best prediction for each shift. These predictions
are then aggregated to classify drivers by their overall most predictive
model. This approach does not require that the strategies are nested
within the same class of models, such as linear models. Instead,
models can differ in nature, provided they yield comparable outputs.
Algorithm 4.2 gives an overview of the testing procedure. To be
able to classify drivers independently, the competitive test is carried
out separately for each driver. As a first step, each shift is predicted
by all six models and the best-predicting model is found for each shift.
To this end, we employ 10-fold cross-validation. By this procedure,
the sample of 𝑁 shifts is divided into ten randomly composed folds
of (roughly) equal size 𝑁 𝑓 ≈ 𝑁10 (step 1). All six models are then
calibrated based on nine of these folds (step 2). For calibration, we
use a derivative-free minimization algorithm (Hooke & Jeeves, 1961)
that allows for a search of the best-fitting set of parameters within
given bounds. Whereas most parameters are left unconstrained, we
constrain the search space for all utility parameters to be positive and
the weight of gain-loss utility to be  < 1. The calibrated models are
used to calculate each model’s predictions for the tenth fold (steps
3–7). For each model, the mean squared errors in these predictions are
recorded (step 8). The procedure is performed ten times, each with a
different fold used for prediction. With this procedure, predictions
can be calculated for all shifts without fitting.
Calculating the mean squared error for the sequential data is not
straightforward. The predicted shift end can easily be computed
when it lies within the observed shift. Frequently, however, a given
model predicts that the driver continues beyond the observed shift
end, and after the shift ends, the models lack the cues they require
for a prediction. This is a typical problem of stopping decisions. Our
solution exploits the size of the data sample. Although driver 𝑖 ends
shift 𝑠, we observe other drivers’ trips in the aftermath of 𝑠. Although
we do not observe the full market, the portion we do observe reflects
variation in demand independently of 𝑖. In the absence of location
data, we assume that each of the subsequent trips taken by competing
drivers is equally likely to have been assigned to 𝑖, had the latter not
ended their shift. Under these assumptions, we construct “extended
shifts”, which are shifts amended by imputed trips from other drivers.
Specifically, for each shift 𝑠 we look at the final minute of the
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Algorithm 4.2
10-Fold Competitive Test of Models Predicting Shift Ends
1 forall shift type do
2 forall market do
3 foreach driver 𝑑 do
4 1. assign shifts randomly across ten folds;
5 foreach fold 𝑓 do
6 2. calibrate all models based on all folds except 𝑓 ;
7 foreach shift 𝑠 in 𝑓 do
8 3. record end of final observed trip in 𝑠 as actual end of 𝑠;
9 foreach version 𝑣 do
10 foreach model 𝑚 do
11 foreach trips 𝑡 do
12 4. use fitted models to calculate prediction;
13 if prediction is “continue” then
14 5. move to next 𝑡;
15 else
16 if end of 𝑡 is later than 24 hours after
beginning of s then
17 6a. use beginning of 𝑠 + 24 hours as
predicted end of 𝑠;
18 else
19 6b. record end of 𝑡 as predicted end
of 𝑠 for model 𝑚;
20 end
21 7. move to next model;
22 end
23 end




27 9. calculate root-mean squared residual across all 20 versions;
28 10. identify best-predicting model by smallest RMSR;
29 end
30 end
31 11. count for each model number of shifts it predicts best;
32 12. order models by count with 𝑚1 predicting most shifts and 𝑚6 the
fewest;
33 if count of 𝑚1 > 1.2× count of 𝑚2 then
34 13. classify 𝑑 as using 𝑚1;
35 else
36 14. leave 𝑑 unclassified;
37 end
38 end
39 15. count number of drivers for each model;
40 end
41 end
final trip and find all other drivers who fulfill three conditions: i)
They are currently on duty, ii) they are currently without passengers,
and iii) they complete at least one more trip during their current
shift. Of these drivers, we select one at random and impute their
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Figure 4.1: Construction of extended shifts: The shift of driver 𝑖 lasts from trips T1 to T5; at
the end of T5, drivers currently waiting for passengers are found and one of their next trips is
chosen at random (here of driver 𝑐) and imputed as the next trip of 𝑖; at the end of that imputed
trip, the procedure is repeated with drivers currently waiting. Note that driver 𝑥 is busy or off
duty at T6 and not considered, whereas driver 𝑦 is considered at T6 but was previously busy or
not on duty.
next trip as the next trip of 𝑠, including trip beginning, trip end, and
trip earnings. This procedure is repeated for the final minute of this
imputed trip until a total of fifty trips are imputed. The set of drivers
for which the trips are imputed varies over time, as different drivers
fulfill the above conditions at different points in time. Using this
procedure, which is depicted in Figure 4.1, we obtain hypothetical
trip sequences beyond observed shift ends. Because each of these
sequences consists of randomly imputed trips, the sequences beyond
the observed section are random themselves. For this reason, we
apply the selection procedure twenty times for each shift. The result is
that for each shift 𝑠 with 𝑛 observed trips, we obtain twenty versions
𝑠1 , 𝑠2 , ..., 𝑠20, each consisting of 𝑛 + 50 trips, the first 𝑛 of which are
equal, whereas the following 50 trips vary. These extended shifts
allow us to calculate predictions for all strategies beyond the observed
shift end by applying each decision model to all twenty versions of
each shift, and averaging the residuals in prediction (step 9). The
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Table 4.4
Classifications of Shifts and Drivers
All Drivers Single Drivers only
Shifts Drivers Shifts Drivers
Model Count Share Count Share Count Share Count Share
neoclassical 69,742 9.4 % 10 0.3 % 23,923 9.6 % 4 0.5 %
reference 57,569 7.7 % 1 <1.% 18,536 7.5 % 1 0.1 %
earnings 193,528 26 % 537 16.5 % 71,208 28.7 % 190 24.2 %
duration 231,738 31.2 % 1,432 44.1 % 70,503 28.4 % 224 28.6 %
clock 147,645 19.9 % 260 8 % 49,265 19.8 % 64 8.2 %
hiatus 43,361 5.8 % 5 0.2 % 15,016 6 % 1 0.1 %
unclassified — — 1,004 30.9 % — — 300 38.3 %
total 743,583 100 % 3,249 100 % 248,451 100 % 784 100 %
model with the lowest root-mean squared residual is then considered
the best predictive model for shift 𝑠 (step 10).
The results are aggregated to classify drivers by their most pre-
dictive decision model. To this end, for each driver 𝑑, the number of
shifts most accurately predicted by each of the six models is counted.
The first model, that is, the model that predicts the simple majority of
shifts, is then ranked as the best predicting model for 𝑑 (steps 11 and
12), provided the simple majority is decisive. To be decisive, the first
model needs to predict twenty percent more shifts than the second
model. We take this precaution to ensure that drivers for whom two
models predict roughly equally well remain unclassified (steps 13
and 14). Finally, classified drivers are counted (step 15).
4.4.3 Classification of Shifts and Drivers
We begin our presentation of results with the classification of shifts
and drivers. Table 4.4 gives an overview of these classifications
across all four samples we have analyzed separately. Starting with an
overview of shift classifications, we then proceed with a discussion
of driver classifications.
First, we focus on the classification of shifts. Columns 2 and 3
of Table 4.4 show the number of shifts best predicted by each of the
six models, as well as their share. The majority of shifts are best
predicted by the duration model, accounting for 31 percent of all
shifts, and also by the earnings model, accounting for 26 percent of
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shifts6. Because many drivers may need to adhere to a shift schedule,
we also counted the number of shifts driven by single drivers, who
are likely unconstrained by shift schedules. Columns 6 and 7 show
that the duration model accounts for a smaller percentage of shifts
but also that the majority of single-driver shifts are best predicted by
the duration and earnings models.
Of the remaining shifts, most were predicted by the clock model
and fewest by the hiatus model. Again, this result holds for both all
drivers and the subgroup of single drivers. Like the hiatus model,
both utility models account for at most 10 percent of all shifts. Between
them, the neoclassical utility model predicts somewhat more shifts
than the reference utility model. In contrast to the hiatus and utility
models, the clock model typically accounts for about 20 percent of
shifts. Overall, it appears that a distinction can be made between the
duration, earnings, and clock models jointly predicting around three
quarters of shifts and the hiatus and utility models predicting around
one quarter of shifts.
Next we examine the classification of drivers. To arrive at these
classifications, we calculated for each driver the percentage of shifts
best predicted by each of the six models. The vertical bars in Figure 4.2
show for a random sample of 50 drivers the range of these percentages.
The letters on top indicate the models predicting the highest number
of shifts, which we refer to as the first and second model, respectively.
The lower end of the line shows the percentage best predicted by
the last model. Differences between these two models are stark and
mostly above 25 percentage points.
Drivers were classified by their first model only if it predicted
20 percent — not percentage points — more shifts than the second
model; otherwise they were left unclassified. In Figure 4.2, the first
38 drivers were classified according to their first model, whereas
the remaining 12 drivers were left unclassified. For these drivers,
we deemed the evidence too weak for a classification. In Table 4.4,
columns 4 and 5 show the number and share of drivers classified by
each model. Around 30 percent of all drivers were left unclassified,
with a slightly higher percentage among single drivers.
6Note that shift classifications are not independent of drivers: By itself, each
shift end is consistent with all six models if model parameters could be chosen freely.
However, if each model’s parameter values are fixed for each driver, we can identify
for each shift the model yielding the best prediction. The counts of these models are
presented here.
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Figure 4.2: Percentages of shifts predicted by six models for random sample of 50 drivers;
letters indicate model with highest and second-highest number of shifts: neoclassical utility
(U), reference utility (R), earnings (E), duration (D), clock (C), hiatus (H); drivers classified by
their first model shown in black, unclassified drivers in gray.
Among those drivers we could classify, consider first the earnings
and duration models. Again, these two models jointly account for
the majority of drivers, including those left unclassified. By these
results, the duration model offers the widest description of drivers’
shift choices. Consider next the clock model, which accounts for
about 10 percent of all drivers. Together with the duration and
earnings models, the clock model accounts for around two thirds
of drivers. With around 30 percent unclassified, the hiatus model
and the utility model each accounts for a fraction of a percent of
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drivers. These results hold true in our subsample of single drivers,
although the duration model accounts for a smaller percentage of
drivers, indicating that part of its descriptive power may be due to
shift schedules. Overall, driver classifications therefore mirror the
dichotomy of shift classifications, with stronger divergence in the
performances of both groups of models.
Table 4.4 shows results aggregated across all drivers, ignoring
differences between day and night shifts and between the old and the
new market. In Appendix C we produce a more extended version
of Table 4.4 that reports results separately for the four samples
constructed by crossing shift type and market. Although there are
some differences, primarily between day and night drivers, the results
do not change qualitatively. In addition, we report more details on
the number of shifts consistent with driver classifications, on average
between 30 and 40 percent per driver, indicating that shift ends may
be best predicted using a combination of models. We therefore
examine the second model and find that for most drivers, the majority
of shifts are best predicted by the duration and earnings targets
but percentages vary. Finally, Appendix B reports histograms of
parameter estimates.
4.4.4 Aggregate Outcomes
Given the classifications of shifts and drivers above, we can compare
drivers’ aggregate outcomes stratified by their best predicting model.
We begin with a short discussion of the labor supply elasticity and
then turn to average hourly earnings.
To obtain the overall wage elasticity, we follow the IV approach
by Farber (2015) and regress ln(sdur), the natural logarithm of
shift earnings, on ln(searn/sdur), rain.d, saturday, and sunday
separately for day and night shifts. In addition, we add the variable
shock, a dummy indicating one of the demand shocks listed in Table
4.1. We use other drivers’ average hourly earnings on the same day
as an instrument for ln(searn/sdur). This approach is similar to
Farber’s approach, who used a non-overlapping sample to instrument
drivers’ wages in the remainder of his data set.
The results are shown in Table 4.5, with elasticity estimates of
−0.206 and −0.002 for day and night shifts, respectively. For day
drivers, we therefore find a negative wage elasticity, despite using
an instrumental variable. For night drivers, we find a wage elasticity
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Table 4.5
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply Across All Shifts
All Drivers Single Drivers
Variable Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value
Day Shifts
intercept 2.797 0.020 <0.001 2.597 0.034 <0.001
log wage −0.175 0.007 <0.001 −0.074 0.013 <0.001
rainy day −0.001 0.001 0.493 −0.004 0.002 0.090
Saturday −0.075 0.003 <0.001 −0.110 0.005 <0.001
Sunday −0.064 0.002 <0.001 −0.080 0.004 <0.001
shock −0.011 0.002 <0.001 −0.010 0.003 0.002
Night Shifts
intercept 2.062 0.018 <0.001 1.856 0.047 <0.001
log wage 0.045 0.006 <0.001 0.150 0.018 <0.001
rainy day −0.009 0.002 <0.001 −0.013 0.005 0.007
Saturday −0.037 0.003 <0.001 −0.176 0.008 <0.001
Sunday 0.086 0.003 <0.001 0.016 0.007 0.034
shock −0.004 0.002 0.072 −0.014 0.006 0.019
very close to zero, implying that drivers on average do not respond
to wage increases. The elasticities of single drivers are negative for
day shifts and positive for night shifts but small in magnitude.
With heterogeneous drivers, calculating elasticities across all
drivers may be misleading and our classification of drivers allows
for a more detailed examination. The estimates in Table 4.5 give an
aggregate summary across all drivers but also hide a considerable
amount of variation between them. To shed light on the relation
between best predicting model and demand elasticity, we can use
both the classifications of shifts and drivers. The former give a
complete picture, whereas the latter offer a clearer picture of the
relation between shift termination model and aggregate outcomes.
Table 4.6 reports both of these analyses.
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Table 4.6
Elasticities And Hourly Earnings by Model
Across Drivers Across Shifts
Earnings Earnings
Model Drivers Elasticity Mean SD Shifts Elasticity Mean SD
neoclassical 10 0.25 22.3 7.0 69,742 0.03 19.0 7.9
reference 1 −0.38 24.7 — 57,569 −0.23 19.4 7.4
earnings 537 −0.75 15.8 5.5 193,528 −0.89 17.5 7.1
duration 1,432 0.05 19.5 5.2 231,738 0.02 18.7 8.0
clock 260 0.09 20.6 5.1 147,645 0.11 18.5 7.4
hiatus 5 −0.08 22.7 8.1 43,361 0.03 16.6 9.7
Notes: Across drivers: hourly earnings averaged across consistent shifts and drivers,
hourly earnings SD gives SD across drivers, elasticity gives median elasticity estimate
from IV regression for each driver; across shifts: hourly earnings averaged across shifts
of the same strategy, elasticity obtained from regression using all shifts of the same
strategy; for brevity, no separate display for single drivers.
First, we estimate the elasticity separately for each driver by
applying the IV approach to those shifts that are consistent with the
driver’s classification. Column 3 of Table 4.6 reports these results,
stratified by model. As expected, the median elasticity of drivers best
predicted by the earnings target is negative. In contrast, the median
elasticity of drivers best predicted by the duration and clock targets
fluctuates around zero and is small in magnitude. This is consistent
with expectations, given that shifts in these models are terminated
independent of their profitability. Because drivers best predicted by
the utility and hiatus models are few in number, we refrain from
interpretations of their median elasticities.
In a second analysis, we apply the IV analysis to all shifts, irre-
spective of driver classifications; the results are shown in column
7 of Table 4.5. Again, we find a negative elasticity for shifts best
predicted by the earnings model, whereas those best predicted by
the duration and clock models are close to zero on the median. The
neoclassical utility model yields an average elasticity parameter of
zero, but averages for both utility models differ considerably from
the first analysis. We therefore suspect that these results primarily
reflect between-driver variability, as these models typically predict
only few shifts per driver. For brevity, both of these analyses have
ignored differences between day and night shifts and between the old
and the new market. Appendix D reports classifications of drivers
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separately for these four subsamples.
One final issue concerns the profitability of different models,
as measured by the hourly earnings they generated. Mean hourly
earnings across drivers are given in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.6.
Drivers best predicted by the earnings model exhibit the lowest
mean earnings, whereas those best predicted by the hiatus model
exhibit the highest. Columns 8 and 9 of Table 4.6 report means
across shifts rather than drivers. By comparison, differences between
models are somewhat smaller but the earnings model yields, on
average, lower hourly earnings than the duration model. Similarly,
the heuristic models appear to yield somewhat lower mean earnings
than the utility models. At the same time, these differences are
small compared with the variation within each class. For a more
detailed illustration, Appendix D reports kernel density plots of mean
hourly earnings separately for day and night shifts in the old and
new market.
4.4.5 Conclusion: Duration and Earnings Models Most Predic-
tive
The second analysis demonstrates the inability of utility theory to
consistently predict drivers’ behavior. Although both utility models
could predict sizable portions of shift ends, these shifts are spread
across many drivers rather than concentrated on drivers who can
be described consistently by these models. Instead, those models
of drivers as pursuing simple aspirations on earnings or time are
best at predicting drivers, despite the fact that these models assume
drivers to have constant aspiration levels within each sample of
shifts, irrespective of predictable demand shocks. In particular, many
drivers are best predicted by some combination of earnings and
duration targets. We hypothesize that the individual mix depends on
personal circumstances. Across models, wage elasticities, with few
exceptions, conformed to expectations. The distributions of average
hourly earnings are very similar across models, with heuristic models
exhibiting slightly lower modes than utility models in some samples.
4.5 Discussion
This paper set out to predict taxi drivers’ earnings and shift ends. For
both analyses, we used competitive out-of-sample tests. As we have
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argued, this methodology differs from conventional microeconomic
analysis but has desirable properties for empirical work. It directly
tests models’ predictive powers rather than their abilities to adjust
to existing data. Furthermore, the competitive approach enables a
comparison of different, non-nested models, provided they work on
the same input and yield comparable outputs. This methodology has
resulted in a picture of taxi drivers’ choices that differs from earlier
results in several important ways.
Our first analysis found that a variety of statistical models can
hardly predict individual drivers’ hourly earnings from readily ob-
servable variables. Unless we are willing to assume that drivers’
predictive talents exceed the power of these models, we may accept
the conclusion that drivers’ earnings in the next hour appear largely
random. These findings contradict those by Farber (2015) and lead to
the divergent conclusion that even in reference utility models that
set their reference point at the expected level of earnings, there is
ample room for the reference point to affect decisions. However,
the level of predictability is so low that behavioral models relying
on expected earnings, such as neoclassical and reference-dependent
utility models, appear unfit for the task at hand. This conclusion is
conditioned on the assumption that our set of considered covariates
is exhaustive and that drivers do not have access to information
beyond these variables. In practice, of course, additional variables
may exist that drivers use for making predictions. Such variables
include information on the timing of specific events, such as concerts
or sports events, or the number of other taxis on shift. That being
said, the small progress made with the existing set of variables leaves
us skeptical that extensions will lead to improvements so large as to
qualitatively change our conclusion that predictions of earnings are
difficult in practice and prone to error. Because the merit of utility
theory is typically seen in its assumed rationality, our findings furnish
no theoretical reasons to assume a priori that utility theory describes
drivers’ behavior better than any other theory.
Our second analysis found most drivers to be best described by
one of three satisficing models that set aspiration levels on earnings,
shift duration, or clock time. These aspiration levels are fixed in
the sense that drivers may set different aspiration levels for day and
night shifts but ignore other factors. Camerer and colleagues (1997)
referred to such models as the “strong form of the target income
hypothesis,” emphasizing their inflexibility. However, given the
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small predictive power of observables such as weather or demand
shocks, we decided to test models with fixed aspiration levels. These
inflexible models yielded considerably better predictions than both
utility models we tested.
From these results, we cannot conclude that drivers actually use
one model rather than another. Instead, there are two alternatives.
First, it is possible that they use a model not tested here. The results of
our analysis are namely relative to the selection of candidate models:
Although we have made an effort to select promising and relevant
candidates, we cannot exclude the existence of better predicting
models from the universe of countless possible models. Second, it is
theoretically possible that drivers use one of the utility models but
their behavior is better predicted by the satisficing models because
of the latter’s lower exposure to variance. Despite these caveats, our
analysis has demonstrated a considerable predictive advantage of
satisficing models over utility models.
The results of this study appertain to the Hamburg taxi market,
and generalizations must be made with caution. Markets differ
along several dimensions, including demand patterns and drivers’
goals and working conditions. Our findings indicate that drivers
use a set of heuristics that are assumably selected not at random but
according to the specifics of each decision environment. For example,
Farber (2015) reports positive wage elasticities for the majority of NYC
taxi drivers, indicating that differing conditions lead drivers to use
different strategies in New York and Hamburg7. Therefore, similar
analyses of other markets, for taxis or otherwise, would be more
appropriate than over-generalizations beyond the domain studied
here.
Our findings also imply that positive elasticities are more difficult
to attain than is commonly understood. The inaccuracy of predicted
earnings virtually prohibits any judgements of future earnings as
being worth the time or not. To illustrate, consider a taxi driver on
a small island who operates one of few taxis that bring day tourists
from the harbor into town and back. The number of tourists varies
with a few observables such as weather, day of the week, and time of
the year. Because day tourists arrive by ferry, the driver can use the
7Similarly, Fehr and Goette (2007) report positive wage elasticities for bike messen-
gers in their experiment. Unlike Hamburg taxi drivers, who spend most of their shifts
waiting for passengers, the bike messengers in their study have considerable control
over their earnings and the effort they exert.
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ferry schedule to predict the timing of passengers across the day and
terminate the shift when expected earnings drop too low. Therefore,
the driver can focus work on the most profitable hours and attain a
positive elasticity. The conditions for Hamburg taxi drivers are quite
different. Trips do not necessarily go from harbor to town and vice
versa but vary in length and profitability, and timing of passengers
cannot be looked up on a schedule. Individual earnings therefore
not only depend on overall demand but vary along many factors,
including location and the labor supply of other drivers. Predicting
market averages therefore helps little in finding the best point during
the day to terminate the shift. Although such points may exist, drivers
may find themselves unable to identify them.
Nonetheless, positive elasticities are entirely possible. For ex-
ample, a driver may decide a priori to work three hours a night
during the week and six hours on profitable weekend nights. Pre-
sumably, this simple strategy generates a positive wage elasticity
and illustrates how the wage elasticity is also affected by shift choice
and shift beginnings. Indeed, other strategies are conceivable that
can generate positive elasticities, such as the hiatus heuristic, which
seeks to detect signals of decreasing demand. However, our findings
suggest that substantially positive elasticities are difficult to attain
based on prediction of future earnings.
The emergent picture of the taxi market is more complicated that
initially assumed by Camerer and colleagues. They chose the taxi
market for its variability in daily earnings, which could be used to
estimate the wage elasticity. However, this plan ignores the fact that
the variability in earnings appears to be dominated by factors not
readily observable, which makes positive elasticities difficult to attain
on the basis of predictions of earnings. Under these circumstances, it
appears misguided to assume a positive wage elasticity to be rational
and view a negative wage elasticity as evidence against neoclassical
theory.
In addition, the focus on elasticities can be inadequate for other rea-
sons. Consider again the driver working three hours on weeknights
and six on weekend nights. If the same driver were to stop working
on weeknights altogether, the elasticity would likely decrease, seeing
as there are fewer comparatively short and unprofitable shifts. At the
same time, average wages would likely increase. This discrepancy
illustrates that evaluating drivers according to a single indicator can
be misleading and does not do justice to the intricacies of preferential
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choice. Given the lack of evidence that violations of coherence, the
classical criterion for economic rationality, impair choices (Arkes et al.,
2016), we advocate a more comprehensive benchmark of ecological
rationality that judges decision strategies by their ability to reach
defined goals. By this account, an analysis of the rationality of drivers’
strategies requires detailed data on drivers’ goals. Until such data is
available for analysis, assertions of rationality remain speculative.
Finally, our analysis has shown the limits of conventional decision
modeling. One of the reasons the income-target hypothesis has been
criticized is the counter-intuitive idea that drivers would prefer a
specific income. On the one hand, why would income beyond a
target be less valuable than below the target? On the other hand, the
conventional approach models deviations from neoclassical theory
through modifications of the preference structure. In this article, we
have described an alternative explanation. By this hypothesis, drivers
have no particular preference for any given amount of earnings.
However, the uncertainty of their decision environment prevents
them from calculating optimal paths of action. For that reason, they
rely on a “toolbox” of satisficing strategies. The selection of the
aspiration variable can be regarded as an expression of which goal
the driver deems most important. Yet the aspiration level is not
necessarily an expression of preference but the value that yields the
best trade-off of time and earnings in the driver’s specific decision
environment. The empirical challenge lies in understanding the
circumstances under which such strategies are rational.
185
Chapter 4 Taxi Drivers’ Earnings and Shift Ends
Appendix A Plots of Shift Beginning s
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Appendix B Parameter Estimates
The classifications reported in Section 4.4 rest crucially on the plausible
parametrization of the six models. We therefore include a brief
description of the estimated parameter values. Although each model
was evaluated for each driver, we examine only drivers we could
classify and for each of them, we examine only shifts that are consistent
with the driver’s classification. These parameters are estimated ten
times per driver, once for each of the ten folds across which the
driver’s shifts were distributed. For each driver we have computed
the median parameter value across these ten folds. The distributions
of these median values are shown in Figures ?? to ??, respectively.
We display them separately for day and night shifts and for the old
and new markets, that is, before and after the fare increase and the
introduction of the minimum wage.
In our implementation, neoclassical utility theory has two free
parameters that were estimated from the data. First, the disutility of
work was restricted in fitting to 0 ≤  and was estimated for the 6
day drivers in the new market at values between 0.328 and 1.260 and
for the 6 drivers in the old market at values between 0.496 and 3.124.
Values for night drivers ranged from 0.059 to 1.597 for both markets.
Second, the wage elasticity parameter was restricted in fitting to 0 ≤ 𝜌
and was estimated for most drivers across markets and shift types
above one. However, because there were few drivers best described
by the neoclassical utility model, these results cannot be used to infer
representative parameter estimates. Similarly, there were fewer than
5 drivers best described by the reference utility model across all four
samples; we refer the reader to Figures ?? to ?? for distributions of its
parameters.
We now turn to the four satisficing models, each of which has one
parameter only. For day drivers whose shift ends are best predicted
by the earnings model, the parameter estimates follow a bell-shaped
distribution, irrespective of old or new market. The central 60 percent
of drivers between the 20𝑡ℎ and 80𝑡ℎ percentiles had estimated targets
between 112 EUR and 190 EUR. For night drivers, the distribution was
flatter with 60 percent of drivers estimated to have targets between
90 EUR and 197 EUR. Parameter estimates for drivers best predicted
by the duration model followed a bell-shaped distribution with 60
percent of estimates between 446 and 603 minutes for day drivers
and between 406 and 559 minutes for night drivers, irrespective of
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the market. For day drivers best predicted by the clock model, 60
percent of targets were estimated between 1pm and 8pm, with no
apparent differences between old and new market. In contrast, 60
percent of night drivers had targets estimated between 9pm and 6am,
again with no apparent differences between the two markets. For
those day drivers best predicted by the hiatus model, 60 percent of
drivers had estimated targets between 47 and 63 minutes. Similarly,
60 percent of night drivers had estimated targets between 34 and 49
minutes..
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Figure 4.B: Histograms of median parameter estimates for old market (gray) and new market
(black)
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Figure 4.B (cont.): Histograms of median parameter estimates for old market (gray) and new
market (black)
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Figure 4.B (cont.): Histograms of median parameter estimates for old market (gray) and new
market (black)
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Figure 4.B (cont.): (Histograms of median parameter estimates for old market (gray) and new
market (black)
C Shift and Driver Classifications in Detail
Appendix C Shift and Driver Classifications in Detail
Here, we offer more details on the classification of shifts and drivers.
Table 4.C gives an extended version of Table 4.4 and reports classifi-
cations stratified by shift type and market. Shift classification appear
robust across all subsamples, with only minor changes. Driver classi-
fications were carried out separately for each of the four subsamples,
implying that drivers may count multiple times if they fall into multi-
ple samples. Unclassified drivers remain stable at around 30 percent.
Overall, the duration model accounts for slightly more drivers among
night shifts than day shifts, but this conclusion does not hold for
single drivers. Difference between the old and the new market are
minor.
Table 4.C also shows the absolute number of shifts consistent
with their classification. These numbers are considerably lower than
the overall absolute number of shifts best predicted by each of the
six models, as shown in columns 2 and 5. This discrepancy is not
surprising for two reasons. First, for each model, the total number
of shifts include shifts of drivers that we could not classify. Second,
there is no driver for whom all shifts are best predicted by the same
model, so for each driver there are shifts inconsistent with the driver’s
classification. Indeed, Figure 4.2 illustrated that the first model rarely
predicts more than 50 percent of shifts, indicating only a moderate
level of consistency among drivers.
To assess consistency, we have added in parentheses to columns 4
and 7 the average of the share of consistent shifts among all shifts.
Across all samples of drivers, consistency is around 40 percent for the
goal models and between 30 and 35 percent for the utility models.
There are several reasons for this finding. First, a larger number
of models tested implies that — even by chance — percentages for
individual models are reduced. Second, the nature of observational
data implies that many personal constraints are unobserved, such as
appointments or days with lack of motivation. Such constraints affect
shift ends irrespective of the driver’s strategy. Third, we hypothesize
that many drivers use different strategies in parallel. These drivers
predominantly use one strategy but change strategies in some regular
fashion. Consider, for instance, a father who needs to pick up his
children from sports every Tuesday and Friday at 6pm and is best
predicted by the clock model for those days only.
If drivers use strategies in parallel, their second models deserve
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Table 4.C
Classifications of Shifts and Drivers By Market and Shift
All Drivers Single Drivers only
Drivers Drivers
Model Shifts Count Consistent Shifts Count Consistent
Day Shifts in Old Market
neoclassical utility 16,225 (8 %) 4 (0 %) 168 (35 %) 6,336 (9 %) 1 (0 %) 60 (36 %)
reference utility 15,171 (8 %) 3 (0 %) 93 (29 %) 5,625 (8 %) 1 (0 %) 16 (27 %)
earnings 55,124 (28 %) 360 (23 %) 17,011 (42 %) 21,216 (30 %) 130 (28 %) 7,051 (43 %)
duration 61,059 (31 %) 554 (36 %) 29,795 (42 %) 20,906 (29 %) 119 (25 %) 7,470 (39 %)
clock 38,317 (19 %) 149 (10 %) 7,084 (41 %) 13,460 (19 %) 40 (9 %) 2,412 (38 %)
hiatus 10,836 (6 %) 6 (0 %) 184 (40 %) 4,155 (6 %) 3 (1 %) 121 (38 %)
unclassified — 484 (31 %) — — 175 (37 %) —
total 196,732 1,560 54,335 71,698 469 17,130
Night Shifts in Old Market
neoclassical utility 17,142 (11 %) 16 (1 %) 462 (33 %) 4,092 (11 %) 6 (2 %) 135 (31 %)
reference utility 12,092 (8 %) 2 (0 %) 48 (29 %) 2,556 (7 %) 2 (1 %) 48 (29 %)
earnings 36,880 (24 %) 239 (16 %) 8,875 (43 %) 9,762 (27 %) 89 (26 %) 3,613 (44 %)
duration 48,125 (31 %) 614 (41 %) 27,858 (40 %) 9,898 (27 %) 85 (25 %) 3,916 (37 %)
clock 31,955 (21 %) 182 (12 %) 6,713 (40 %) 7,711 (21 %) 48 (14 %) 1,958 (38 %)
hiatus 9,258 (6 %) 4 (0 %) 96 (35 %) 2,350 (6 %) 2 (1 %) 42 (34 %)
unclassified — 423 (29 %) — — 105 (31 %) —
total 155,452 1,480 44,052 36,369 337 9,712
Day Shifts in New Market
neoclassical utility 18,013 (8 %) 6 (0 %) 410 (34 %) 7,920 (9 %) 3 (1 %) 226 (37 %)
reference utility 16,501 (7 %) 2 (0 %) 49 (30 %) 6,840 (7 %) 1 (0 %) 38 (31 %)
earnings 60,450 (27 %) 348 (22 %) 17,026 (41 %) 26,716 (29 %) 144 (26 %) 8,338 (42 %)
duration 70,350 (32 %) 568 (36 %) 34,965 (42 %) 26,959 (29 %) 144 (26 %) 10,231 (39 %)
clock 43,658 (20 %) 125 (8 %) 6,995 (41 %) 18,223 (20 %) 45 (8 %) 2,904 (40 %)
hiatus 12,492 (6 %) 9 (1 %) 333 (35 %) 5,215 (6 %) 3 (1 %) 161 (37 %)
unclassified — 515 (33 %) — — 206 (38 %) —
total 221,464 1,573 59,778 91,873 546 21,898
Night Shifts in New Market
neoclassical utility 18,362 (11 %) 14 (1 %) 550 (31 %) 5,575 (11 %) 5 (1 %) 205 (32 %)
reference utility 13,805 (8 %) 2 (0 %) 64 (30 %) 3,515 (7 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %)
earnings 41,074 (24 %) 258 (18 %) 10,640 (42 %) 13,514 (28 %) 102 (26 %) 5,194 (44 %)
duration 52,204 (31 %) 608 (42 %) 30,665 (40 %) 12,740 (26 %) 103 (26 %) 5,178 (37 %)
clock 33,715 (20 %) 153 (10 %) 5,986 (39 %) 9,871 (20 %) 55 (14 %) 2,419 (38 %)
hiatus 10,775 (6 %) 15 (1 %) 474 (35 %) 3,296 (7 %) 6 (2 %) 175 (32 %)
unclassified — 414 (28 %) — — 123 (31 %) —
total 169,935 1,464 48,379 48,511 394 13,171
closer examination. Thus far, our most striking conclusion has been
that the majority of drivers are best described by the earnings and
duration models. Indeed, of all 1,076 day drivers in the old market we
could classify, only 12 had neither of the two models among the first
two, and of the 914 best predicted by either of the two models, 624 had
the respective other model as their second one. These proportions are
similar for the other three samples, although only about half of the
night drivers best predicted by either the earnings or duration model
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has both model among the first two8. Taken together, the first and
second model account for about two thirds of the shifts completed by
drivers on average.
Next we turn to overlaps between the four samples examined
separately so far, beginning with the overlap between day and night
drivers. In total,1,054 drivers had sufficiently many day and night
shifts to fall into both our samples and for 355 of them, day shifts are
best predicted by the duration model. For 147 of these drivers, night
shifts were also best predicted by the duration model, with night
parameter values on average 4 percent below their day counterparts.
For 54 drivers, in contrast, night shifts were best predicted by the
earnings model, and for 97 drivers, night shifts could not be classified.
Consider next the overlap between drivers in the old and new
markets. In total, 1,411 drivers had a sufficient number of shifts in the
old and new market to fall into both of our samples. For 393 of them,
shifts in the old market were best predicted by the duration model
and for 401 of those, shifts across both markets were best predicted
by that model. On average, parameter values for the new market
were 0.3 percent lower than for the old market. In contrast, for 52
drivers, night shifts were best predicted by the earnings model and
for 148 drivers, night shifts could not be classified.
8Specifically, for day drivers in the new market/night drivers in the old mar-
ket/night drivers in the new market, we find that 22/18/20 drivers out of 1,058/
1,057/ 1,050 had neither the duration nor the earnings model among the first two and
of the 916/853/866 drivers best predicted by either the earnings or duration model,
594/434/474 drivers had both models among their first two.
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Appendix D Aggregate Outcomes in Detail
Table 4.D is an extension of Table 4.6 and reports elasticity estimates
and mean earnings stratified by shift type and market. Differences
between subsamples are large for the utility and hiatus models that
account for very few drivers only. For the three most predictive
models, median elasticity estimates of drivers are fairly stable: The
median for drivers best predicted by the earnings target consistently
falls between −1 and −1 but fluctuates around zero for the duration
and clock models. These conclusions also hold for elasticity estimates
across shifts. For the earnings model, we find a moderate increase
from the old market to the new and for the duration model, we find
slightly more positive elasticities for night than for day shifts, but
these remain close to zero. Estimates for the utility and the hiatus
models fluctuate considerably, strengthening our suspicion that these
results are strongly affected by between-driver variance.
Table 4.D also reports mean hourly earnings across the four
subsamples. Overall, hourly earnings tend to be higher during night
shifts than day shifts. Nonetheless, we find only minor differences
between mean earnings of different models — between day and
night shifts and between the old and the new market. As before, the
earnings model consistently exhibits the lowest mean hourly earnings
among the three best predicting models, sometimes the lowest overall.
Calculated across shifts, the utility models exhibit somewhat higher
earnings than other models, but standard deviations remain large. For
a better illustration of differences, Figure 4.D shows the kernel density
estimates of the distribution of earnings across drivers predicted by
the earnings and duration models in gray and of those predicted by
the utility model with highest mean earnings in black. Across all four
subsamples, differences between the models exist but appear small
in comparison with the variance within each group of drivers.
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Table 4.D
Elasticities And Hourly Earnings by Model By Market and Shift
Across Drivers Across Shifts
Earnings Earnings
Model Drivers Elasticity Mean SD Shifts Elasticity Mean SD
Day Shifts in Old Market
neoclassical utility 4 −0.27 18.5 3.0 16,225 −0.23 16.0 6.9
reference utility 3 −0.90 15.3 5.0 15,171 −0.32 16.5 6.4
earnings target 360 −0.66 15.1 5.1 55,124 −0.72 16.0 6.3
duration target 554 0.00 16.0 4.8 61,059 −0.01 15.8 6.6
clock target 149 0.00 18.3 4.7 38,317 0.04 16.3 6.4
hiatus target 6 −0.04 16.3 4.0 10,836 0.05 14.9 7.4
Night Shifts in Old Market
neoclassical utility 16 0.19 25.1 3.2 17,142 0.27 19.9 7.5
reference utility 2 2.06 13.1 4.6 12,092 0.00 20.4 7.2
earnings target 239 −0.72 14.1 5.5 36,880 −0.68 17.6 7.2
duration target 614 0.11 20.5 5.0 48,125 0.14 19.7 8.3
clock target 182 0.26 19.9 5.0 31,955 0.39 19.2 7.4
hiatus target 4 1.30 19.1 6.5 9,258 0.67 16.6 7.9
Day Shifts in New Market
neoclassical utility 6 1.15 21.6 6.4 18,013 0.03 18.1 7.5
reference utility 2 −0.38 21.4 — 16,501 −0.38 18.6 6.8
earnings target 348 −0.86 16.6 6.0 60,450 −1.01 17.4 6.7
duration target 568 −0.01 18.5 4.8 70,350 0.01 17.9 6.9
clock target 125 0.09 20.5 5.8 43,658 0.13 17.9 6.8
hiatus target 9 −1.40 17.6 3.8 12,492 0.07 16.3 7.5
Night Shifts in New Market
neoclassical utility 14 0.43 23.2 6.7 18,362 0.33 21.7 8.3
reference utility 2 0.60 20.5 — 13,805 −0.04 22.6 8.0
earnings target 258 −0.83 17.1 7.1 41,074 −0.95 19.6 8.0
duration target 608 0.11 23.0 5.3 52,204 0.14 22.3 8.9
clock target 153 0.03 21.2 5.8 33,715 0.32 21.1 8.2
hiatus target 15 0.01 20.5 5.7 10,775 0.23 18.8 14.0
Notes: Across drivers: hourly earnings averaged across consistent shifts and drivers,
hourly earnings SD gives SD across drivers, elasticity gives median elasticity estimate
from IV regression for each driver; across shifts: hourly earnings averaged across shifts of
the same strategy, elasticity obtained from regression using all shifts of the same strategy;
for brevity, no separate display for single drivers.
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Figure 4.D: Plots of kernel density estimates for distribution of mean hourly shift earnings for
earnings model (gray, solid), duration model (gray, dashed), and the utility model with highest
mean earnings (black); includes all shifts, rare outliers above 60 EUR excluded.
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